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“O you who have believed, be persistently standing firm in justice, witnesses for Allah, even 
if it be against yourselves or parents and relatives. Whether one is rich or poor, Allah is more 
worthy of both.” Surat An-Nisa 4:135.  
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ABSTRACT 
In 2015, the National Anti-Corruption Commission (Nazaha) conducted a survey to assess 
corruption in Saudi Arabia. From this survey, two main findings deserve to be highlighted. First, 
the survey reveals that the practice of wasta was the most prevalent corrupt practice in Saudi 
society, constituting about 62 percent of such practices. This finding shows that it is essential to 
examine such a practice not only as a legal issue, but also as a social issue. Accordingly, the first 
part of this dissertation is devoted to providing a legal and social analysis of the practice of 
wasta. Another significant finding of the Nazaha survey is that around 81 percent of respondents 
attributed the prevalence of corruption in Saudi Arabia to the complexity of procedures and the 
outdated nature of the laws. In light of this finding, the latter part of this dissertation undertakes 
an evaluation of the Anti-Bribery Law, which is one of the main legal instruments to fight 
corruption, and other legal provisions that intersect with it in order to highlight issues which may 
hinder the application of the Anti-Bribery Law and which consequently constitute legal factors 
that promote corruption.   
 
  
  vii 
Table of Contents 
Dedication ............................................................................................................................... iv 
Acknowledgments ................................................................................................................... v 
Abstract ................................................................................................................................... vi 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 1 
Chapter One: Corruption in General ................................................................................... 6 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 6 
A. Definition and Related Issues ......................................................................................................6 
B. Classification of Corruption ......................................................................................................11 
1. Political Corruption v. Bureaucratic Corruption ...............................................................11 
2. Private Corruption v. Collective Corruption .....................................................................13 
3. Redistributive Corruption v. Extractive Corruption ..........................................................13 
C. Forms of Corrupt Practices ......................................................................................................14 
1. Bribery ...............................................................................................................................15 
2. Embezzlement and Fraud ..................................................................................................15 
3. Extortion ............................................................................................................................16 
4. Abuse of Power ..................................................................................................................16 
D. Causes and Consequences of Corruption ................................................................................17 
1. Political Explanation ..........................................................................................................18 
2. Cultural Explanation ..........................................................................................................22 
3. Economic Explanations .....................................................................................................26 
4. Legal Explanations ............................................................................................................30 
E. Problems in Fighting Corruption .............................................................................................34 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 38 
Chapter Two: Background: Islamic Criminal Law .......................................................... 39 
Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 39 
A. The Sources of Islamic Law ......................................................................................................40 
1. Primary Sources .................................................................................................................41 
2. Secondary Sources .............................................................................................................46 
B. Islamic Criminal Legislation .....................................................................................................49 
1. The Classification of Crimes in Islamic Criminal Legislation ..........................................50 
2. The Legal Consequences of Classification ........................................................................55 
3. Characteristic Features of Islamic Criminal Justice System ..............................................57 
As a consequence of this religious character,  .................................................................... 58 
C. Corruption in Islamic Law ........................................................................................................60 
1. Bribery ...............................................................................................................................61 
2. Nepotism and Intercession (shafa’ah) ...............................................................................63 
D. Islamic Mechanisms of Combating Corruption ......................................................................66 
1. The Internal Mechanisms ..................................................................................................66 
2. The External Mechanisms .................................................................................................67 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 68 
Chapter Three: Background: Saudi Arabian Law ............................................................ 70 
Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 70 
  viii 
A. The Saudi Criminal Justice System ..........................................................................................70 
1. The Criminal Judicial System ............................................................................................73 
2. Jurisdiction .........................................................................................................................75 
3. Criminal Procedures ..........................................................................................................76 
B. The Historical Development of Laws .......................................................................................77 
C. The Saudi Legal System in the Twenty-First Century ...........................................................83 
D. Corruption in Saudi Arabia ......................................................................................................86 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 89 
Chapter Four: Corruption and Saudi Arabian Society .................................................... 90 
Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 90 
A. Societies and Corruption ...........................................................................................................90 
B. Saudi Society in Context ............................................................................................................98 
1. History ...............................................................................................................................98 
2. Culture .............................................................................................................................102 
3. Social Stratification .........................................................................................................107 
C. The Application of Social Psychology to Saudi Arabian Society .........................................115 
1. Ibn Khaldun’s Analysis ...................................................................................................115 
2. Power and Corruption ......................................................................................................117 
3. Corruption and the Role of Intergroup Bias and the Culture of Collectivism .................127 
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 138 
Chapter Five: Wasta in Saudi Arabia ............................................................................... 140 
Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 140 
A. Wasta and Similar Concepts ...................................................................................................140 
B. The Background and Evolution of Wasta in Saudi Arabia ..................................................149 
C. Is Wasta an Act of Corruption? When and How? Legal or Moral? ...................................160 
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 174 
Chapter Six: The Saudi Anti-Bribery Law ...................................................................... 175 
Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 175 
A. The Saudi Anti-Corruption Legal Framework .....................................................................175 
B. General Legal Analysis ............................................................................................................179 
1. Bribery Offense in Anti-Bribery Law ..............................................................................186 
2. Punishments .....................................................................................................................190 
3. The Effective Regret Defense ..........................................................................................191 
4. Rewards ...........................................................................................................................192 
C. Classifications of the Crimes ...................................................................................................193 
1. The Offering of Bribery ...................................................................................................193 
2. Knowingly Enjoying a Benefit Resulting from Bribery ..................................................195 
3. Gratuity ............................................................................................................................197 
4. The Offer and the Acceptance of Wasta ..........................................................................199 
5. Trade in Influence ............................................................................................................200 
6. The Use of Force and the Threatening of a Public Official .............................................202 
7. Following up on a case being processed outside the public official’s authority:  being an 
“expediter” ........................................................................................................................................203 
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 205 
  ix 
Chapter Seven: Evaluation of the Framework of Anti-Bribery Law ............................ 206 
Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 206 
A. The Liability of Legal Persons ................................................................................................206 
B. The Wasta Provision ................................................................................................................210 
C. Immunity ...................................................................................................................................216 
D. Penalties and Rewards .............................................................................................................219 
E. Protection of Whistleblowers and Witnesses .........................................................................223 
F. The Jurisdiction of the Anti-Bribery Law ..............................................................................227 
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 232 
Chapter Eight: Fighting Corruption a Different Way .................................................... 234 
Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 234 
A. Nudges .......................................................................................................................................234 
B. Simplification of the Procedures and the Implementation of E-Government ....................240 
C. The Reform of Anti-Bribery Jurisdiction ..............................................................................246 
1. General View of the Jurisdiction of Anti-Bribery Law ...................................................246 
2. Bribery of Foreign Public Officials .................................................................................247 
3. Private-to-Private Bribery ................................................................................................251 
D. The Role of Criminal Law in Preventing Corruption ..........................................................256 
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 263 
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 265	
  1 
INTRODUCTION 
As the largest global supplier of oil, Saudi Arabia saw almost continuous economic 
expansion in the last half of the twentieth century, an expansion which has continued in the 
twenty-first. Since King Abdullah ascended the throne in 2005, Saudi Arabia has made 
significant economic improvement. In that same year, it joined the World Trade Organization, 
which has attracted a number of international and foreign investors to expand their business in 
the Kingdom. Even before that, in 2001, the Saudi government began establishing a number of 
industrial cities (modon) around the country. It can be said that Saudi Arabia has a new economic 
strategy for the twenty-first century aimed at expanding and liberalizing the economy.  
This seemed successful until 2009, when a flood struck Jeddah City and many other cities 
in Makkah Province, leaving some 500 dead and thousands missing. Afterward, it was revealed 
that the casualties, as well as the major financial losses, were due to unethical practices in the 
awarding and execution of construction contracts. A similar but even worse disaster occurred in 
2011. These two incidents brought the issue of corruption to the fore.  
This has led the Saudi government to establish the National Anti-Corruption Commission 
(Nazaha), which, along with other authorized governmental bodies, is charged with investigating 
the source of the corruption and with preventing such corruption in the future. Though the 
Commission and other authorities have had their achievements, this did not prevent the 
disastrous flooding that hit Riyadh, the capital, in 2013. This series of events indicates that there 
are still more difficulties and challenges facing the Nazaha and other authorized governmental 
bodies that prevent them from getting to the heart of the issue.  
Although there are articles and books that have addressed the issue of corruption in Saudi 
Arabia, most of these works do not consider the issue more holistically. Instead, they tend to 
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view corruption as the result of government practices, rather than examining the legal and 
cultural system that allows such corruption to arise. Cultural and legal structures lie at the root of 
this issue, and only by addressing these can the problem of corruption be reduced significantly.  
Accordingly, this dissertation sheds light on wasta as a socially promoted corrupt 
practice, in addition to examining the Saudi Anti-Bribery Law and related aspects within the 
Saudi legal framework as legal issues. It seeks to argue that combating corruption may not be so 
much an issue of enforcing anti-corruption laws as an issue of discovering the social and legal 
factors that hinder the enforcement of the legal provisions in the first place—although this cannot 
be understood as implying that enforcement issues are of no account.  
In terms of the social factors that contribute to corruption, it needs to be said that Saudi 
society does not promote bribery; it does, however, promote the practice of favoritism based on 
tribal and familial relationships, or what is known broadly as wasta. Wasta constitutes a 
sufficient reason for the increase of corruption. Generally, wasta can be categorized as 
indigenous forms of informal influence processes which involve acts of favoritism, whether on 
the basis of family, tribe, or region. The practice of wasta is widespread, not only in Saudi 
society, but also in the Arab world at large, where individuals resort to the practice in order to 
obtain certain advantages. Although Islamic jurisprudence clearly distinguishes between 
permissible and forbidden forms of shafa’ah (intercession), wasta is frequently confused with 
the Islamic concept of shafa’ah (intercession).  
To understand wasta as a practice, it is necessary to understand the social, cultural, and 
historical background within which this practice thrives. Social psychology plays a significant 
role in providing the basic explanation for why individuals promote and participate in practicing 
wasta instead of challenging and resisting it, despite their negative perception of the practice. 
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From a legal perspective, wasta exists most frequently in a grey area of the law, which poses a 
significant challenge for the existing legal provisions that aim to combat such practices.  
The Saudi Anti-Bribery Law is one of the country’s main anti-corruption regulations. The 
Law represents a significant advance in certain respects, in that it criminalizes a number of 
corrupt practices, establishes the criminal liability of legal persons, rewards whistleblowers, and 
gives the government partial jurisdiction over the private sector. Despite such advances, 
however, the Law contains within it certain provisions that may hinder its effectiveness. Other 
obstacles and disadvantages that arise from related provisions within the criminal justice system 
generally and within the anti-corruption framework in particular may also neutralize the benefit 
of such advances.  
Since Saudi Arabia ratified the United Nation Convention against Corruption in 2013, the 
Saudi Anti-Bribery Law should be examined in light of the Convention’s standards and 
provisions, in addition to comparing it with other legal systems and with international 
conventions and standards. Such an evaluation will highlight the disadvantages more vividly so 
that the Saudi government and future researchers may consider them. Since the Anti-Bribery 
Law does not exist by itself as a comprehensive legal instrument, the identification of its 
disadvantages requires the examination of related provisions and aspects within the criminal 
justice system generally and within the anti-corruption framework in particular.  
Research Roadmap 
This dissertation is divided into eight chapters. The first three chapters lay the basic 
foundation and explore the relevant background on corruption, Islamic criminal law, and the 
Saudi legal system, while the remaining chapters focus specifically on the issues of concern to 
this dissertation. The first chapter discusses the definition of corruption and related issues and 
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briefly surveys the classification of corruption, problems in fighting corruption, and the causes 
and consequences of corruption.  
The second chapter provides background on Islamic criminal law as the source of the 
Saudi legal system. In the first section, the sources of Islamic law are explained. The second 
section explores the structure of the Islamic criminal law, including its classification of crimes 
and its main principles. The last section sheds light on the position of Islamic criminal law on 
certain corrupt practices.  
The third chapter reviews the background of the Saudi legal system. This chapter focuses 
mainly on the Saudi criminal justice system by identifying briefly and generally the structure of 
the criminal justice system. It then surveys the historical development of the Saudi legal system 
in general and the criminal justice system in particular, as well as the obstacles it faced during 
that development. The chapter concludes by reviewing the current situation of corruption in 
Saudi Arabia  
After the essential foundations for the dissertation are laid, the focus turns toward the 
specific issues to be examined. Chapter four makes a transition to the topic of corruption and 
Saudi Arabian society. The first section surveys the debate as to whether corruption is an 
individual phenomenon or a social phenomenon. Section two delves into Saudi Arabian society 
to supply readers with the essential background on Saudi history, culture, and social 
stratification. Finally, a brief review of the social psychological perspective is given in the last 
section.  
Chapter five places the practice of wasta under the microscope. The first section 
describes the practice of wasta and compares it with a number of similar practices that involve 
informal influence. The chapter then tracks the evolution and development of wasta in Saudi 
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Arabia in light of the brief historical and cultural background provided in chapter four. The last 
section investigates how the public perceives wasta and the legal position of the practice.  
The Anti-Bribery Law is the sole focus of chapter six. Before analyzing the Anti-Bribery 
Law, the first section reviews the Saudi anti-corruption legal system. The second section 
explores the definition of bribery as an offense under the Law, the elements of the offense, the 
scope of the Law’s application, and the punishments, defenses, and rewards for reporting the 
offense under the Law. The third section further examines the corrupt practices included in the 
Law and their elements.  
Based on chapter six, chapter seven examines the strength and weaknesses of the Anti-
Bribery Law in regard to four aspects: the liability of legal persons; the wasta provision, 
immunity; penalties and rewards; the protection of whistleblower and witnesses; and the 
jurisdiction of the Anti-Bribery Law.  
  The dissertation concludes by offering potential legal, structural, and behavioral solutions 
to fight corrupt practices generally and the practice of wasta specifically. The first section 
proposes improving institutional structures by the implementation and development of e-
government. The second section suggests using the approach of nudges in order to discourage 
corrupt practices generally and wasta specifically. The third section then considers the possibility 
of expanding the jurisdiction of the Anti-Bribery Law. Finally, the dissertation concludes by 
addressing the role of criminal law in fighting corruption. 
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CHAPTER ONE: CORRUPTION IN GENERAL 
INTRODUCTION  
Corruption concerns many individuals around the globe, whether in the so-called 
developing nations or in developed nations. Corruption, as a subject, gains its complexity from 
the fact that it is related to different disciplinary perspectives. This indicates that each factor has 
a role in corruption. Consequently, each discipline argues and provides an explanation of the 
causes and consequences that may overlap with other disciplinary perspectives. 
In this chapter, a general examination of the issue of corruption will be provided. At the 
outset, the definition of corruption will be discussed. The discussion will be extended to cover 
the issues related to the definitions of corruption. This will lay a foundation for discussing the 
classification of corruption and the forms of corrupt practices. After that, this chapter will shift to 
examine the causes and consequences of corruption from the political, cultural, economic, and 
legal perspectives. This chapter will conclude by highlighting the main problems that arise in 
fighting corruption.  
A.  Definition and Related Issues 
Corruption is not a new phenomenon, but rather one that has existed for thousands of 
years.1 Since the 1990s it has received greater attention, but why was that not the case before? No 
definite answers can be provided. Instead, a number of possible reasons have been offered. 
Globalization, without doubt, has had a significant role in generating discussion about corruption 
                                                
1 For example, in the period of Prophet Mohammad, there were incidents where he had to stand 
against certain practices and acts that fall under the umbrella of corruption. See generally Vito 
Tanzi, Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures, (Int’l Monetary 
Fund, Working Paper No. 98/63, 1998), available at 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/wp9863.pdf. Jacob van Klaveren, Corruption as a 
Historical Phenomenon, in POLITICAL CORRUPTION: CONCEPTS AND CONTEXTS 83, 83-94 
(Arnold J. Heidenheimer & Michael Johnston eds., 3d ed. 2002) (providing a historical review of 
corruption). 
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and has given rise to a series of consequences. Not only has corruption become a universal 
phenomenon, it is also no longer a taboo topic. This, it is certain, was a result of the growth of a 
democratic environment that has facilitated the media’s advancement to a sufficient stage of 
development. The media began to shift from traditional means to more advanced means that have 
almost zero restrictions, which then eliminated the obstacles created by lack of information and 
boundaries. Globalization and the idea of universality have encouraged the rise of 
nongovernmental organizations whose missions focus wholly or partly on fighting corruption.2    
 Politically, corruption is often utilized as a political agenda. Allegations and charges are 
now more obvious than they were before. The attention to seeking out and discussing corruption 
can also be attributed to the end of the Cold War, since there has been no more need to cover up 
corruption in attempts to gain allies. In fact, the United States and European countries have played 
significant efforts in fighting corruption. Economically, countries have suffered and are still 
suffering from corrupt practices. Again, due to globalization, the effects of corruption are not 
limited within the borders of the nation where it occurs.3            
When it comes to discussing corruption, a disagreement can be seen as regards the 
definition. Corruption can be defined from different points of view. Consequently, quite broad 
definitions exist, eliminating the idea of one single definition. The reason for the existence of 
diverse definitions can be attributed generally to the idea that corruption is perceived differently 
by different societies.  
 International organizations have adopted a number of definitions, and this is also true 
when it to comes to different scholars. Transparency International (TI) defines corruption as “the 
                                                
2 See generally Tanzi, supra note 1. 
3 Id.   
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abuse of entrusted power for private gain.”4 A similar definition to some extent is also adopted by 
the World Bank (WB), which defines corruption as “the abuse of public office for private gain.”5 
The difference between these definitions is manifest in the idea of using the term “public office” 
in the WB definition. Thus, a number of criticisms are brought against the WB definition, arguing 
that such a definition is incomplete since it does not include the private sector.  
 Scholars have also gone further to define corruption starting from the very same point—
that is, corruption implies that there is an ideal model or condition and there is perversion or 
deviation from it. Then they have seemed to suggest different propositions or concepts of what 
the ideal condition or model is. At the outset, definitions have ranged across the classifications 
found in Arnold. J. Heifenheimer’s analysis of corruption, which divided the analysis into three 
main models: public-office-centered, public-interest-centered, and market-centered.6 
The public-office-centered definition of corruption focuses mainly on the acts of public 
officials that can be considered to deviate from a legal norm in favor of private gain. The 
definition and concept of corruption in this category tends to be narrower than that of other 
categories, since it is linked to legal norms. The most cited definition representing this category is 
that of Nye, who defined corruption as “behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a 
public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or 
status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private regarding influence.”7 
                                                
4 TRANSPARENCY INT’L,  http://www.transparency.org/what-is-corruption (last visited Nov. 14, 
2016). 
5 THE WORLD BANK GROUP, 
http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/corruptn/cor02.htm#note1 (last visited Nov. 
14, 2016).  
6 ARNOLD J. HEIDENHEIMER, POLITICAL CORRUPTION: READINGS IN COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, at 
4-6 (1970).   
7 Joseph S. Nye, Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis, 61 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 417, 419 (1967). 
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The critics of the public-office-centered definition argue that it is too narrow, since not all illegal 
acts by public officials are corrupt practices, and vice versa. The second criticism focuses on the 
fact that a number of countries do not provide explicit rules governing officials’ conduct.8  
The public-interest-centered definition emphasizes the harm to the public interest or the 
common good, i.e., corruption is an act that causes damage to the public interest. Rogow and 
Laswell, for instance, argue that practice of corruption is inconsistent with public order that 
elevates public interest over private interest. Other scholars, such as Friedrich9 and Morris,10 
follow the same model in their concept of corruption. The public-interest-centered concept and 
definition, however, has attracted criticism on the basis of its non-specificity, i.e., it fails to 
specify whose interest has been violated. Moreover, a number of corrupt practices occur, in fact, 
in accordance with public interest, such as so-called honest graft.11  
The market-centered definition of corruption has been influenced to some extent by the 
perspectives of economists. According to this model, thus, “[c]orruption is an extra-legal 
institution used by individuals or groups to gain influence over the actions of the bureaucracy. As 
such, the existence of corruption per se indicates only that these groups participate in the 
                                                
8 John A. Gardiner, Defining Corruption, in POLITICAL CORRUPTION: CONCEPTS AND CONTEXTS 
25, 26 (Arnold J. Heidenheimer & Michael Johnston eds., 3d ed. 2002); see also Thomas D. 
Lancaster & Gabriella R. Montinola, Toward a Methodology for the Comparative Study of 
Political Corruption, 27 CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE. 185, 188 (1997) (citing C. Leys, What is the 
Problem About Corruption?, in POLITICAL CORRUPTION: READINGS IN COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, 
31, 31–37 (Arnold J. Heidenheimer ed. 1970)). 
9 Carl J. Friedrich, Political Pathology, 37 POL. Q. 70, 74 (1966) (Friedrich links a practice of 
corruption and the damage that occurs to the organization or the group in general.).   
10 See STEPHEN D. MORRIS, CORRUPTION & POLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY MEXICO 6-7 (1991) 
(Morris also noted that practice of corruption is not consistent with public interest, which he 
refers to as the “state’s legitimizing ideology”.). 
11 Lancaster & Montinola, supra note 8, at 188. 
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decision-making process to a greater extent than would otherwise be the case.”12 The market-
centered concept of corruption mainly focuses on bureaucrats or “civil servants” who use their 
public office as a private business,13 which then results in a shift from a mandatory pricing model 
to a semi-black-market model, where an individual is forced to pay higher than the mandated 
price in order to receive a certain benefit.14 The main criticism of this concept is that it only 
focuses on the practices of bureaucrats, while it excludes the practices of others, such as elected 
officials.15    
Attempting to eschew the difficulties related to defining corruption, a number of 
international and regional conventions16 and domestic regulations opt not to provide a 
comprehensive definition of corruption; instead, these conventions and regulations list certain acts 
and practices of corruption and define them separately. This method was motivated by the fact 
that attempts to define corruption, as noted in the U.N. Anti-Corruption Toolkit, “invariably 
encounter legal, criminological and, in many countries, political problems.”17 Consequently, 
corruption generally as a term refers to a wide collection of acts and practices including bribery, 
                                                
12 Nathaniel H. Leff, Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption, 8 AM. BEHAVE. 
SCI. 8, 8 (1964). 
13 ARNOLD J. HEIDENHEIMER & MICHAEL JOHNSTON, POLITICAL CORRUPTION: CONCEPTS AND 
CONTEXTS, at 8 (3d ed. 2002). 
14 Robert O. Tilman, Emergence of Black-Market Bureaucracy: Administration, Development, 
and Corruption in the New States, 28 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 437, 440-42 (1968). 
15 Lancaster & Montinola, supra note 8, at 190. 
16 This includes the United Nations Convention against Corruption, the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Anti-Bribery Convention, the Inter-
American Convention against Corruption, the African Union Convention on Preventing and 
Combating Corruption, the League of Arab States Anti-Corruption Convention, the Council of 
Europe’s Civil and Criminal Law Conventions on Corruption, and the European Union’s 
Convention Against Corruption Involving Officials. 
17 U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, THE GLOBAL PROGRAM AGAINST CORRUPTION; U.N. 
ANTI-CORRUPTION TOOLKIT 10 (3d ed. 2004). 
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trade of influence, embezzlement, favoritism, abuse of power, extortion, fraud, and money 
laundering. 
From a legal perspective, defining corruption is a difficult task due to the potential 
restrictions it may impose on individuals and the consequences of criminalization. To define a 
crime too generally or using too broad a concept would jeopardize the freedom of individuals and 
the stability of societies. Therefore, to be on the safe side, each corrupt act can be defined 
separately in a way that describes both the act (actus reus) and the intention (mens rea), followed 
by other elements, such as punishments and jurisdiction.   
B.  Classification of Corruption  
Corruption is generally classified based on various features, and such classification mainly 
depends on the perspective from which the analysis is undertaken. Economists classify corruption 
based on its economic consequences or its sources; thus, for example, they have classified 
corruption based on the frequency of incidence, how rare or widespread it is, or based on how 
organized the corruption is, i.e., whether it is well organized or chaotic.18 The political scientists 
follow the same pattern and focus on governmental structures and institutions, leading to a 
classification of corruption as centralized or decentralized, and the same path is followed by legal 
scholars and sociologists. Their form of classification aims no lower, but rather gains its 
significance from the fact that it defines accurately the root causes of corruption, and, 
accordingly, prescribes the appropriate measures to combat corruption and offers solutions.       
1. Political Corruption v. Bureaucratic Corruption  
It is not always possible to set forth a definition of corruption that clearly draws a line 
between political corruption and bureaucratic corruption. This can be attributed to the 
                                                
18 See, e.g., U Myint, Corruption: Causes, Consequences and Cures, 7 ASIA PAC. DEV. J. 33, 40-
42 (2000). 
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generalization that usually takes place in defining any concept. Political corruption, also known as 
grand corruption,19 refers to corrupt practices committed by higher level officials or decision-
makers. Falling into this category are politicians and public representatives who deviate from 
their main mission of making rules and enforcing them on behalf of the people, to protect them, 
and do so in order to enhance their own power and wealth. While the previous type of corruption 
focuses on the misconduct of higher level officials, bureaucratic corruption, also referred to as 
petty corruption, focuses on the corrupt practices committed by lower level officials, i.e., the 
administrative staff.20 
 This classification relies heavily on a clear separation, which practically speaking, does 
not exist in most political systems, between high level or political officials and lower level or 
administrative officials; without such a distinction, it will remain a vague system of classification. 
This, however, does not deprive this classification of its own analytical and practical merits, since 
the consequences of political corruption are not only more serious than those of petty corruption, 
they also have a clear impact on the political system in general. In the real world, political 
corruption exceeds the bounds of mere deviation or violation of legal rules or codes to encompass 
the utilization of laws and rules to serve personal interests, which can be considered a deviation 
from the principles and values of legal rationality.21 
                                                
19 Id. at 40 (it can also be referred to as high-level corruption).  
20 Id. at 40-41; see also JENS C. ANDVIG ET AL., CORRUPTION: A REVIEW OF CONTEMPORARY 
RESEARCH 10-12 (2001).  
21 Inge Amundsen, Political Corruption: An Introduction to the Issues 3-4 (CHR. MICHELSEN 
INST, Working Paper. 7, 1999) (political corruption though it occurs in both authoritarian and 
democratic regimes, can be characterized as a norm in the former and as incidental in the latter); 
see also SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, 
AND REFORM 113-26 (1999). 
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2. Private Corruption v. Collective Corruption 
 Another type of classification depends on who would benefit from the corrupt act. In the 
private corruption category, the benefit emerging from the corrupt act would be limited to the 
perpetrator and his family or friends, meaning that the circle of beneficiaries is still within private 
and individual limits.22 Once the circle of beneficiaries extends beyond that, the corruption can be 
regarded as collective corruption. The benefits emerging from collective corruption are divided 
among the group members.23 The group can be a certain class, organization, party, or even a gang 
that can utilize the resources in their advantages. Here, corruption may shift to being a form of 
organized crime.   
 The latter form is what most corrupt acts tend to be aimed at hiding. As a result, when a 
corrupt act starts as a conspiracy between two or more individuals, it grows quickly to a larger 
group being involved. This gradual development and spread of corruption from private 
“individual” corruption to collective “aggregated” corruption may lead to greater social 
acceptance of corruption. The ultimate dangerous and frustrating result is the belief among the 
people that corruption is inevitable and expected.24       
3. Redistributive Corruption v. Extractive Corruption   
  This classification aims at identifying the relationship between the state and society, as 
the two main players in corruption problem, and the direction in which the resources flow, i.e., 
from the top downward, which is extractive corruption, or from the bottom upward, which is 
redistributive corruption. Since the relationship between the society and the state in cases of 
                                                
22 Amundsen, supra note 21, at 4. 
23 Id. at 5. 
24 Id. 
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corruption is usually not balanced, one party, either the state or the society, will benefit the most 
from corruption.25  
 In redistributive corruption, the state is in the weaker position in the relationship, allowing 
a number of individuals or social or economic groups to gain more benefit from the corruption 
than the state. This results from these groups and individuals being powerful and organized, 
which enables them to challenge the state and distribute state resources based not on fairness but 
rather on how powerful the groups or individuals are. Appropriately, in this type of corruption, a 
powerful ethnicity, region, or tribe will benefit the most as a group from the corruption. The mafia 
is the quintessential example of this type of corruption. Ultimately, the state and the poor will be 
affected the most.26  
Extractive corruption, on the other hand, is a type of corruption in which the society is in 
the weaker position in the relationship. Accordingly, the state will benefit more from corrupt 
practices. Though they are passive players, the ruling elite benefit more from corruption by 
extracting the resources from the society through using the state system and instruments to their 
advantage. This category of corruption can be seen in authoritarian and neo-patrimonial states, 
where the resources and the power are concentrated in the hands of the rulers.27       
C.  Forms of Corrupt Practices 
Having identified a number of classifications of corruption, it will be helpful to list the 
most significant forms of corrupt practices recognized in anti-corruption regulation and 
conventions in order to identify more specifically what corruption is from a criminal law 
perspective.  
                                                
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 6-7. 
27 Id. at 7-10. 
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1. Bribery  
Bribery is “the corrupt payment, receipt, or solicitation of a private favor for official 
action.”28 This definition appears similarly in both domestic laws and international conventions.29 
The benefit from bribery is not limited to monetary benefits and need not be paid directly to the 
bribed individual but rather can be anything that benefits the bribee directly or indirectly. The 
criminalization of bribery can apply to the private sector and the public sector alike. It can also be 
limited to public officials, in which case the definition of public officials would be extended 
broadly to include individuals or corporate groups with a relationship to public functions.  There 
are many terms equivalent to bribery, such as kickback, gratuity, commercial arrangement, 
sweetener, baksheesh, pay-off, and speed money or grease money. 
2. Embezzlement and Fraud 
Embezzlement is “the fraudulent taking of personal property with which one has been 
entrusted.”30 Though it is considered generally a form of property crime, embezzlement can be 
considered a form of corruption when applying broader definitions of corruption, since the act 
affects the public interest and is committed by a public official.  Fraud is the use of false or 
deceptive information to “induce another to act to his or her detriment.”31 For instance, fraud can 
be committed by an official who conveys false information about the distribution of supplies or 
the number of beneficiaries.   
                                                
28 BRIBERY, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
29 See, e.g., United Nations Convention Against Corruption art 8, 43 I.L.M. 37 (2004). 
[hereinafter UNCAC]; see, e.g., Organization for Economic Development Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions art 1, Nov. 
21, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter OECD Convention]. 
30 EMBEZZLEMENT, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
31 FRAUD, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
  16 
3. Extortion 
Extortion is “the offense committed by a public official who illegally obtains property 
under the color of office.”32 The main element in the crime of extortion is the use of coercion, 
which also affects, in addition to the public interest, the victim of the crime itself. The difference 
between bribery and extortion is critical, since the individual who paid the benefit will be 
criminally liable if the offense is bribery, but not if it is extortion.33 Between bribery and 
extortion, however, there is not a clear, bright line. 
If one other than the officer corruptly takes the initiative and offers what he knows is not 
an authorized fee, it is bribery and not extortion. On the other hand, if the officer corruptly 
makes an unlawful demand which is paid by one who does not realize it is not the fee 
authorized for the service rendered, it is extortion and not bribery. In theory it would seem 
possible for an officer to extort a bribe under such circumstances that he would be guilty 
of either offense whereas the outraged citizen would be excused.34  
4. Abuse of Power35   
Abuse of power is a general and broad category that includes acts such as abuse of 
discretionary powers and favoritism. Abuse of power refers to acts involving the use of power to 
gain a personal benefit. Abuse of power is associated in most cases with bureaucracies where 
there is a broad discretionary power and little supervision or accountability. Favoritism, as a form 
of abuse of power, involves a high level of bias in the distribution of resources to family, friends, 
or members of a group. Nepotism, as a specific form of favoritism, is defined as the “bestowal of 
                                                
32 EXTORTION, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
33 See generally U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, supra note 17, at 14-15.  
34 ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 538 (3D ED. 1982). 
35 U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, supra note 17, at 15.  
  17 
official favors on one's relatives.”36 Other examples of favoritism are the acts of clientelism, 
patronage, and cronyism.  
D.  Causes and Consequences of Corruption  
 When it comes to corruption, almost every aspect of it seems difficult to pin down, 
starting with the definition of it. The same difficulties apply to the causes and consequences of 
corruption, which seem to have a dynamic relationship. This dynamic relationship shifts some 
elements from the side of causes to the side of consequences, and vice versa. The overlap between 
the two sides not only arises because some factors that can be found in one place do not 
necessarily exist in another, but also because some factors can be observed on one side in one 
place and on the other side in another place.  
 Despite these difficulties, research has consistently advanced so that it can at least 
determine the chain of corruption in a series. As a result, from each of the perspectives on 
corruption, whether economic, political, legal, or social, scholars and researchers have identified a 
number of causes and consequences. When it comes to the causes of corruption, however, most of 
the research pivots around Klitgaard’s corruption equation. The equation is as follows: 
Corruption = Economic Rent + Discretionary Power – Accountability.37   
This equation indicates that the co-existence of three elements is required: economic rent 
accompanying discretionary power and a low probability of accountability and penalization.   
I am proposing that corruption is similar to a seesaw or teeter-totter where there are four 
factors on each side, depending on the following cultural, economic, political, and legal factors on 
the side of the causes. On the consequences side, the same factors are organized backward, i.e., 
the legal, political, economic, and cultural consequences. In the case of unbalanced weight 
                                                
36 NEPOTISM, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
37 ROBERT E. KLITGAARD, CONTROLLING CORRUPTION 75 (1988). 
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resulting in a collapse of the consequences, the most damage will be seen in the cultural and 
economic aspects, since each consequence will affect both of those aspects, either directly or 
indirectly. In a sense, the legal and political aspects are merely means to create corruption, while 
the motivations and the explanations remain to be found in the cultural and economic aspects.     
1. Political Explanation 
The democratic system, adopted in most of the wealthy states, does not necessarily 
succeed in reducing corruption. This is due to two main reasons: first, the term “democracy” is an 
overarching rubric and includes several forms. Second, a government system that works 
efficiently and effectively in one state may not work in the same way in another. History provides 
a number of examples of corruption that have occurred in democratic states—consider Chicago, 
for example. This is a clear indication that democratic systems do not succeed in fighting 
corruption without efficient tools.38  
Nevertheless, studies show that democracy gradually helps to lower the level of 
corruption, as can be seen in a study testing the impact of grounded democracy in states with a 
democratic tradition since 1950.39 The study found a significant impact of democracy on 
corruption, which was derived from being exposed to democracy over time, rather than the 
current level of democracy.40 Other studies have found that corruption in authoritarian systems is 
slightly lower than in medium-democratic systems.41  
                                                
38 ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 21, at 113.  
39 Daniel Treisman, The causes of corruption: a cross-national study, 76 J. PUB. ECON. 399, 433-
35 (2000).   
40 Id.   
41 Johann G. Lambsdorff, Causes and Consequences of Corruption: What Do We Know from a 
Cross-Section of Countries, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORRUPTION 
11 (Susan Rose-Ackerman ed., 2006) (citing Philip Manow, Politische Korruption und 
Politischer Wettbewerb: Probleme der Quantitativen Analyse [Political Corruption and Political 
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The form of democracy also plays a significant role in determining the level of corruption 
in a democracy. Empirical studies indicate that democratic systems with more powerful presidents 
are more corrupt than the parliamentary system, in the absence of U.S.-style checks and balances, 
as is the case in the majority of presidential systems. A study that compared parliamentary 
systems with presidential systems provided evidence that the former were associated with lower 
levels of corruption. 42 This can be attributed to an imbalanced distribution of powers; that is, in 
presidential systems where presidents have semi-complete power over the resources, they can be 
more easily utilized for the presidents’ personal profits. Presidents also tend to extend their power 
to gain both legislative and non-legislative powers, taking advantage of the absence of checks and 
balances.43  
Describing the relationship between decentralization and corruption increases the 
complexity and challenges of giving an adequate account of corruption. Studies are divided 
between the advantages and disadvantages of decentralization, though a number of studies have 
found no significant impacts of either on corruption.44 This division in the results is due to how 
decentralization is measured.45 Decentralization and centralization are important, but they are not 
                                                                                                                                                       
Competition: Problems of Quantitative Analysis], in DIMENSIONEN POLITISCHER KORRUPTION 
[Dimensions of Political Corruption] 249, 249-66 (Ulrich von Alemann ed., 2005)). 
42 John Gerring & Strom C. Thacker, Political Institutions and Corruption: The Role of 
Unitarism and Parliamentarism, 34 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 295, 325-28 (2004) (the study also 
compared unitarism with a federal system and found that unitarism tended to be associated with 
less corruption. The ranking was as follows: 1. Federal and presidential systems are high 
corruption. 2. Unitary presidential and federal parliamentary systems are intermediate corruption. 
3. Unitary parliamentary systems are low corruption). 
43 Jana Kunicová & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Electoral Rules and Constitutional Structures as 
Constraints on Corruption, 35 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 573, 586 (2005) (the authors also support the 
results of the previously mentioned study. They also expand the study to examine plurality 
voting in contrast to proportional representation and found that the latter is associated with more 
corruption in the case of presidential systems).   
44 Lambsdorff, supra note 41, at 16.  
45 Id. at 17. 
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the right basis on which to fight corruption, as there are other factors, mainly cultural, that are 
likely confuse the issue.46  
Finally, strong competition serves as dual function: it not only provides societies with the 
option to change leaders who did not meet their expectations,47 it also decreases the likelihood of 
corrupt practices in the political domain, since such acts hurt the reputation of candidates.48 In 
general, an ideal democratic system would reduce corruption, since it limits politicians’ greed by 
the device of elections and safeguards liberties and free speech, which ultimately enhance the 
transparency and openness of governments.49 More specifically, democratic systems control the 
level of corruption indirectly by imposing essentially two types of limitations on political power: 
the first is the very structure of democratic government, which creates “veto points and 
independent sources of political, administrative and judicial power”; the second type provides 
citizens freedom of speech and assembly, a channel through which they can complain and have 
their voice heard.50   
When corruption is rife, it erodes the legitimacy of governments.51 The belief that 
government is placing democratic values at the top of its agenda is undermined by corruption, 
which leads the citizens to form an alternative belief that their “government is for sale to the 
                                                
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 10. 
48 ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 21, at 127. 
49 Id. at 113. 
50 See generally id. at 143-74; see also Daniel Treisman, What Have We Learned About the 
Causes of Corruption from Ten Years of Cross-National Empirical Research?, 10 ANNU. REV. 
POL. SCI. 211, 228-36 (2007). 
51 See Mitchell A. Seligson, The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A Comparative 
Study of Four Latin American Countries, 64 J. POL. 408, 424 (2002) (“In every case, higher 
corruption is significantly (<.001) associated with lower support for the legitimacy of the 
political system”). 
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highest bidder.”52 Once democratic rulers are accused of corruption, this provides a justification 
for military takeover. In authoritarian governments, conversely, corruption is used to maintain 
power. The placement of wealthy and powerful individuals inside the circle of corruption and 
benefit maintains support for the regime and eliminates the chances of exposure.53  
Moving a step back, corruption reduces the services provided by the government. This is 
mainly because the evaluation of what should be provided is not based on efficiency or quality. 
The shift from the basis of efficiency and quality to that of personal profit coupled with the 
existence of a corrupt relationship between corrupt producers and the bureaucracy prevents 
producers offering products or projects with adequate quality and efficiency from the start.54  
Consequently, corruption affects decisions regarding budget expenditures.55 This may 
explain the tendency of corrupt governments to have more military projects than those dealing 
with, for example, education. The tendency toward “hard” public investments will be higher than 
that toward “soft” investments such as health and education services; resources are likely to be 
reallocated out of the borders of the country rather than inside it.56 The effects of corruption, then, 
include lowering public revenue and increasing spending, which lead to fiscal deficits.57 This is 
not to mention the processes of the appointment and promotion of officials, which come to be 
based on nepotism or bribery, rather than on candidates’ merits.58 Such acts contribute 
significantly to the inefficiency of bureaucracy and of the public sector in general.     
                                                
52 Susan Rose-Ackerman, The Political Economy of Corruption, in CORRUPTION AND THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMY 45 (KIMBERLY A. ELLIOTT, ED. 1997). 
53 Id. 
54 Arvind K. Jain, Corruption: A Review, 15 J. ECON. SURV. 71, 93 (2001). 
55 Myint, supra note 18, at 49. 
56 Amundsen, supra note 21, at 20. 
57 Tanzi, supra note 1, at 582.  
58 Lambsdorff, supra note 41, at 31. 
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2. Cultural Explanation 
The fact that the corruption is contextual in its nature suggests that cultural factors 
influence the level of corruption in states, both directly and indirectly. The causal relationship can 
be often described as unidirectional, i.e., the culture affects the level of corruption, rather than 
vice versa, due to the stability of cultural variables over long periods of time.59 The influence of 
culture on the level of corruption can be seen in the previously mentioned studies which 
emphasize that mere exposure to democracy for a significant period of time lowers the level of 
corruption.  
In the 1950s, Edward Banfield examined the association between strong family bonds and 
the high levels of corruption found in Sicily and southern Italy; he found that corruption was 
linked to powerful familial values that included an intense feeling of obligation.60 A higher 
loyalty to the family was related to a higher level of corruption, since familial interests and 
broader social or official interests were in competition with each other.61 This description explains 
primarily nepotistic practices and the influence of culture, especially when accompanied with 
high levels of kinship or familial loyalty.62   
Robert Merton also explained the relationship between cultural goals and institutional 
norms, indicating that cultures establish the goals of cultures and societies and then pave certain 
roads and means to reach them. He noted that there was unequal access, for a variety of reasons, 
including race, religion, capital, and so on, to the opportunity structure, leading those who were 
                                                
59 Id. at 17. 
60 EDWARD BANFIELD, THE MORAL BASIS OF A BACKWARD SOCIETY (1958). 
61 Lambsdorff, supra note 41, at 19. 
62 See Seymour M. Lipset & Gabriel S. Lenz, Corruption, Culture, and Markets, in CULTURE 
MATTERS: HOW VALUES SHAPE HUMAN PROGRESS 112, 120 (Lawrence E. Harrison & Samuel P. 
Huntingto eds., 2000) (Lenz and Lipset found a positive correlation between the level of 
familism and the level corruption). 
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excluded or had small chance of access not to follow the rules and to find another means of 
access.63 The implication of this observation is that cultures set a number of economic goals, but 
also create limited access to chances of achieving these goals, which ultimately increases the level 
of corruption.64 
There is a negative correlation between the level of trust and the level of corruption. A 
high level of trust builds better cooperation among bureaucrats themselves and between 
bureaucrats and citizens, which is ultimately a helpful factor in fighting corruption. Uslaner 
argued that trust has a stronger impact on corruption than corruption has on trust.65     
Another relevant study is one conducted by Husted that sought to measure different 
variables related to cultural values. Husted relied on surveys that were made by Hoftede in 1997 
to investigate the relationship between Hoftede’s cultural dimensions66 and corruption.67 The 
                                                
63 Id. at 116-17 (citing ROBERT K. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 186-193 
(1957)). 
64 Id. at 117. 
65 Eric M. Uslaner, Trust and Corruption, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS OF 
CORRUPTION 76, 76-7 (Johann G. Lambsdorff, et al. eds., 2005). 
66 GEERT HOFSTEDE ET AL., CULTURES AND ORGANIZATIONS: SOFTWARE OF THE MIND: 
INTERCULTURAL COOPERATION AND ITS IMPORTANCE FOR SURVIVAL 61, 92, 191, 140, 239, 281 
(3d ed. 2010). (The six dimensions are as follows: 
1. The power distance index (PDI): “the extent to which the less powerful members of 
institutions and organizations (like the family) within a country expect and accept that 
power is distributed unequally.”  
2. Individualism vs. collectivism (IDV): “Individualism pertains to societies in which the 
ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after himself or herself 
and his or her immediate family. Collectivism as its opposite pertains to societies in 
which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, which 
throughout people's lifetime continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning 
loyalty.”  
3. Uncertainty avoidance index (UAI): “extent to which the members of culture feel 
threatened ambiguous or unknown situation.”  
4. Masculinity vs. femininity (MAS): “A society is called masculine when emotional gender 
roles are clearly distinct: men are supposed to be assertive, tough, and focused on 
material success, whereas women are supposed to be more modest, tender, and concerned 
with quality of life. A society is called feminine when emotional gender roles overlap: 
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study found a positive correlation between the level of corruption and power distance and 
between the level of corruption and the level of masculinity, as well as a positive correlation 
between uncertainty avoidance and the level of corruption. The variables related to individualism, 
as Husted noted, were not significant.68 Harry Triandis et al., however, found a positive 
correlation between cultural collectivism and the level of deception, which included the tendency 
to bribe.69    
Hufsted saw “traditionalism” as related to other cultural variables: “Societies that cultivate 
secular-rational attitudes towards authority (that is, where impersonal values are more important 
as opposed to particularistic or family values) are perceived to be less corrupt, unlike those where 
traditional religious values dominate.”70 A later study sought to create a scale using traditional 
values vs. secular-rational values as one dimension and survival values vs. self-expression values 
                                                                                                                                                       
both men and women are supposed to be modest, tender, and concerned with the quality 
of life.”  
5. Long-term orientation vs. short-term orientation (LTO): “Long Term Orientation stands 
for the fostering of virtues oriented towards future rewards, in particular perseverance 
and thrift. It’s opposite pole, short Term Orientation, stands for the fostering of virtues 
related to the past and present, in particular, respect for tradition, preservation of ‘face’ 
and fulfilling social obligations.”  
6. Indulgence versus restraint (IND): “Indulgence stands for a tendency to allow relatively 
free gratification of basic and natural human desires related to enjoying life and having 
fun. Its opposite pole, restraint, reflects a conviction that such gratification needs to be 
curbed and regulated by strict social norms.”).  
67 See, e.g., James H. Davis & John A. Ruhe, Perceptions of Country Corruption: Antecedents 
and Outcomes, 43 J. BUS. ETHICS 275, 275 (2003) (“This study examines the relationship 
between Hofstede's cultural dimensions and how country corruption is perceived. Power 
distance, individualism and masculinity were found to explain a significant portion of the 
variance in perceived corruption.”).  
68 See generally Bryan W. Husted, Wealth, Culture, and Corruption, 30 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 339-
59 (1999). But see Monica V. Achim, Cultural Dimension of Corruption: A Cross-Country 
Survey, 22 INT’L ADVANCES IN ECON. RES. 333, 333-45 (2016) (found that individualism-
collectivism dimension, in addition to power distance and long- versus short-term orientation 
dimensions have an influence on corruption.). 
69 See generally Harry C. Triandis et al., Culture and Deception in Business Negotiations: A 
Multilevel Analysis, 1 INT’L. J. CROSS CULTURAL MGMT. 73-90 (2001). 
70 Lambsdorff, supra note 41, at 19. 
  25 
as the second dimension.71 It found that “a strong ‘survival’ orientation contributes twice as much 
as a strong ‘traditional’ orientation to higher levels of corruption.”72  
The consequences of corruption for cultures are huge, since such consequences, whether 
they are legal, political, or economic, directly or indirectly affect cultures and societies. The 
inability of governments to impose regulatory laws, as a legal consequence, has further cultural 
and societal impacts. Corruption leads to more violations of building codes, environmental 
regulations, and health standards, which can result in severe social harm. Around the world, we 
hear about such incidents resulting in a huge number of casualties.   
Income inequality, as an economic impact, not only creates a vacuum in which powerful 
groups allocate resources for their private benefit, it also extends its impacts to further inequalities 
in education, health, and land distribution.73 Education and health are affected not only by income 
equality, but also by misallocation of expenditures.74   
Moreover, corruption affects income distribution by concentrating the wealth among few 
individuals out of the whole population.75 Consequently, the burden becomes heavier for the poor, 
since they become unable to pay bribes in order to obtain basic necessities in life. Correlated with 
                                                
71 Ronald Inglehart & Christian Welzel, Changing Mass Priorities: The Link Between 
Modernization and Democracy, 8 PERSPECTIVES ON POL. 551, 554 (2010) (see the cultural map 
2005-2007 and the explanation of the dimensions). 
72 Johann G. Lambsdorff, supra note 41, at 20 (citing Wayne Sandholtz & Rein Taagepera, 
Corruption, Culture, and Communism, 15 INT’L REV. SOC. 109-31 (2005)) (Lambsdorff also 
criticizes the finding of that study since the authors did not explain on what basis the dimensions 
were determined, and they did not control for some standard variables, such as GDP per capita).  
73 See, e.g., You, Jong-sung & Sanjeev Khagram, A Comparative Study of Inequality and 
Corruption, 70 AM. SOC. REV. 136, 139 (2005).  
74 Kwabena Gyimah-Brempong, Corruption, Economic Growth, and Income Inequality in 
Africa, 3 ECON. & POL. 183, 188 (2002) (“increased corruption is associated with decreases in 
the share of government expenditures devoted to education and health care”). 
75 See generally Sanjeev Gupta et al., Does Corruption Affect Income Inequality and Poverty?, 3 
ECON. GOVERNANCE. 23, 23-45 (2002); see also Hongyi Li et al., Corruption, Income 
Distribution, and Growth, 12 ECON. & POL. 155, 155-82 (2000). 
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that is a change in the pattern of consumption where the wealthy class becomes obsessed with 
keeping up to date with the new fashions and modern lifestyle, creating what can be called an 
unproductive and superficial society.76      
At the personal level, in societies with high levels of corruption, talents and resources are 
misallocated and eventually lost.77 This explains why individuals in such societies are more 
attracted to occupations providing extra revenue—an occupation where one can receive bribes, or 
where one holds high rank in order to create a wide network of connections, rather than an 
occupation where an individual can be more productive and contribute directly to the society’s 
success.78  The scarcity of talented individuals, scientists, and entrepreneurs is also impacted by 
the lack of incentives, since the society’s evaluation is not based on merits.   
3. Economic Explanations  
 As a central argument, a number of researchers propose that the absence of economic 
competition and the expansion of a monopoly of profit fuel a higher level of corruption. 
Competition between suppliers diminishes the monopoly which ultimately reduces the irrational 
prices. The existence of competition reduces the motivation of politicians and public officials to 
seek bribes, since they have little to “sell” in exchange for bribery. The opposite, however, can 
                                                
76 Myint, supra note 18, at 47. 
77 Toke S. Aidt, Corruption, Institutions, and Economic Development, 25 OXFORD REV. ECON. 
POL’Y. 271, 275 (2009) (“As highlighted by a large literature on rent seeking, the jobs of those 
government officials are contestable. As a consequence, real resources, sometimes of a value 
equal to the total bribe revenues, are wasted in contesting these jobs and, in the process, 
entrepreneurial talent is misallocated”).  
78 PAOLO MAURO, WHY WORRY ABOUT CORRUPTION? 6 (1997) (“Where rent seeking proves 
more lucrative than productive work, talent will be misallocated. Financial incentives may lure 
the more talented and better educated to engage in rent seeking rather than in productive work 
…”). 
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also be seen: less or limited competition creates more opportunity and high rents for politicians 
and public officials to exchange for bribery or other corrupt practices.79  
A downside of competition can be a decrease of quality: that is, competition may lead 
private firms to reduce the quality of supplies or projects by, for example, paying off projects 
inspectors or auditors to ignore violations of quality standards.80 Nevertheless, a negative 
correlation between corruption and competition is supported by numerous studies.81 For instance, 
a study examining data from a market dominance index82 and an anti-trust laws index83 shows 
that high levels of corruption are more likely to be seen in countries that provide domestic firms 
with higher rents.84 This can happen where domestic firms are protected by nature or policy from 
foreign firms’ competition or where there is an absence of effective anti-trust laws.85 
In line with competition, there is an inverse relationship between openness toward more 
international investment and corruption. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the growth of 
globalization restricts to a great extent the expansion of corruption.86 In support of that, Sandholtz 
and Gray noted that the level of corruption is lower if a nation is a member of international 
organizations and institutions such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, or the 
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World Trade Organization. The study also reported that the longer the time a nation had been a 
member of such organizations, the lower the level of corruption in the country.87 In a similar vein, 
another study found that the longer period of time a country had been exposed to imports and 
open to trade, the lower the level of corruption.88  
Finally, economic development is negatively associated with the level of perceived 
corruption, i.e., the higher the level of economic development, the lower the perceived corruption 
level. The direction of causation, however, is debatable. While some argues that good institutions 
foster economic development, others suppose the opposite.89 The debate extends to the wage level 
and its effects on the level of corruption. The relationship between wages and corruption remains 
ambiguous. Earlier researchers encouraged high wages as an instrument to fight corruption.90 
More recent research has concluded that increasing wages reduce bribery, but “only under some 
circumstances”.91 On the other hand, other studies show that high wages pose no significant roles 
in reducing corruption.92 Other economic factors such as inflation have been proposed as indirect 
reasons for corruption. Since it lowers the ability to monitor public spending, inflation increases 
the level of corruption.93  
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The consequences of corruption on the economy are diverse and ultimately lead to 
inhibiting economic growth. To begin with, studies provide evidence for the negative impact of 
corruption on both domestic and foreign investments. In order to initiate a new business or 
investment, bribes or other similar corrupt practices are required, not to mention the continuous 
corrupt practices needed to keep the business running.94 Due to the lower commitment of corrupt 
governments to trustworthy policies, both domestic and foreign investments are likely to suffer 
from corruption.95 If a country is affected by corruption, this discourages investors from 
expanding or even initiating investment in that country.  
Though there are studies indicating the benefits of corruption for economic growth,96 the 
more recent studies provide evidence for the adverse impacts of corruption. A great number of 
these studies demonstrate the negative impacts of corruption on foreign direct investment, rather 
than on domestic investment.97 Mauro argued that corruption reduces the level of private 
investments, which negatively effects the economic growth in general, noting that if Bangladesh 
had a bureaucracy as efficient and honest as that of Uruguay, “its investment rate would rise by 
almost five percentage points, and its yearly GDP growth rate would rise by over half a 
percentage point.”98  
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95 Lambsdorff, supra note 41, at 27. 
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Different types of corruption can also have different effects on the level of investments. 
Investment may be deterred more by petty corruption than by grand corruption.99 Foreign 
investors ultimately tend to invest in joint projects; joint projects between domestic investors and 
foreign investors are preferred because the domestic investors are likely to be better acquainted 
with the corrupt practices that are common in the host country.100    
Corruption affects the tax revenues of governments mainly because private gain is 
reducing the commitment to tax collection, which eventually lowers government revenues. A 
study suggests that “[a] 1 point increase in the corruption index is associated with 1.5 percentage 
point decline in total revenue-GDP ratio, [and a] 2.7 percent decline in tax-GDP ratio”.101 In line 
with that, the underground economy102 tends to be larger where the level of corruption is high. 
The increase in the underground economy affects the validity and the accuracy of the value and 
volume of a country’s economy.103  
4. Legal Explanations  
 States perform their roles by relying on and utilizing a set of laws and regulations. The 
existence of these laws and regulations contributes to the power distribution in a state; that is, the 
more authorization given to officials, the more power they have. In states with higher levels of 
corruption, these officials extract more benefits through the power they have. The situation can be 
aggravated in cases where the regulations and procedures are not transparent or not publically 
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available.104 Corruption can be aided by ineffective substantive laws or by insufficient 
implementation of the provisions.  
In general, the absence of transparent and clear laws and procedures creates an atmosphere 
for corruption to thrive.105 Thus, for instance, when trade tariffs are diverse, the probability of 
corrupt acts is high.106 The number of substantive laws can create more rents and profits for 
public officials and eventually leads to corruption. Studies show that higher barriers to market 
entry and higher levels of state intervention lead to higher levels of corruption.107  
It is not only criminal law or anti-corruption laws108 that create space for corruption; other 
types of law such as tax law,109 anti-trust laws,110 and procurement laws111 do so as well. These 
laws encourage corruption when they give officials more discretionary power, have more 
loopholes, and contain vague provisions. The other kind of laws relevant to corruption is 
regulatory law, which mainly regulates public officials. This category creates a space for 
corruption to thrive when it avoids drawing a clear line between what is legal and what is illegal.  
The implementation of legal provisions relies heavily on two essential bodies. The judicial 
body, on the one hand, can influence, negatively or positively, directly or indirectly, the level of 
corruption in a country. Independence of the judicial branch by itself does not always provide a 
safeguard against corruption. Instead, the legal procedure and the accessibility of the judicial 
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system can critically affect the level of corruption.112 Yes, it is essential to have an independent 
judicial body to protect individuals from arbitrary decisions and abusive powers, but if citizens 
lack the ability to access the judicial system or if there is a high threshold to enter it, the power of 
judicial independence is gradually diminished.113 The indirect restrictions involve, inter alia, 
delayed procedures and vague litigation procedures.114 This drives individuals and firms to seek 
for alternatives.  
The other important body on the implementation side is the investigative and prosecutorial 
body. The exact same character of being independent that is essential to the judicial branch is also 
required here to achieve the goal of reducing corruption. The success of the anti-corruption 
commissions was generated by their independence.115 They were also armed with an adequate 
power to enforce laws and investigate cases.116 It is not only independence that leads to a 
successful commission: power, tools, and resources are also factors enhancing the ability of these 
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commissions to combat corruption. Recently, such investigations have begun using wiretaps, for 
example to provide more details and evidence in cases.117   
 Generally, identifying whether a law is beneficial or not can help in directing efforts to 
fight corruption. Two issues, however, remain problematic. The first is the causal direction—that 
is, whether bad laws are consequences or causes of corruption. For instance, privileging domestic 
firms in public procurements can cause corruption, but when domestic firms provide a way for 
strong private interests to seize public funds, bad laws can merely be a consequence of 
corruption.118  Secondly, it is not always obvious whether a certain law is beneficial or not. Laws 
may, on the one hand, create an opportunity for corruption, but may also, on the other hand, 
promote public health and safety. Thus, something that has a negative impact in terms of 
corruption may have a positive impact in some other sphere.119 
 The impact of corruption in the legal realm is manifest mainly in the enforcement of laws 
and regulation, on the one hand, and in the lawmaking process, on the other. Corruption 
minimizes the capacity of governments to impose the essential regulations through which they 
can monitor and control the failures of markets. This leads to unsatisfactory performance of 
governments’ necessary duties in supervising financial markets, hospitals, schools, and so forth. 
Even when governments intervene, their interventions are blemished by corrupt motivations and 
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often lead to more monopolies and more failures.120 Moreover, the enforcements of contracts and 
protection of property rights, as a fundamental duty of governments, is eroded by corruption.121 
More importantly, when corruption is dominant, it erases, completely or partly, legal 
restrictions and regulations. It will not be surprising if laws are violated with no regard to the 
protection of people and the environment which such laws sought to create. In many countries, for 
instance, violations of building standards result in a large number of casualties.122 This is mainly 
because it is difficult to inculcate respect for the law in a system that is rife with corruption, since 
such systems breed cynicism instead.123  
Corruption also affects the quality of certain types of regulations. It has been noted that 
countries where corruption is prevalent have less effective or protective laws. The example of 
such laws par excellence is environmental law, where a number of studies indicate that the quality 
of environmental regulation is affected negatively by high levels of corruption.124 An extension of 
this can be seen in the low levels of compliance with international measures and regulations.125      
E.  Problems in Fighting Corruption  
Before going further in outlining the problems of fighting corruption, it has seemed 
worthwhile to identify the nature of corruption. Corruption is contextual, since what is considered 
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an act of corruption in a certain nation is not necessarily so in another.126 A variety of factors, 
such as ideology, culture, politics, and context, delineate the meaning of corruption.127 This leads 
to the point that corruption is essentially a matter of perception and depends on how individuals 
or societies perceive a given behavior. Consequently, corrupt behavior can be classified as white, 
gray, or black.128 This implies that corruption is seen as a deviation from a moral, cultural, or 
legal norm.129 Eventually, since individuals, by default, avoid the shame that results from 
deviating from a norm, corruption will be committed secretly and stay hidden.   
Furthermore, corruption is associated with power.130 Consequently, a bribe is paid to an 
individual who is in a position of power or has control over the desired benefit, and an individual 
must be a position of power to abuse it. Such an association between corruption and power means 
corruption is not a unique phenomenon that only exists in the public-sector only, but can also 
exist in the private-sector.131  
Therefore, problems in fighting corruption raise some challenges and in some cases flaws. 
Since corruption is contextual, it will be difficult to combat it once a society perceives such 
practices as a normal way life. The situation worsens when a society is blind to identifying 
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corruption.132 The justification in such a case is already provided: corrupt individuals, regardless 
of their own lack of integrity, tend to believe that corruption existed before they came to power 
and that they did not invent it; thus, all they are doing is following the same path as those who 
came before them.133 Consequently, any penalties have lost their deterrence, since most of the 
time such penalties will not be associated with the loss of any social capital.134   
Another problem stems from a partial view of corruption. In a number of countries, and 
even in the international arena, fighting corruption focuses significantly on corruption in 
governments. This is justifiable, based on the high expectations citizens may have of their 
governments, but such an assumption could be misleading, since corruption can occur in every 
sector of society, including the private sector and non-profit and non-governmental 
organizations.135 Gerald Caiden notes that in a given culture, people who study, socialize, and live 
together are not likely to be significantly different in their conduct, and thus, public ethics are not 
likely to differ significantly from private ethics either.136   
Finally, following on the contention that corruption is associated with power, we can see 
that a significant obstacle manifests itself as power in opposition to fighting corruption. This 
occurs through two main ways: first, through a lack of government willingness to fight corruption 
that occurs through refusing to ratify and implement anti-corruption measures.137 Political 
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willingness is not only needed to promote anti-corruption measures, but also to support efforts 
and individuals fighting corruption.138 In fact, a number of politicians and officials gain more 
power merely by allying with corrupt cliques.139  
The second way in which power seeks to restrain anti-corruption movements is by 
sabotaging them. This can happen when politicians and others who benefit from the existence of 
corruption will be negatively affected by the abandonment of corruption. As for others, so long as 
they are spoiled by corrupt benefits in one way or another, they lack an incentive to abandon 
corrupt practices, which creates a sufficient motivation to nullify any efforts to fight corruption.140 
This can be seen where there is a strong will from governments to fight corruption, yet the 
measures taken against corruption are weak and ineffective. In this case, there may be an 
investigatory body, but it is enfeebled and lacks the power needed to act.141   
Practically, there is a significant obstacle posed by national security. Many of countries’ 
defense projects involve a huge amount of corruption that goes unchecked and unprosecuted. In 
such cases, the investigation is dismissed under the justification of national security. In the same 
spirit, human rights standards can be an issue in fighting corruption. For instance, if a country 
with a poor human rights record sends another country a request for extradition on the grounds 
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that the accused has committed acts of corruption, should the other country approve such a 
request or not?142  
CONCLUSION  
From what has been said so far, it can be seen that corruption has attracted many 
explanations from several perspectives. Not all disciplines have been equally involved in 
examining this topic, however, as some of them have given it much more study than others. The 
analysis of corruption in particular circumstances may require a more in-depth analysis, since 
each nation and culture may possess factors distinguishing it from others. Underestimating these 
differentiating factors may jeopardize not only the analysis but also the purposed solutions and 
measures to fight corruption.  
This chapter has sought to survey the issue of corruption from various perspectives. 
Initially, it highlighted the issues related to defining corruption. Distinctions between the forms 
of corruption were offered in order to provide an adequate understanding of the issue of 
corruption and how it should be combated. Further, this chapter explored the general causes and 
consequences of corruption in different dimensions with an aim of connecting the dots together 
that make up a picture of corruption. In light of that picture, the problems encountered in fighting 
corruption were identified.  
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CHAPTER TWO: BACKGROUND: ISLAMIC CRIMINAL LAW 
INTRODUCTION 
In the pre-Islamic era in Arabia, criminal law was associated with or based on the idea of 
retaliation. Due to the importance of the tribal system, the emphasis was on collective 
responsibility; thus, not only would offenders be punished, but also their tribes. Motivated by 
revenge and the desire to maintain or repair tribal dignity, the Arabs of that era tended to apply 
severe, and in many cases, unjust punishments. So, for instance, in a case of the punishment for 
murder, a man must be punished, rather than a woman; a male slave did not represent a sufficient 
revenge, and in the case of a tribe that was considered superior to the offending tribe, two or more 
men had to be killed as punishment, rather than one. These examples show the aggressiveness and 
the seeming irrationality of the system, which, however, is not strange when the Arabs’ collective 
social structure is taken into consideration.143 
 In 610 C.E.,144 the Arabs were introduced to a new era. In this year, the Prophet 
Mohammad received the first Quranic verse (ayah). The divine revelation continued for twenty-
three years,145 ending in 632 C.E. with the completion of the Holy Quran, which consists of more 
than 6,200 verses146 (āyāt, sing. ayah) divided into 114 chapters (suwar, sing. surah). The 
chapters were also divided according to where they were received. The first category, those 
received in Mecca, or the Meccan chapters (610–622 C.E.), includes 86 chapters. The general 
theme of the Meccan chapters is the belief in Allah and the afterlife. The second category, those 
received in Medina, or the Medinan chapters (622–632 C.E.), includes 28 chapters, which are 
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devoted to the organization of Muslims’ social life and their relationships with each other and 
with non-Muslims as well.147   
A.  The Sources of Islamic Law 
 The study of the Islamic law resources generally is called usul al-fiqh. It is important to 
mention that there are four Sunni schools of interpretation, or Madhãhib (sing. Madh'hab), the 
Maliki, the Hanafi, the Shafiʿi, and the Hanbali.148 The schools agree on the primary resources but 
they disagree about the ranking of the secondary resources.149 Moreover, the disagreement does 
not relate to the essentials of Islam, such as faith in God and the Five Pillars of Islam (profession 
of faith, prayer, fasting, alms, and pilgrimage).150 Thus, the disagreement led the schools to adopt 
in some cases different legal positions or notions.151  More importantly, the emergence of 
different notions among the four schools can be seen as the result of the different situations, 
geographical areas, and traditions in which they arose.152  
To illustrate, Imam Abu Hanīfah (80–150 A.H., or 699–767 C.E.), did his teaching in 
Kufa.153 Imam Malik (97–179 A.H., or 717–795 C.E.) established his school in Medina, where 
the Prophet Mohammad had been, which led him to consider the Medinan people’s traditions as a 
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secondary resource.154 Imam Al-Shāfīʿī (150–204 A.H., or 767–819 C.E.), unlike the previously 
mentioned imams, was not known for taking up residence in a particular place. He started his 
journey as a student of Imam Malik in Medina, and then was in Iraq as a scholar of Imam Abu-
Hanifa. He did his teaching in Mecca, Baghdad, and Yemen, and finally ended his journey in 
Egypt.155 Similarly, Imam Ahmad ibn Ḥanbal (164–241 A.H., or 780–855 C.E.) was a student of 
the illustrious Hanafi scholar and judge, Abu Yusuf. He also met and studied under the 
supervision of Imam Al-Shāfīʿī in Mecca. His well-known saying, “With the inkwell to the 
cemetery,”156 illustrates his frequent travels seeking more knowledge. Among the places to which 
he traveled are Baghdad, Kufa, Basra, Hejaz, and Sana.157  
1.  Primary Sources 
a. The Qur’an 
In Islam, the Qur’an is the Holy Book, and it contains 114 chapters, or suwar, and 6,342 
verses.158 Since it contains codes regulating religious and social matters, the Qur’an is not a text 
that is fully devoted to legal issues, which explains why the Qur’an only has approximately 500 
verses that can be considered as legal provisions. Not surprisingly, 30 of the 500 verses relate to 
criminal law.159 The 500 verses contain injunctions that may take the form of a command (amr) or 
a prohibition (nahi).160  
                                                
154 ABU ZAHRA, supra note 149, at 399-400; see generally ABU ZAHRA, supra note 149, at 333- 
65; see also Khadduri, supra note 153, at 13-14. 
155 Bassiouni & Badr, supra note 146, at 161; see generally ABU ZAHRA, supra note 149, at 407-
21. 
156 ABU ZAHRA, supra note 149, at 459. 
157 Id. at 451-62.  
158 Taymour Kamel, The Principle of Legality and Its Application in Islamic Criminal Justice, in 
THE ISLAMIC JUSTICE SYSTEM 149, 152 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1982). 
159 Bassiouni & Badr, supra note 146, at 149. 
160 Kamel, supra note 158, at 152. Bernard K. Freamon, Slavery, Freedom, and the Doctrine of 
Consensus in Islamic Jurisprudence, 11 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 15-16 (1998) (“Legal scholars 
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 The Qur’an in its formulation is considered to be general, allowing it to govern issues that 
might exist in the near or distant future, either explicitly or implicitly.161 Thus, a full 
understanding of the Qur’an is difficult without relying on its commentaries (tafsir), which 
include both the text’s historical and its linguistic aspects.162 This character is what explains the 
rules of scholars to whom religious and judicial rulings are attributed.163        
 In Islamic law, the Qur’an and the Sunnah are considered as the primary and the supreme 
resources which no other rules should violate. As with many constitutions, the Qur’an provides 
general rules and leaves the details to be worked out later. For instance, the Qur’an orders 
Muslims to pay alms (Zakah), but does not specify what constitutes a quorum (Nisab) of the 
money above which the Zakah is mandatory.164 Conversely, in other cases, the Qur’an provides 
detailed rules, such as for the rule of inheritance. Consequently, in the Qur’an, there is a clear 
reference to the Sunnah (“Whatever the Messenger gives you, take; whatever he forbids you, give 
over. And fear God; surely God is terrible in retribution”).165  
                                                                                                                                                       
have developed a system of Qur’anic interpretation that actually assigns at least five values 
(alahkim al khamsah) to the Qur'an's regulation of human behavior. At one end of this yardstick 
are those forms of behavior that are wjib (obligatory) and at the other end are those behaviors 
that are strictly harem (forbidden). Between these two poles are values classifying all other 
behavior as mandub (commendable), halal (permissible), or makruh (reprehensible).”).  
161 Irshad Abdal-Haqq, Islamic Law: An Overview of Its Origin and Elements, 7 J. ISLAMIC L. & 
CULTURE. 27, 45-46 (2002). 
162 See generally id. at 51-53 (elaborates the role of tafsir). 
163 Kamel, supra note 158, at 152. 
164 Abdullah S. Alarefi, Overview of Islamic Law, 9 INTER’L. CRIM. L. REV. 707, 711 (2009). 
165 Surat Al-Hashr 59:7; see also Freamon, supra note 160, at 19 (“The Sunnah is extremely 
important because, through it, the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) interpreted, clarified, 
explained, and complemented many of the principles revealed in the Qur'an.”). 
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b. Sunnah 
The Sunnah, as the second primary resource, is defined as any act, saying (hadith), or 
confirmation of another’s practice by the Prophet Muhammad.166 As a result, a Sunnah may take 
one of three forms.167 The first is an uttered Sunnah in which the Prophet spoke and addressed a 
certain issue. The second is a reported act performed by the Prophet. The third form is when the 
Prophet did not act or speak, but gave a confirmation of a certain act or statement. The Sunnah 
can play two main roles; the first is to be a supplement to the Qur’an, i.e., to be explanatory to the 
general provisions of the Qur’an.168 The second is to be a primary resource by providing a rule 
that is not given in the Qur’an.169 It is significant to mention that the Sunnah cannot violate the 
Qur’an, and that other sources should be in concurrence with the Qur’an and the Sunnah.170     
From what has been said so far, it can be seen that the Sunnah can be considered as an 
additional instrument that developed many of the Qur’anic principles. Thus, in addition to relying 
on the Qur’an’s commentaries, scholars consider the Sunnah to be a significant source for 
reaching a comprehensive understanding of the Qur’an in order to develop a particular doctrine.171 
Consequently, the Sunnah is considered as a first-tier source and has the same legal authority as 
the Qur’an. 
                                                
166 ABU ZAHRA, supra note 150, at 105 (A confirmation by the Prophet Muhammad of what a 
person has done or said agreeing that is acceptable.); see also Abdal-Haqq, supra note 161, at 47. 
(“Muhammad’s tacit approval of actions performed in his presence, i.e. his silence on a matter 
was interpreted as consent.”); see Abdulaziz S. Al-Rodiman, The Application of Shari’ah and 
International Human Rights Law in Saudi Arabia 7 (April, 2013) (unpublished Ph.D. 
Dissertation, Brunel University) (on file with author) (“The Sunnah refers to the Prophet’s actual 
life, actions, sayings, judgements or attitudes, whereas the Hadith relates mostly to what he said 
in expressive opinion on a subject.”).  
167 Alarefi, supra note 164, at 707-12.   
168 Id. at 712-3. 
169 Id. 
170 Abdal-Haqq, supra note 161, at 48-49. 
171 Kamel, supra note 158, at 154.  
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By the time of the Prophet Muhammad’s death in 632 C.E., there were more issues that 
were not referred to or addressed directly by the Qur’an or the Sunnah. Subsequently, 
supplemental sources of law were developed to deal with issues about which the Qur’an and the 
Sunnah had no direct rules.172 Thus, it was necessary to develop further supplemental sources, an 
undertaking carried out by the four Sunni schools of interpretation. The schools, however, ranked 
and applied the supplemental sources differently, which ultimately led to having an “intellectual 
framework within which the Shari'a maintained some rigid continuity, while at the same time 
preserving elasticity for change.”173 
c. Ijma (Consensus) 
Consensus (ijma) is recognized as the third source of Islamic law. Ijma occurs when the 
jurists of any era, not limited to a certain era, reach a consensus over an issue confronting them.174 
Ijma is derived from the affirmation of the community and unity of Muslims as an essential 
characteristic. This emphasis on the significance of the community and the legitimacy of 
consensus as a source of Islamic law is derived from various Qur’anic and Sunnah texts. In the 
Qur’an, for instance, a verse reads, “And hold you fast to God's bond, together, and do not 
scatter,”175 and another verse says, “But whoso makes a breach with the Messenger after the 
guidance has become clear to him and follows a way other than the believers’, him We shall turn 
over to what he has turned to and We shall roast him in Gehenna — an evil homecoming.”176 In 
                                                
172 Bassiouni & Badr, supra note 146, at 139-40. 
173 Id. at 140. 
174 C.G. WEERAMANTRY, ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 39 (1988) 
(“General consensus among Islamic scholars of a particular age in relation to the legal rule 
correctly applicable to the situation.”). 
175 Surat Ali-'Imran 3:103. 
176 Surat An-Nisa 4:115. 
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the Sunnah, there is a hadith of the Prophet Muhammad saying, “My community will never agree 
on an error.”177   
The question then becomes, whose opinions are considered in seeking consensus?  
Qualified jurists and scholars, known as mujtahidin (sing. mujtahid), are individuals who are 
identified by their ability and capability to form judgments relying on other Islamic sources (usul 
al-fiqh) following the process of ijtihad.178 Consensus (ijma) may take one of two forms: the first 
is an active consensus, which occurs when the mujtahidin in a certain era reach and express the 
same judgment regarding the same issue. The second is a passive consensus, which occurs when 
some mujtahidin express a judgment while the others remain silent and express no objections.179   
d. Qiyas (Analogical reasoning) 
The fourth source of Islamic law is analogical reasoning (qiyas), which has a wider 
application than consensus due to the fact that consensus is hard to reach in the contemporary era. 
The difficulties of reaching ijma can also be attributed to the differences in the attributes of each 
of the sources, since ijma is a group task, whereas qiyas is an individual task.180 As a result, 
opinions and judgments based on analogical reasoning are abundant.181  
                                                
177 Kamel, supra note 158, at 155. 
178 Bassiouni & Badr, supra note 146, at 153. Wael B. Hallaq, Considerations on the Function 
and Character of Sunnī Legal Theory, 104 J. AM. ORIENTAL SOC’Y. 679, 680-81 (1984) 
(“Whether in the final analysis an opinion was to be accepted as authoritative or to be rejected as 
weak was the primary function of the instrument of consensus (ijma). Consensus had the final 
say not only on the validity or invalidity of a juristic opinion but also on what of the Qur'an and 
Sunna is or is not to be accepted as a basis for that opinion. The consensus of the community, 
represented by its scholars, sanctioned law; on whatever the community agrees, the decision of 
consensus must be right.”). 
179 Bassiouni & Badr, supra note 146, at 153 (All four schools consider the active consensus as a 
source of law, while only two of them consider the passive consensus to be so.). 
180 Kamel, supra note 158, at 157. 
181 MUSTAFA AL-ZARQA, AL-MADKHAL AL-FIQHI AL-‘AM [General Introduction to 
Jurisprudence] 80 (2nd ed. 2004). 
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Qiyas can be defined as deriving a judgment on an unresolved issue from an existing 
judgment because they share the same raison d'être, known as illa in Arabic.  To render a 
judgment relying on qiyas, there must be an existing judgment or rule that is similar in its 
reasoning that can be applied to the new situation which has no rule or judgment. For the 
application of qiyas, the identification of the raison d'être of the existing rule is the first and 
fundamental step. This is different from the rationality expected of all legal rules, which is similar 
to hikma (wisdom),182 because illa is more specific.  
The prohibition of narcotic drugs, for example, was based on qiyas. To render a judgment 
on prohibiting narcotic drugs, a new situation with no rules, jurists relied on analogy by extending 
the prohibition on drinking alcohol, an existing rule in the Qur’an, because both kinds of 
prohibited substances have the same illa, that is, they are both intoxicating.183 Though the Hanifi 
School refrained from using qiyas, the Shafiʿi School applied it to determine punishments in 
Islamic law.184  
2. Secondary Sources 
In order to keep up with new issues as they arose over time, earlier scholars, mainly the 
founders of the four schools, developed a number of secondary resources to solve issues not 
covered by the primary sources.185 This sprang from the idea that Shari'a applies at all time and in 
                                                
182 ABU ZAHRA, supra note 150, at 249- 53. 
183 Bassiouni & Badr, supra note 146, at 156.  
184 ABU ZAHRA, supra note 150, at 259-61. 
185 Wael B. Hallaq, Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?, 16 INT’L. J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 3,  
 4 (1984) (“The Quran and the Sunna of the Prophet do not, as a rule, specify the law as it might 
be stated in specialized law manuals, but only contain some rulings (ahkam; pl. of hukm) and 
indications (dalalat or amiart) that lead to the causes ('ilal; pl. of illa) of these rulings.”).  
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all places. This chapter will shed light only on those sources that are related to the issues relevant 
to this dissertation.186  
a. Custom (urf) 
Custom, or urf, refers to the common practices of individuals in societies or communities. 
All of the Islamic schools consider custom as a secondary source of the rules of law.187 The 
authority of custom has been established in the Qur’an and the Sunnah.188 In practice, Islam did 
not reject the rules of the pre-Islamic Arabs, but rather adopted a number of rules that were 
compatible with the values and mission of Islam. Accordingly, custom is divided into valid 
customs, compatible with general Islamic rulings, and invalid customs, which are incompatible 
with Islamic rulings derived from the Islamic primary sources. Valid custom is further 
categorized into two categories: the first is a specific custom that is a practice of certain group of 
people, a certain business, or a certain region. The second is a general custom which is the 
practice of the people in all the regions or among many cultures.189 As a good example of the 
latter, taking an oath is upheld by the Islamic rules of law when giving evidence,190 and exactly 
what sum constitutes the crime of theft is defined by custom.191  
                                                
186 Bassiouni & Badr, supra note 146, at 141 (The secondary sources include, inter alia, the 
following:  
1. Masalih mursala (consideration of the public good); 
2. Istihsan (reasoning based on the best outcome, or equity); 
3. Urf (custom and usage, subdivided between general and special); 
4. The practices of the first four “Wise Caliphs” (a form of authoritative precedent); 
5. Treaties and pacts, and; 
6. The jurisprudence of judges.). 
187 Id. at 157. 
188 Surat Al-Haj 22:78; see also ABU ZAHRA, supra note 150, at 273. 
189 ABU ZAHRA, supra note 150, at 274. 
190 ABDULKARIM ZAIDAN, AL-WAJIZ FI USUL AL-FIQH [The Brief of Islamic Jurisprudence] 216 
(1998). 
191 3 MUHAMMAD I. AL-SHAFI‘I, AL-UMM [The Mother] 153 (1990). 
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b. The common good (masalih mursala) 
The common good (masalih mursala) can be defined as any common interest that has not 
been recognized by itself or has not been categorized in the primary sources.192 Islamic jurists 
identified five essential values that should be protected: personal faith, personal life, personal 
intellect, personal progeny, and personal wealth. Consequently, any rule that further endorses and 
protects these values and that is compatible with the Qur’an and the Sunnah is considered a valid 
rule.193 The presumption behind these five values is that they not only serve the individual’s 
interest, they also serve the community’s interest.194 Having that in mind, the common good, as a 
source of Islamic law, can be considered an essential source that has enabled Islamic law to 
advance and face social and economic changes.195 
c. Ijtihad (Individual Reasoning)  
To reach a ruling on a certain issue, scholars follow the process of ijtihad, which is 
“literally striving, the individual search for a ruling from God's law to govern a human action in 
conditions where the divine law is not definitively revealed.”196 A dialogue between the Prophet 
Muhammad and Mu’adh, when he was appointed as a judge and sent to Yemen, illustrates the 
process of the rule-making in Islamic law.  
The hadith is essentially as follows: 
The Prophet: “How wilt thou decide when a question arises?” 
Mu'adh: “According to the Book of Allah [the Qur'an].” 
The Prophet: “And if thou findest naught therein?” 
                                                
192 AL-ZARQA, supra note 181, at 100. 
193 Bassiouni & Badr, supra note 146, at 158. 
194 Id.  
195 Id. at 159. 
196 See FRANK E. VOGEL, ISLAMIC LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM: STUDIES OF SAUDI ARABIA 372 
(2000). 
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Mu'adh: “According to the sunnah of the Messenger of Allah.” 
The Prophet: “And if thou findest naught therein?” 
Mu'adh: “Then I shall apply my own reasoning [meaning ijtihad].”197  
Rule-making (ijtihad) is now governed by what has been known as usul al-fiqh, which has been 
described briefly in the discussion above.  
B.  Islamic Criminal Legislation  
 At the outset, crimes in Islamic criminal legislation can be divided into two main 
categories: determined and discretionary. The determined crimes include the crimes and 
punishments found in the Qur’an and the Sunnah. The determined crimes encompass the crimes 
of hudud, retribution (quesas), and compensation (diyya). The hudud crimes include exclusively 
seven crimes. Crimes of retribution (quesas) and compensation (diyya) acquired their names due 
to the fact that the punishment for these crimes includes either retributive punishment (quesas)—
i.e., a penalty equal to the victim’s injury—or monetary punishment (diyya). It is important also to 
mention that retribution is not applied if the victim or the victims’ heirs waive their right to 
compensation or retribution, or where other reasons make the application of retribution in-
executable or impossible.198    
                                                
197 Bassiouni & Badr, supra note 146, at 141 (“Ijtihad originated in Islam's Ist century as part of 
the doctrine of ray (opinion) and evolved through qiyas (reasoning by analogy). The doctrine of 
[ray] was at first based on authoritative texts and thus came under the doctrinal approach of 
ilm. It was Shafi'i who established the conceptual and doctrinal approach that was later followed 
by other scholars who expanded upon it”).  
198 Muhammad S. Al-Awwa, The Basis of Islamic Penal Legislation, in THE ISLAMIC JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 127, 127 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1982). 
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 The discretionary (ta’azir)199 crimes are the second category of crimes in Islamic criminal 
legislation. This category of crimes arose to protect individuals and societies from crimes that fall 
outside the hudud, quesas, and diyya framework. Having the category of ta’azir crimes is a 
method through which Islamic criminal law is able to cope with rapid social changes and 
challenges and to protect the five values that have been mentioned previously (personal faith, 
personal life, personal intellect, personal progeny, and personal wealth). 
1. The Classification of Crimes in Islamic Criminal Legislation 
Generally, what crimes have in common is the fact that they are all prohibited acts or 
omissions and are punishable; they differ, however, depending on the angle from which they are 
analyzed. The classification of crimes in Islamic criminal jurisprudence is based on the penal 
aspect, i.e., on the severity of the punishment.     
a. The Hudud Crimes  
“There are the limits ordained by God; so do not transgress the limits ordained by God.” 
“Those are God's bounds; do not transgress them. Whosoever transgresses the bounds of God — 
those are the evildoers.”200 Hudud literally means “limit” and the term refers to a certain group of 
crimes punishable by a hadd, a fixed punishment specified in the Qur’an; each of these crimes is 
an offense committed against the rights of God or the rights of individuals.201 In this category of 
crimes, the Qur’an criminalized the acts and their corresponding punishments, leaving the 
definition of other details and the elements of each of these crimes to the Sunnah. The seven 
                                                
199 See generally Ghaouti Benmelha, Ta'azir Crimes, in THE ISLAMIC JUSTICE SYSTEM 211, 211-
55 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1982) (Ta’azir can be defined broadly as corrective and 
discretionary punishment.). 
200 Surat Al-Baqarah 2:229. 
201 1 ABDULQADIR AWDAH, AL-TASHRI' AL-JINĀI' AL-ISLĀMI [Islamic Criminal Law] 78-79 (3d 
ed. 1963) (citing ALI IBN MUHAMMAD AL-MAWARDI, AL-AHKAM ALSULTANIYYA WA AL-
WILAYAT AL-DINIYAH [Ordinance of Government] 221 (Mustafa Al-Babi Al-Halabi 2d ed. 
1966)). 
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hudud crimes202 are theft,203 illicit sexual relations,204 sexual defamation,205 drinking 
intoxicants,206 apostasy,207 rebellion against the legitimate authority, and brigandage.208 
Hudud crimes are distinguished by their punishments because of the physical pain they 
involve. These severe punishments are not aimed at threatening Muslims, but instead at 
preventing the crimes by fighting their root causes and the milieu that enhances the growth of 
these crimes.209 Hudud punishments are subject to strict scrutiny and require strict evidence, 
making their application and enforcement neither automatic nor arbitrary.210 A good example of 
the hudud punishments’ effectiveness can be seen in the 1980s and 1990s,211 when Saudi Arabia 
and other Islamic countries had a lower rate of crime, mainly of hudud crimes, than did other 
countries.212   
                                                
202 AWDAH, supra note 201, at 79; see generally Silvia Tellenbach, Islamic Criminal Law, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 248, 251-53 (Markus D. Dubber and Tatjana Hörnle 
eds., 2014).   
203 See Surat Al-Ma'idah 5:38. 
204 See Surat An-Nur 24:2. 
205 See Surat An-Nur 24:4. 
206 See Surat Al-Ma'idah 5:90-9. 
207 See Surat Al-Ma'idah 5:35. 
208 See Surat Al-Ma'idah 5:33. 
209 Aly A. Mansour, Hudud Crimes, in THE ISLAMIC JUSTICE SYSTEM 195, 195 (M. Cherif 
Bassiouni ed., 1982).  
210 See generally id. at 197-200. 
211 See generally FREDA ADLER, NATIONS NOT OBSESSED WITH CRIME (1983).  
Sam S. Souryal, The Role of Shariah Law in Deterring Criminality in Saudi-Arabia, 12 INT'L J. 
COMP. & APPLIED CRIM. JUST. 1, 1-25 (1988). Seyed H. Serajzadeh, Islam and Crime: The 
Moral Community of Muslims, 4 J. ARABIC & ISLAMIC STUD. 111, 111-31 (2001) (Citing on p. 
113 crimes rates from the Second U.N. Survey of Crime Trends (United Nations 1992)); See also 
Mansour, supra note 209, at 201.  
212 Tellenbach, supra note 202, at 257 (“Punishments provided for in the Quran cannot be 
abolished but we can observe that they are seldom applied. Crucifixion, the punishment provided 
for highway robbery if the victim is killed and his property taken away, is reportedly applied in 
rare cases in Saudi Arabia …”). 
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b. Quesas and Diyya Crimes  
 These crimes are defined as crimes punishable by retaliation (quesas, i.e., the lex talionis 
principle)213 or by monetary compensation (diyya). This category covers mainly the homicide 
offences and battery offences, under each of which there are further classifications on the basis of 
intent (mens rea).214 The punishment, thus, varies depending on the intent of the offender. 
Consequently, intentional crime is punishable by the quesas or diyya, while the unintentional is 
subject to diyya. These crimes and their punishments are also established and defined by the 
Qur’an215 and the Sunnah.216   
 Since these offenses are considered crimes committed against a right of an individual, 
satisfaction or monetary compensation to the victim or to his or her family is required.217 In 
addition to these punishments, there are other penalties that might result from a conviction, such 
as exile or being prevented from receiving an inheritance.218 Crimes in this category, similar to 
                                                
213 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Quesas Crimes, in THE ISLAMIC JUSTICE SYSTEM 203, 203 (M. Cherif 
Bassiouni ed., 1982) (Quesas in Arabic means equality and theoretically refers to the idea of 
equalizing the harm in order to redress the misconduct. This is not, however, an exact meaning, 
as “retaliation” is used by a number of Western authors, implying more the meaning of revenge).  
214 Tellenbach, supra note 202, at 259 (“there is a system of three groups of crimes: intentional 
crimes, semi-intentional crimes, and crimes committed by mistake … Semi-intentional homicide 
comprises cases in which the act as such is intentional but the result is not… Homicide 
committed by mistake denotes both an accidental and negligent way of causing the death of a 
person.”). 
215 See Surat Al-Baqarah, 2:178; see also Surat Al-Ma'idah 5:45.  
216 BULUGH AL-MARAM, BOOK OF CRIMES (KITAB AL-JENAYAT), BOOK 9, HADITH 1216 (The 
Prophet said “If the relative of one of you is killed after my speech, his family has one of two 
choices: ‘Either they take his Diyah or kill the killer.’”); see also Nawal H. Ammar & Robert R. 
Weaver, Crime, Punishment, and Justice Among Muslim Inmates, 2 AFF. J. CRIM. JUST. STUD. 
64, 75-78 (2006). 
217 Bassiouni, supra note 213, at 204.  
218 Id. 
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those in the previous category, are also subject to sophisticated elements governing the 
application of the punishments219  
 Within the atmosphere of heightened emotions that might surround such situations, Islam 
encourages reconciliation between the parties, i.e., encourages the victim or his or her family to 
accept diyya, rather than insisting on quesas. Pardon and forgiveness is supported by numerous 
Qur’anic and Sunnah texts. The Qur’an says, “And the recompense of evil is evil the like of it; but 
whoso pardons and puts things right, his wage falls upon God; surely He loves not the 
evildoers.”220  It was also narrated that Anas bin Mãlik said, “I never saw the Messenger of Allah 
when any case involving retaliation was referred to him, but he enjoined pardoning.”221   
c. Ta’azir Crimes 
 The literal meaning of ta’azir is discipline, rehabilitation, or correction. Legally, Al-
Mawardi defined ta’azir as punishments inflicted for prohibited acts which are not punishable by 
hudud.222 Clearly, hudud and quesas crimes and punishments are not categories that cover all the 
crimes that could be committed. Consequently, there are several crimes that are left to the 
discretion of judges, jurists, and governors. This category encompasses any act jeopardizing the 
public good or considered damaging to the social order at any time. As a result, corrupt acts, 
sexual harassment, or human trafficking are without doubt condemned and held to be crimes by 
                                                
219 See generally id. at 204-08. 
220 Surat Ash-Shuraa 42:40. 
221 SUNAN ABI DAWUD. BOOK OF TYPES OF BLOOD-WIT (KITAB AL-DIYAT), BOOK 40, HADITH 
4482. 
222 ALI IBN MUHAMMAD AL-MAWARDI, AL-AHKAM ALSULTANIYYA WA AL-WILAYAT AL-
DINIYAH [Ordinance of Government] 236 (Mustafa Al-Babi Al-Halabi 2d ed. 1966). Tellenbach, 
supra note 202, at 262 (“Ta‛zir is typically applied to two groups of crimes. The first group is 
made up of crimes for which hadd punishment exists but in the case at issue one or more of its 
requirements are not fulfilled, for instance the value of the stolen object was insufficient. The 
second group deals with conduct that is forbidden in the Quran but for which no punishment is 
provided as well as for conduct that contradicts general principles of Islam.”). 
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any person at any time or place, since they bring harm, if not to the whole society, then certainly 
to individuals.223  
 Appropriately, ta’azir crimes may be divided into three essential categories. The first 
category covers those offences related to the hudud or quesas and diyya crimes, such as attempts 
to commit a crime of hudud, like attempted robbery. The second category involves offences 
punishable by hudud, but where one or more elements of a hudud crime is missing, such as a theft 
committed against a relative of the offender. The last category covers all other criminal acts that 
fall outside the hudud framework.224  
  Since this category is discretionary, judges evaluate harmful acts and apply the 
punishments they see fit. Accordingly, judges take into consideration the culpability, subjectively, 
of the offender, and objectively, of the nature of the offense.225 This discretion, however, is 
limited by the general principles of the framework of Islamic criminal law.226 In addition to that, 
the punishments are subject to certain restrictions that ensure the protection of communities and 
their welfare. First, a committed act must cause an actual harm, or at least threaten the public 
good.227 Second, the punishment must be justified and reasonable.228 Third, the reasoning behind 
the punishment must provide flexible rules that can be adapted to others’ situations.229         
This category provides Islamic criminal law with great flexibility, enabling communities 
to deal with changes that may occur at any time. This category of law requires the continuous 
                                                
223 Kamel, supra note 158, at 167; see also Ammar & Weaver, supra note 242, at 73-74. 
224 Bassiouni, supra note 213, at 213-14.  
225 Kamel, supra note 158, at 167.  
226 Id. at 167-68.  
227 Bassiouni, supra note 213, at 214.     
228 Id.    
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reform and development of jurisprudence to gain the full benefit of it. It can backfire, however, 
when jurists and judges do not keep up with new events.230   
2. The Legal Consequences of Classification  
a. Forgiveness and Amnesty  
Since their commission is considered an offense against the rights of God, neither 
forgiveness nor amnesty may be granted in hudud crimes. Consequently, forgiveness or amnesty 
has no legal effect on either the crime or the punishment.231 In quesas and diyya crimes, on the 
other hand, forgiveness, as previously noted, is encouraged but not mandatory, meaning that 
forgiveness may occur in this category if the victim agrees to accept monetary compensation 
instead of demanding punishment for the offender. The victim also has the right to issue a full 
forgiveness, i.e., one that does not even ask for monetary compensation. It must be noted that the 
right of forgiveness is limited to the victim and his or her relatives, under some circumstances. 
Therefore, judges or other officials who are considered delegates of the sovereign, and even the 
sovereign him- or herself, do not have the right to forgive such crimes, as forgiveness or 
reparations for these crimes are considered to be the rights of individuals.232 
In ta’azir crimes, forgiveness can be issued by a judge or a delegate of the sovereign. This 
is limited, however, if the victim has a right to retaliation or reparations, or if immediate harm 
occurred to an individual. By the same analogy, the victim has also the same right to forgive, but 
only within the scope of his or her rights; that is, a victim has no right to forgive if the crime 
damages the public order.233  
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b. Judicial Discretion as to Punishments 
 As mentioned before, if an offender is convicted of a hudud offense, the judge has no 
discretion either to minimize or to maximize the fixed punishment. The judge’s authority is 
limited in this category to examining the elements of the crime and, accordingly, either to issue a 
conviction or not.234 In the quesas category, the judge’s discretion is also restricted to imposing 
punishment once the offender is convicted. However, if the victim has fully forgiven the offender, 
the judge may have some discretion to impose a ta’azir punishment when the punishment is 
considered to serve the public good.235  
The judge’s discretion manifests itself more obviously in ta’azir punishments, but not 
beyond the principles of Islamic criminal law and the restrictions previously mentioned.236 
Mitigating circumstances, consequently, are more to be considered in imposing punishments in 
ta’azir crimes than in other categories of crimes.237   
c. Rules of Evidence  
 The basis for proving guilt in the hudud crimes is exceptionally restricted, meaning that 
such crimes cannot be proven by other means than by the testimony of a specified number of 
witnesses, which varies depending on the offence; thus, for example, to prove the offence of illicit 
sexual relations, four witnesses must testify, while for slander and defamation, two witnesses are 
sufficient to prove the offender’s guilt.238 In quesas crimes, the same means of proof applies, and 
such crimes cannot be proven by other means — two witnesses or confession are required to meet 
                                                
234 AWDAH, supra note 201, at 82.  
235 Id.  
236 Id. 
237 Id. at 83.  
238 Id. at 83-84.  
  57 
the legal requirements.239 In ta’azir crimes, on the other hand, the rules of evidence are more 
flexible.240  
 The Hanafi, the Shafiʿi, and the Hanbali schools of jurisprudence restrict the evidence 
(bayyina) to testimonies, confessions, oaths, and written documents. They rely on the following 
Qur’anic verse: “And be not loth to write it down, whether it be small or great, with its term; that 
is more equitable in God's sight, more upright for testimony, and likelier that you will not be in 
doubt. Unless it be merchandise present that you give and take between you….”241 The Maliki 
School adopted the more liberal view and included more than 17 types of evidence, while the 
jurist Ibn Al-Qiem242 recognized 26 types of evidence.243  
3. Characteristic Features of Islamic Criminal Justice System  
a. The Religious Character of Islamic Criminal Legislation  
 Since most of its regulations are derived either directly (as with hudud, quesas, and diyya) 
or indirectly (based on Muslim jurists’ reasoning and discretion, or ijthad) from provisions of the 
Qur’an or Sunnah, which have been characterized as divine resources, these regulations have a 
religious character. Consequently, the definition of Islamic Shari'a is “the collection of legal 
provisions (ahkam) divinely revealed to the Prophet.”244  Thus Alshafi noted that “[f]or 
everything that affects the life of a Muslim, there is prescribed in the Qur’an a guide to lead him 
on the right way.”245   
                                                
239 Id. at 83. 
240 Id.  
241 Surat Al-Baqarah 2:282. 
242 AḤMAD M. AL-HUSARI, ILM AL-QADA: ADILAT AL-ITHBAT [Jurisprudence of Judiciary] 16 
(1977). 
243 Id.  
244 Al-Awwa, supra note 198, at 128.  
245 Id. at 130. 
  58 
 As a consequence of this religious character, 246 
1. conformity to these provisions is considered an act of faith in God;  
2. violation of these provisions is punishable in this life and in the hereafter;   
3. obedience to these provisions results from the previous two consequences;  
4. enforcement of these provisions is a part of the state’s obligations according to the 
principles of Islamic government; and 
5. a change of the ruler does not change the law.247   
b. Protection of Morality  
In a number of Qur’anic and Sunnah texts, the emphasis on morality and moral values can 
be clearly observed. The reasoning behind the prohibition of drinking alcohol, for instance, is 
based on morality: “Satan only desires to precipitate enmity and hatred between you in regard to 
wine and arrow-shuffling, and to bar you from the remembrance of God, and from prayer. Will 
you then desist?”248 Another example is the hadith in which the Prophet says, “I was sent to 
perfect good character.”249  
Due to the religious character of Islamic law, the conflict between Islamic criminal 
legislation and moral values is minimized. Furthermore, the issue of the intervention of criminal 
law to protect morality does not arise due to the integrated relationship between moral principles 
and Islamic criminal legislation.250   
                                                
246 Id. at 130-31. 
247 AWDAH, supra note 201, at 73.  
248 Surat Al-Ma'idah 5:91. 
249 MUWATTA MALIK, BOOK OF GOOD CHARACTER (KITAB HUSN ALKHULQ), BOOK 47, HADITH 
8. 
250 WAEL B. HALLAQ, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 20 (2009) (“Thus, all acts are regarded 
as sharʿi (i.e., subject to the regulation of the Shariʿa and therefore pronounced as law – “law” 
being a moral-legal commandment” …). 
  59 
 One of the consequences of the religious character previously mentioned, i.e., punishment 
in this life and in the hereafter, also gives an indication of this character. This link between the 
present life and the hereafter increases the link between the criminal justice system and moral 
values. In short, one of the reasons or sources of respect for and conformity to Islamic criminal 
provisions is Islamic principles of morality.  
c. Equality before the Law and the “Equal Application of the Law” 
 Again, this principle is manifested clearly in Qur’anic and Sunnah texts. A Qur’anic verse 
reads, “O mankind, we have created you male and female, and appointed you races and tribes, 
that you may know one another. Surely the noblest among you in the sight of God is the most 
godfearing of you. God is All-knowing, All-aware.”251 The significance of this principle was 
emphasized by the Prophet when he stated that “[w]hat destroyed the nations before you, was that 
when a noble person committed theft, they used to leave him (without punishment), but if a weak 
person among then committed theft, they would inflict the legal punishment on him.”252 He then 
stated, as a role model, that even if Fatimah, his daughter, was the offender, the specified 
punishment (the hadd) would be carried out. Further, several Qur’anic verses clearly command 
believers to avoid discrimination on any basis, whether of race, religion, kinship, or state of 
hostility.253 
 This strong emphasis was a result of the discrimination that had previously existed in the 
Arab world specifically and in the surrounding nations generally. As has been stated earlier in this 
chapter, among the pre-Islamic Arabs, the application of punishments was extremely 
discriminatory, which was a result of the fact that the Arab nation was constructed of highly tribal 
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competitors for wealth, resources, prestige, and power. The ultimate result, unsurprisingly, was 
wars between tribes that lasted for decades. As a direct response, the Prophet abolished 
discriminatory customs.254     
C.  Corruption in Islamic Law 
Fasad, often used as an equivalent to the word corruption, in Arabic literature refers to 
any conduct or article that contradicts goodness or the good.255 The definition covers a wide range 
of conduct that jeopardizes the society, economy, morality, or politics.256 Thus fasad translates to, 
inter alia, mischief, abuse, rottenness, putrefaction, depravity, wickedness, viciousness, iniquity, 
and dishonesty.257 
Accordingly, the Islamic perspective on corruption is quite broad and is not limited to a 
certain act, nor to a certain category of office, so long as the phenomenon referred to affects the 
principles of justice.258 This broad perspective results in there being a number of definitions and 
even more categories of crimes that can be considered corrupt practices. It must also be taken into 
consideration that these crimes fall under the umbrella of ta’azir crimes, since neither they nor 
their punishments were identified in the Qur’an.259 What follows from considering corrupt 
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practices to be ta’azir crimes is that these practices can be proven by a variety of types of 
evidence, rather than the prosecution being limited to specific types of evidence.260   
1. Bribery  
As a Qur’anic verse states, “O my people, fill up the measure and the balance justly, and 
do not diminish the goods of the people, and do not mischief in the land, working corruption.”261 
The Qur’an prohibits individuals from giving bribes262 to rulers, judges, and decision makers in 
order to obtain a favorable ruling.263 In the Sunnah, there is an explicit prohibition of bribery, as 
narrated by Abdullah ibn Amr ibn al-'As: “The Messenger of Allah cursed the one who bribes and 
the one who takes bribe.”264 It has been reported on the authority of Abu Humaid as-Sa'idi, who 
said the following: 
The Messenger of Allah appointed a man in charge of Sadaqat (similar to tax) to be 
received from another tribe. When he came back, the Messenger of Allah asked him to 
render his account. He said: This wealth is for you (i.e. for the public treasury) and this is 
a gift (presented to me). The Messenger of Allah said: You should have remained in the 
house of your father and your mother, until your gift came to you if you spoke the truth; 
then he addressed us. He praised God and extolled Him, and afterwards said: I appoint a 
man from you to a responsible post sharing with the authority that God has entrusted to 
me, and he comes to me saying: This wealth is for you (i.e. for the public treasury) and 
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this is a gift presented to me. Why did he not remain in the house of his father and his 
mother and his gift came to him, if he was truthful? By God, any one of you will not take 
anything from (the public funds) without any justification, but will meet his Lord carrying 
it on himself on the Day of judgment. I will recognise any one of you meeting Allah and 
carrying a growling camel, or a cow bellowing or a goat bleating.265 
 Jurists, accordingly, have provided a number of definitions of bribery, but the most 
comprehensive definition is, as Ibn Abidin defined it, that bribery is what is given to a ruler, 
judge, or others to obtain a favorable ruling or to gain a needed benefit.266 This definition is quite 
broad, since it does not specify what is given nor to whom it is given. In light of the analysis of 
bribery in Islam, jurists and scholars have categorized bribery, and, accordingly, the ruling for 
each type.  
 The bribery may differ depending on the purpose for giving it. It might be paid in order to 
invalidate someone’s rights or to validate a falsehood, such as obtaining a ruling or judgment that 
favors the briber. The bribery may also be paid in order to obtain a public position. Both of these 
cases are considered bribery, and punishment should be applied both to the briber and to the 
bribee. 
 What is controversial among the jurists is the case where the bribery is paid by an 
individual to obtain or secure his or her right or to reverse an injustice. The dissent considers this 
situation as no different from the previous situation, i.e., as a crime of bribery, since this disagrees 
with the general rules of Islamic jurisprudence.267 The majority of scholars, however, including 
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the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafiʿi, and Hanbli schools of jurisprudence, hold that the briber is permitted 
and not guilty, but the bribee is still forbidden from accepting the bribe, and if he does so, he is 
guilty of bribery.268 The majority based their authority on a Quranic verse that reads, “God does 
not burden any soul beyond its ability,”269 and a hadith narrated by Ibn 'Abbas that the Prophet 
said, “Allah has forgiven my nation for mistakes and forgetfulness, and what they are forced to 
do.”270  
 A critical issue related to bribery is whether a particular gift is considered a bribe or not. 
Generally, gifts are permitted and encouraged between individuals. However, rulers are not 
allowed to accept gifts. The same ruling applies to judges in the following situations:  
1. A gift from a party to a dispute. 
2. A gift from an individual who did not give gifts to the judge before that person was 
elevated to the judiciary; in other words, a gift that was given solely because of the judge’s 
position.  
3. An unusual gift from an individual who used to give gifts to the judge before he became a 
judge.    
The rules about gifts to judges also apply to public officials in general.271 A principle in 
regard to gifts that can be derived from the previous analysis is that if the gift is given because of 
the official’s position, it is a bribe.    
2. Nepotism and Intercession (shafa’ah) 
 The term shafa’ah, or intercession, corresponds to the concept of nepotism, known today 
as wasta. It can be defined as intercession on behalf of another individual in order to gain a 
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benefit or prevent harm.272 Based on legality, Shari'a divides intercession into two categories: 
permissible intercession and forbidden intercession. Between these two categories, a fine line is 
drawn. A Qur’anic verse says, “Help one another to righteousness and piety; do not help each 
other to sin and transgression.”273  
Accordingly, permissible intercession can be defined as intercession to uphold and gain a 
benefit that is considered an individual’s right. In contrast, intercession that results in others’ 
losing their rights, in transgressing public good and order, or in upholding falsehood or deception 
falls under the category of forbidden intercession.274 In contemporary times, intercession is also 
forbidden when it used to violate a regulatory statute, for instance, traffic violations, fees, and so 
forth.275 For forbidden intercession, the intent is self-centered, since permissible intercession must 
spring from a pure intent to help; otherwise, it will be forbidden. So, for example, if intercession 
is done with the intent to get a non-monetary276 benefit, i.e., to obtain a service or intercession in 
return, or if it is motivated by any illegal reason, it falls into the category of forbidden 
intercession.277 
A number of Qur’anic and Sunnah texts forbid the former category. In addition to the 
previously cited verses, in the Qur’an, a verse says, “Whoso intercedes with a good intercession 
shall receive a share of it; whosoever intercedes with a bad intercession, he shall receive the like 
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of it….”278 Commentators indicate that “shall receive a share of it” implies that this kind of 
intercession is forbidden and is rewarded with punishment in this life and in the hereafter.279  
In the Sunnah, the previously mentioned hadith (footnote 253) is another example where 
the Prophet, as the highest authority, refused the intercession of Osama280 when he was 
interceding with him not to execute punishment on a thief, and condemned Osama’s deed. It has 
also been narrated on the authority of Abu Dharr, one of the Prophet’s companions, who said,  
I said to the Prophet: Messenger of Allah, will you not appoint me to a public office? He 
stroked my shoulder with his hand and said: Abu Dharr, thou art weak and authority is a 
trust, and on the Day of judgment it is a cause of humiliation and repentance except for 
one who fulfills its obligations and (properly) discharges the duties attendant thereon.281  
The previously mentioned Qur’anic and Sunnah verses are in agreement with the principle 
of equality and in general with justice as a fundamental principle of Shari'a, since the forbidden 
type of intercession ultimately generates inequality of opportunity and rights. It also works 
against honesty and trustworthiness, which eventually results in corruption.282  
Principles that can be derived from this understanding are as follows: 
1. Intercession that would work against the public good and order is forbidden. 
2. Intercession that would impair equality and justice for all citizens is forbidden.  
And further, as a strategy to combat corruption, do not appoint someone who asked to be 
appointed because he will follow that pattern in appointing others.   
                                                
278 Surat An-Nisa 4:85.  
279 MA'ABREH, supra note 272, at 185. 
280 Osama was one of the Prophet’s companions and was adopted by him; see footnote 253. 
281 SAHIH MUSLIM, THE BOOK ON GOVERNMENT (KITAB AL-IMARA), BOOK 20, HADITH 4491. 
MA'ABREH, supra note 272, at 185 (Jurists also argue that an individual should not be appointed 
as a judge if he asked to be appointed.).  
282 Id. at 187. 
  66 
D.  Islamic Mechanisms of Combating Corruption  
 It can be said that Islam has dual mechanisms, both internal and external, for fighting 
corruption. The internal mechanisms aim at establishing self-control or self-government. In order 
to achieve that, what is required is adherence to the Islamic principles and commands derived 
from the Qur’an and the Sunnah. The external mechanisms rely on the broad criminalization of 
abuse of power and crimes of dishonesty by categorizing them under the broad category of 
ta’azir.  
1. The Internal Mechanisms   
As noted previously, Islamic law is characterized as religious law, which implies that 
responsibility for such law exists both in this life and in the hereafter. This implies that in making 
risk assessments, Muslims must take into consideration not only the risks of being caught in this 
life, but also the consequences of their deeds in the hereafter. This, however, does not exist 
without roots. Moral education is required to establish and enhance the internal mechanisms. 
Conduct, and especially moral conduct, is an external reflection of social values. In a 
similar vein, to fight corruption, social values must form the frontline of defense by condemning 
corrupt acts on moral grounds. A moral education is exactly what has been established and 
followed in Islamic criminal legislation, not only as regards corruption, but also in relation to 
other criminal acts.283 
Although compliance with divine commands and standards is, on the face of it, done to 
please God, it also serves another purpose solely aimed at human beings. This is what is referred 
to as huquq al-íbad, or individuals’ rights and duties toward each other.284 This category 
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establishes several morally based standards to organize and govern individuals and communities, 
and eventually nations. This path aims at achieving a peaceful and just co-existence of 
individuals.285 To sum up the significance of the internal aspect of individuals’ behavior, consider 
the concept of justice in Islam. A Qur’anic conception of justice implies that justice emanates 
from the interior of individuals (bāţin), rather than from the exterior (zāhir). Thus, true justice 
requires the proper intention behind it.286  
2. The External Mechanisms  
 Since the corruption-fighting mechanisms at the internal or personal level can fall short, 
and can even be expected to do so, for a variety of reasons, Islam has recognized the need for 
external mechanisms that fight corruption also. The external mechanisms are manifested in a 
series of laws and incentives. The ta’azir category of crime, as noted above, was developed in 
order to provide adequate flexibility to define contemporary crimes based on how they endanger 
the five essential values mentioned previously. This was enhanced by the precaution of 
criminalizing a series of acts in furtherance of fighting the root causes of corruption, or the crimes 
that might lead to corrupt practices in the future.  
 As a mechanism for fighting the root causes of corrupt practices, Islamic criminal 
legislation creates no scope under which the legalization of corruption will be allowed. This zero 
tolerance stance toward corruption appears lucidly in the rejection of the so-called “grease that 
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oils the economic wheels” or any form of unjustified facilitation of business endeavors.287 Such a 
mechanism can also be seen in the principle that rulers should refuse to appoint individuals to 
positions in the judiciary who are actively seeking such a position and are relying on their 
connections with high public officials, and the tight restrictions on, if not the complete prohibition 
of, officials’ acceptance of gifts.288  
 At the administrative level, not only is the separation of powers promoted, but also a 
restricted framework of legislation is implemented. The legislative process, as has been explained, 
is well established by defining and rooting it in transcendent rules and principles. This 
characteristic feature makes Islamic legislation something that it is difficult for the state to 
monopolize for political purposes. Instead, the Islamic legal framework opens the door to 
knowledgeable and sophisticated jurists and scholars who are not necessarily affiliated with the 
state.289  
CONCLUSION 
The Qur’anic and Sunnah provisions that have been cited clearly condemn and reject 
corruption. Moreover, corruption clearly negates the main characteristic features and principles 
established and articulated by Shari‘a. Most notably, corruption contradicts the protection of 
morality since corruption is essentially an act of dishonesty which is inconsistent with moral 
principles. Furthermore, corruption jeopardizes the equal application of the law, an aspect to 
which Islamic jurisprudence has responded with firm disapproval, as has been noted.    
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Islamic law and principles have to be distinguished from the practice of individuals 
within Muslim nations. Though it does not designate or assign a penalty, Islamic law pronounces 
its firm rejection of several corrupt practices. Thus, those practices remain subject to the ta’azir 
crimes and penalties since they violate the principles and commands of Shari‘a. These can be 
considered, as previously noted, the external mechanisms for fighting corruption. In fighting 
corruption, however, Islam also relies on the internal mechanisms, which derive their 
effectiveness from the religious character of Islamic criminal law.   
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CHAPTER THREE: BACKGROUND: SAUDI ARABIAN LAW 
INTRODUCTION  
This chapter seeks to explore and provide a foundation to the Saudi criminal justice 
system; it gives an overview of the criminal judicial system, jurisdiction, and criminal 
procedures. It also offers a brief introduction to the development of the Saudi legal system and 
identifies the challenges facing it. Following that, the general problem of corruption in Saudi 
Arabia is highlighted.   
A.  The Saudi Criminal Justice System 
Essentially, Saudi criminal law is derived from mainly from three resources: Islamic law, 
statutory law, and royal decrees and orders. Saudi Arabia confirms its adherence to Islamic law 
through articles 1,290 7,291 and 48292 of the Basic Law of Governance. Consequently, Saudi Arabia 
remains reliant on Islamic criminal jurisprudence when identifying the substantive and general 
rules of criminal law and refrains from adopting a criminal penal code.293 Since the Saudi 
criminal justice system adopts Islamic criminal jurisprudence,294 crimes are classified in 
accordance with the traditional classification of Islamic criminal jurisprudence as follows:  
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1. The hudud crimes include the seven crimes of theft, illicit sexual relations, sexual defamation, 
drinking intoxicants, apostasy, rebellion against the legitimate authority, and brigandage.    
2. Quesas and diyya crimes cover the crimes of homicide and battery.  
3. Ta’azir crimes encompass all other types of crimes.  
In general, as discussed in the preceding chapter, there are four schools of Islamic 
jurisprudence, each of which places an emphasis on certain aspects of law in a way that 
distinguishes it from the others. This can be an emphasis on traditions, logic, or textual 
interpretation.295 In each Muslim country, there tends to be a strong reliance on one of the schools 
more than the others. The situation in Saudi Arabia, however, needs further explanation.  
The Hanbali School is recommended, but not mandatory, for the Saudi courts to follow—a 
fact that runs contrary to the argument of some scholars that the Saudi courts are mandated to 
apply the Hanbali School.296 The Royal Order issued by King Abdulaziz in 1346H/1928 indicates 
that there is no required school of jurisprudence, so long as the reasoning of the holding is in 
accordance with the general principles of Shari’a.297 The Royal Order also recommended a 
number of works authored by Hanbali scholars and jurists as guidance, rather than as a mandatory 
requirement.298 
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(6) Ash-Sharḥ ul-Kabīr (Grand Explanation) by Muwaffaq al-Dīn Ibn Qudāmah.) 
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Thus, Saudi judges handle cases by relying on direct reference to Qur’anic and Sunnah 
texts, rather than by “making close analogies to Hanbali fiqh rules.”299 The situation in Saudi 
Arabia, as described by Shaykh Al-Lahaydan, is this: “Saudi qadis [judges] are Hanbalīls, though 
they do not commit themselves in every one of their cases to the school of the Imam Ahmad.”300 
Instead, judges “are required to be Hanbalis in their fiqh, but only as a starting point, for the sake 
of unification of the system.”301 Dr. Hamad al-Faryan, former Deputy Minister of Justice for 
Administrative and Financial Affairs, noted that practitioners in the Saudi legal system have told 
him that “Saudi judges do occasionally apply rules from other schools when they believe such 
rules are suited to the case before them.”302      
  Additionally, statutory laws, influenced by the civil law system (mainly by the legal 
systems of France and Egypt), have emerged since the late fifties.303 The statutory laws are 
generally issued by royal decrees through the Council of Ministers as the legislative branch.304 
Accordingly, ta’azir crimes are partially but not completely codified in Saudi Arabia. The 
criminalization of certain acts and practices is done in one of two ways. The first is by setting 
forth a complete criminal act, such as the Anti-Bribery Law, the Anti-Money Laundering Law, 
the Law of Combating Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances, and so forth. The other way this 
                                                
299 VOGEL, supra note 196, at 122.  
300 Id. at 125.  
301 Id. at 126 (citing Dr. Hamad al-Faryan interview.).  
302 Id. 
303 Maren Hanson, The Influence of French Law on the Legal Development of Saudi Arabia, 2 
ARAB L. Q. 272, 272-91 (1987).  
304 (Note that Royal Orders, unlike Royal Decrees, are that group of regulations that have been 
issued by the king without going through the Council of Ministers. The laws enacted by Royal 
Decree include the Basic Law of Governance, the Shura Council Law, the Council of Ministers 
Law, and the Regional Law.) see, e.g., Abdulrahman AlMasnad, Unclaimed Money in Saudi 
Banks 11 (March, 2013) (unpublished S.J.D. Dissertation, Indiana University) (on file with 
author).   
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occurs is through the criminalization of some acts within other laws. This can be seen, for 
instance, in the Commercial Court Law305 and the Saudi Arabian Citizenship System.306   
 The adoption of statutory laws derives its legitimacy from the doctrine of the common 
good (al-maslahah al-mursalah) as a source of Islamic laws, so long as provisions are in 
accordance with the divine law.307 Being in accord with and in conformity to the principles of 
Shari’a as a stipulation for the legitimacy of the codified law, which can be seen in a number of 
provisions in different laws.  For instance, Article 67 of the Basic Law of Governance states that 
“[t]he regulatory authority shall have the jurisdiction of formulating laws and rules conducive to 
the realization of the well-being or warding off harm to State affairs in accordance with the 
principles of the Islamic Shari‘a.”308 
1. The Criminal Judicial System 
 According to the most recent Law of the Judiciary,309 Saudi Arabia has a three-tier court 
system consisting of First-Degree Courts, Courts of Appeals, and the High Court.310 The structure 
                                                
305 Commercial Court Law, Royal Decree No. 32 of 1350H (corresponding to 1930), art. 143 
(SA). 
306 Law of Saudi Arabian Citizenship System, Royal Decree No. M/54 of 1425H (corresponding 
to 2004), art. 26 (SA).  
307 Frank E. Vogel, The Public and Private in Saudi Arabia: Restrictions on the Powers of 
Committees for Ordering the Good and Forbidding Evil, 70 SOC. RES. 749, 571 (2003) (“In the 
formulation given to siyasa by the ulama, a ruler to take any legal action as long as it meets two 
conditions: 1) serves the general or public interest [al-maslahah al-mursalah]; 2) gives no 
offense to a fundamental principle or rule of the Sharia.”). 
308 The Basic Law of Governance, supra note 290, art. 67; see also Law on Procedures before 
Shari'a Courts, Royal Decree No. M/2 of 1435H (corresponding to 2013), art.1 (SA); see also 
Law of Criminal Procedures, Royal Decree No. M/2 of 1435H (corresponding to 2013), art. 1 
(SA) (“Courts shall apply to cases before them provisions of Shari’a laws, in accordance with the 
Qur’an and Sunnah of the Prophet (peace be upon him), and laws promulgated by the State that 
do not conflict with the Qur’an and Sunnah, and their proceedings shall comply with the 
provisions of this Law.”). 
309 Law of the Judiciary, Royal Decree No. M/78 of 1428H (corresponding to 2007) (SA) (The 
Executive mechanism for developing the judicial system was set forth in the same Royal Decree, 
part 6 of section I, as follows: 
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of the first two tiers is based on specialized courts where the matter of the case determines the 
specialized court in which it is tried. The number of judges hearing a case depends also on the 
matter of a case.311   
In the first-degree courts, the criminal courts have jurisdiction over criminal cases. The 
criminal courts consist of three specialized panels: the hudud and qisas cases panel, the ta’azir 
cases panel, and the juvenile cases panel.312 Generally, cases in these panels are heard by a three-
judge panel with exception of some offences which the Supreme Judicial Council has specified 
should be tried by one judge.313 In districts where there are no specialized criminal courts, general 
courts establish a criminal cases panel that has a jurisdiction over the criminal cases.314  
 For criminal cases, the courts of appeals are structured in the same way as the first-degree 
courts, with minor differences. The courts of appeals do not consist of a number of panels, as the 
first-degree courts do; instead, the criminal circuits have jurisdiction over all criminal cases, 
including those that were decided by the general courts.315 The general rule is that three judges 
rule on a case, but there are five judges in cases dealing with homicide, amputation, stoning, or 
qisas cases.316 The role of the High Court is critical, since any ruling on homicide, amputation, 
stoning, or qisas cases must be affirmed by that Court.317  
                                                                                                                                                       
§ 6. Relocate the Criminal Circuits in the Board of Grievance to The Criminal Courts. 
§ 7. Transfer all the criminal cases to the criminal courts. 
§ 8. Transfer all the proceeding criminal cases in the Board of Grievance to The Criminal 
Courts.). 
310 Id. art. 9. 
311 Id. art. 15, 20, & 21. 
312 Id. art.  20.  
313 Id. 
314 Id. art. 23. 
315 Id. art. 16. 
316 Id. art. 15.  
317 Law of Criminal Procedures, supra note 308, art. 10. 
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2. Jurisdiction 
In identifying the Saudi jurisdiction, it is important to give an overview of the concept in 
ancient Islamic jurisprudence. The four schools of jurisprudence are divided over the issue of 
jurisdiction. The majority, including the Maliki, Shafi‘i, and Hanbali Schools, hold that Islamic 
laws apply to any individual who has committed a crime inside a Muslim country, yet the laws 
apply only to a Muslim or a dhimmi318 who commits a crime outside a Muslim country, similar to 
the principle of nationality .319 The Hanafi School, however, restricts the jurisdiction to crimes 
committed within a Muslim country’s boundaries and committed only by a Muslim or dhimmi.320  
According to the Saudi Criminal Procedures Law, jurisdiction is determined by the place 
where the crime was completely or partially321 committed, or the residence of the accused.322 In 
the case of a conflict of jurisdiction, the High Court identifies which court has jurisdiction over 
the case.323 In codified laws, generally Saudi jurisdiction is based on the principle of 
territoriality,324 which links the jurisdiction with the place where the crime was committed, unless 
otherwise specified. This is can be confirmed by inference from Article 3 of the Law of Terrorism 
Crimes and Financing, which states that, “[n]otwithstanding the principle of territoriality, the 
provisions of this Law shall apply to any person, Saudi or non-Saudi, who commits, aids, 
attempts, instigates, participates or conspires to commit—outside the Kingdom—a crime 
                                                
318 JUAN E. CAMPO, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM 194 -195. (2009) (“Dhimmis are non-Muslims who 
live within Islamdom and have a regulated and protected status.”). 
319 AWDAH, supra note 201, at 287.  
320 Id. at 280-1. 
321 Law of Criminal Procedures, supra note 308, art. 131.  
322 Id. art. 130.  
323 Id. art. 134. 
324 Rollin M. Perkins, Territorial Principle in Criminal Law, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 1155, 1155 
(1971). 
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provided for in this Law….”325 Other laws specify the jurisdiction over and the application of the 
provisions to certain group of individuals, which can be seen in the Anti-Bribery Law, as will be 
illustrated in Chapter Six.   
3. Criminal Procedures 
Criminal procedure is regulated by the Criminal Procedures Law326 and its executive 
regulation.327 The provisions of the Law can be divided into two main categories: investigative 
procedures and trial procedures. In the investigative procedures, the law first identifies the 
investigative bodies. Instead of identifying their jurisdictions precisely, the Law refers to other 
laws or orders laying out their jurisdictions.328 Additionally, the Law regulates the collection and 
seizure of evidence,329 flagrante delicto,330 arrest procedures,331 searches of individuals and 
homes,332 seizure of mail and surveillance,333 and the investigative process.334  
                                                
325 Law of Terrorism Crimes and Financing, Royal Decree No. M/16 of 1435H (corresponding to 
2013), art. 3 (SA); see also Combating Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, Royal 
Decree No. M/39 of 1426H (corresponding to 2005), art. 4 (SA). 
326 Law of Criminal Procedures, supra note 308. 
327 Executive Regulation of Law of Criminal Procedures, Royal Decree No.142 of 1436H 
(corresponding to 2015) (SA).  
328 Law of Criminal Procedures, supra note 308, art. 26 (“The authority of investigation the 
crimes are conducted by:  
1. Bureau of Investigation and Prosecution. 
2. Directors of police and their assistants in the various provinces, counties, and districts.  
3. Public security officers, secret service officers, passport officers, intelligence officers, 
civil defense officers, prison directors and officers, border guard officers, special security 
forces officers, national guard officers and military officers, each in accordance with their 
specified duties with respect to crimes committed within their respective jurisdictions.  
4. Heads of counties and chiefs of districts.  
5. Captains of Saudi ships and airplanes, with respect to crimes committed on board.  
6. Heads of centers of the Bureau for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, with 
respect to matters falling within their jurisdiction.  
7. Employees and other individuals who have powers of criminal investigation pursuant to 
special regulations.  
8. Entities, commissions and other persons who have been assigned to conduct an 
investigation pursuant to the regulations.”). 
329 Id. § 3, pt. 1. 
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In the trial procedures, the Law identifies the courts’ jurisdictions335 (as noted above), trial 
procedures,336 and the appeals process.337 In trials, the Bureau of Investigation and Prosecution 
has jurisdiction over prosecuting criminal cases, in addition to the authority to investigate 
criminal cases.338 It must be noted, however, that the Law on Procedures before Shari'a Courts 
applies in any case where “there are no provisions provided herein, and in matters that are not 
inconsistent with the nature of penal actions.”339 The case par excellence is that the provisions 
regulating the law of evidence in the Law on Procedures before Shari'a Courts will be applied in 
criminal cases, since the Law of Criminal Procedures does not regulate them as the former law 
does.   
B.  The Historical Development of Laws  
Saudi Arabia has witnessed some significant legal changes, especially in the past decade. 
Nevertheless, the Saudi legal system is still in need of reform.340 In essence, the Saudi legal 
system is based on the interaction between three factors: Islamic law, modern law, and the Saudi 
                                                                                                                                                       
330 Id. § 3, pt. 2. 
331 Id. § 3, pt. 3. 
332 Id. § 3, pt. 4. 
333 Id. § 3, pt. 5. 
334 Id. § 4 (Regulates the authority of investigators, assignment of experts, crime scene 
inspection, disposal of seized items, questioning the witnesses, interrogation process, summons, 
detention warrants, and temporary release.). 
335 Id. § 5. 
336 Id. § 6.  
337 Id. § 7.  
338 Id. §15. 
339 Id. art. 218. 
340 ANTOINETTE VLIEGER, DOMESTIC WORKERS IN SAUDI ARABIA AND THE EMIRATES: A SOCIO-
LEGAL STUDY ON CONFLICTS 227 (2012).  
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tribal structure.341 Identifying the history of each element can help in identifying the main 
obstacles the Saudi legal system faces.   
Saudi Arabia, and more specifically King Abdulaziz, opted to follow Islamic law and 
based the legal system’s identity on that since its establishment in 1926. To have a comprehensive 
understanding of the reason why, it is necessary to step back and take a broader view. An early 
Saudi Sheikh, Mohammed ibn Sa’ud (1710–1765), had established an alliance with Muhammad 
ibn Abdul Wahhab (1703–1791).342 When the latter observed a deviation from the pure Islamic 
faith, the former offered support for him to achieve his goal of returning to the pure faith.343 Thus, 
when King Abdulaziz came to power, he adopts the same path of restoring pure Islam as the 
foundation of the new Saudi State in order to unify and unite scattered people from diverse areas 
and tribes. Since then, Islam as a religion continues to be the foundation of the country344 and has 
formed the country’s identity and its legal and political system.345 
Further, Saudi Arabia holds a position of particular eminence within the Muslim world, 
since the Holy Cities, Mecca and Medina, are located within its boundaries. The fact that the 
birthplace of Islam constitutes a distinctive status of Saudi Arabia is another reason why Islamic 
law ought to be the basis of the country’s legal system.346 Consequently, Muslims around the 
                                                
341 Hossein Esmaeili, On a Slow Boat towards the Rule of Law: The Nature of Law in the Saudi 
Arabia Legal System, 26 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 6 (2009).  
342 PETER W. WILSON, SAUDI ARABIA: THE COMING STORM 16 (1994) (Provides essential 
information about Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab.). 
343 FOUAD FARSY, MODERNITY AND TRADITION: THE SAUDI EQUATION 20-22 (1990).  
344 FAIRCHILD, supra note 294, at 58.   
345 Ziad A. Al-Sudairy, The Constitutional Appeal of Shari'a in a Modernizing Saudi State, 2 
MIDDLE E. L. & GOVERNANCE. 1, 6 (2010). 
346 Esmaeili, supra note 341, at 7; see also Al-Sudairy, supra note 345, at 5. 
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world consider Saudi Arabia the center of Islam and that the Shari'a should govern every aspect in 
this area, and the government bears the responsibility to protect and uphold it.347  
Being the birthplace of Islam has also a significant impact manifested in the role of tribal 
laws and customs in the Saudi legal system. As explained in Chapter 2, Arab traditions and 
customs have had an influence on Islamic law.348 In Saudi Arabia, unlike in other Muslim 
countries, Arab customs overlap with Islamic law.349 This is mainly because in other Muslim 
countries, such as Turkey, Iran, or Asian countries, the traditions and customs to some extent may 
not be consistent with Islamic principles.350  
The role of tribal customs appears in the process of settling cases, or mediation. A case par 
excellence is the homicide cases, where the tribes engage in the process of settlement in order to 
persuade the victims or their heirs to accept monetary compensation instead of qisas.351 
Furthermore, the role of tribal customs has caused some difficulties in the application of some 
                                                
347 Esmaeili, supra note 341, at 8-9. See also Mark Jones, Islamic law in Saudi Arabia: a 
responsive view, 16 INT’L. J. COMP. & APPLIED CRIM. JUS. 43, 45-46 (1992). 
348 Esmaeili, supra note 341, at 16 (In addition to custom as a source of Islamic law, there are 
three main channels through which pre-Islamic Arab customs became part of Islamic legal 
system. 
1. There are practices and rules that existed before Islam and were upheld in Islam. 
2. There are practices and rules that were neither upheld nor overruled. 
3. There are practices and rules that exist though they were banned by Islam.).    
349 Id. at 8-9. See also VOGEL, supra note 196, at xviii (“Looking only at the legal system 
neglects essential study of that system's social underpinnings, even the influences of customary 
or tribal laws.”).    
350 Id.    
351 Id. at 22 (The negotiation process witness the heavy involvement of middlemen who might be 
people with high stature in the community in order to receive a commission for their 
involvement, which is against Islamic principles.); see, e.g., Diyya auction; who is paying more, 
ALRIYADH NEWSPAPER, Jan. 22, 2013, http://www.alriyadh.com/803684  
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laws, on the one hand, and created fertile ground for certain crimes to thrive on the other. This can 
be seen most obviously in crimes of domestic violence.352  
Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia has opposed tribal rules and customs353 and has reduced their 
impact to some extent. This is mainly because the movement of Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab 
at its core aimed at diminishing those traditions that violated the Shari'a.354 Moreover, civilization 
and the movement into cities has also weakened those customs.355 In line with the increase in 
civilization, a number of laws were promulgated against those customs.356   
Modernity and civilization lead to the third element of Saudi legal system history, namely, 
modern laws and a modern legal system. Modern laws and a modern legal system have clearly 
been developing, as will be described in the next section, since the beginning of the twenty-first 
century. However, the ongoing issue in Saudi Arabia is whether the authorities, the state, or rulers 
can codify the Shari'a rules and adopt a codified legal system.357  
The dilemma here is essentially between the role of the authorities and the role of judges. 
Judges’ autonomy springs from the autonomy of Shari'a from all human beings through the 
practice of ijitihad,358 whereas the authorities gain their power from siyāsa shar´iyya,359 the power 
                                                
352 See, e.g., Ministry of Interior States that Traditions and Customs Impede the Application of 
Law of Protection from Abuse, ALRIYADH NEWSPAPER, Dec. 28, 2014, 
http://www.alriyadh.com/1007693; see also Sahar Alhabdan, Domestic Violence in Saudi Arabia 
11 (October, 2013) (unpublished S.J.D. Dissertation, Indiana University) (on file with author) 
(“It must be stressed, though, that economic-social abuse is often a result of tribal legacies, 
tradition, and culture of the family rather than actual Islamic teachings.”).  
353 VOGEL, supra note 196, at 157. (explaining the impact of settlement). 
354 Id. at xvi; see also Esmaeili, supra note 341, at 22. 
355 Id. 
356 See, e.g., Law of Protection from Abuse, Royal Decree No. M/52 of 1434H (corresponding to 
2013) (SA). 
357 Esmaeili, supra note 341, at 30.    
358 VOGEL, supra note 196, at 372 (Ijitihad literally means “striving, the individual search for a 
ruling from God's law to govern a human action in conditions where the divine law is not 
definitively revealed.”).  
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and rule of governance given to the authorities through the common good, masalih mursala, as a 
non-textual source. Between these two poles, the ulamā360 and the judges on one side and the 
authorities and rulers on the other, the issue arose.361  
As a firm response to the movement toward codification, the Board of Senior Ulamā 
issued a fatwa362 rejecting the idea of codification.363 Furthermore, due to Shari'a judges’ 
reluctance to apply the state’s legislation, which comes in the form of codes, and their insistence 
on applying the traditional form of Islamic law, the jurisdiction of Shari'a courts over a number of 
cases were relocated to several administrative boards, specialized committees, and 
commissions.364  
This issue has existed since the establishment of Saudi Arabia, but it became more acute 
after the discovery of oil, when Saudi Arabia was about to step into the arena of international 
trade. Saudi Arabia is not the only country facing this issue,365 yet it must also reckon with the 
                                                                                                                                                       
359 IBN QAYYIM AL JAWZY, AL TURUQ AL HUKMIYYAH FI AL SIASAH AL SHAREIAH [The Rules 
in Religious Policies] 16 (1961) (siyāsa shar´iyya is defined as “necessary measures taken for the 
well-being of people and to distance them from corruption even if there is no authority for such 
measures in the Islamic sources.”); see also id. at 329 (illustrating the siyāsa shar´iyya, 
explaining that “in public matters it acknowledges, though often tacitly, broad discretion in the 
ruler, but seeks even then to place doctrinal limits on his affairs. Its doctrine for doing this, the 
siyāsa shar´iyya, attempts to constrain ruler action by dictating for it positive and negative 
requirements: positively, it declares that siyasa stems from public or general utility; negatively, it 
requires that it not conflict with shari’a.”). 
360 Id. (the ulamā refers to scholars of the religious sciences and Islamic jurisprudence.) 
361 See generally Ayoub M. Al-Jarbou, The Role of Traditionalists and Modernists in the 
Development of the Saudi Legal System, 21 ARAB L. Q. 191, 191-229 (2007). 
362 A fatwa is an advisory opinion by a qualified scholar on a point of Islamic law. 
363 3 SENIOR SCHOLARS RESEARCH [LAJNAT AL-BUHUTH], FATWA NO.8. [TADWIN AL-RAJIH] 
231-239 (2001). 
http://www.alifta.net/Fatawa/FatawaChapters.aspx?languagename=ar&View=Page&PageID=29
7&PageNo=1&BookID=1. See also VOGEL, supra note 196, at 339. 
364 Al-Sudairy, supra note 345, at 8. 
365 See, e.g., FAZLUR RAHMAN, ISLAM AND MODERNITY: TRANSFORMATION OF AN INTELLECTUAL 
TRADITION. (1984) (Providing more examples about the experience of a number of Muslim 
countries.). 
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additional factor of being the birthplace of Islam, which has made the area unconditionally 
controlled by Shari'a since then.366 Looking back at history, we can see that the Ottoman Empire 
went through an almost similar experience.367 The Ottomans adopted a hybrid system which had 
Islamic law and state legislation, mainly similar to the Western system, and established a dual 
legal system of secular courts and Shari'a courts.368 However, the Hijaz area in which the Holy 
Cities are located was governed by Shari'a and Shari'a courts.369  
The debate over codification is not a new issue in Saudi Arabia370 and in fact the debate 
has been going on since 1926, when the Hijaz was conquered.371 The continuous debate seems to 
indicate a sort of agreement between the two parties specifically on three points: firstly, the status 
quo in Saudi Arabia is neither adequate nor stable. Secondly, the smooth and effective interaction 
between policymaking and Shari'a and between laws and courts requires a legal system that 
creates and enhances more internal harmony. Finally, all of that should lead in one direction, 
avoiding the creation of “the sort of ideologically dual (secular/religious) legal system” that exists 
in many neighboring countries.372   
 
                                                
366 Al-Sudairy, supra note 345, at 5. 
367 See generally VOGEL, supra note 196, at 309-62 
368 Al-Sudairy, supra note 345, at 4. 
369 Id.  
370 See generally Haitham Osta, Modernization, Codification and the Judicial Analysis: 
Exploring Predictability in Law in Sharī`a Courts in Saudi Arabia (Feb, 2015) (unpublished 
Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Washington School of Law) (on file with author). 
371 Gayle E. Hanlon, International Business Negotiations in Saudi Arabia, in ABA GUIDE TO 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS NEGOTIATIONS: A COMPARISON OF CROSS- CULTURAL ISSUES AND 
SUCCESSFUL APPROACHES 891 (James R. Silkenat et al. eds., 3d ed. 2009).  
372 VOGEL, supra note 196, at 310.    
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Figure 1. Saudi Legal Dilemma 
C.  The Saudi Legal System in the Twenty-First Century  
The Saudi legal system has been subject to significant legal amendments in an effort 
aimed at modernizing the legal system. At the outset of the twenty-first century, the Law on 
Procedures before Shari'a Courts was promulgated.373 A year later the Criminal Procedures 
Law374 was issued to bring together a number of scattered procedures issued in various laws and 
ministerial circulars under one law.375  
In 2007, the Law of the Judiciary was amended to change the landscape of the litigation 
system and trial law and to unify the court system.376 The Law, as previously noted, establishes 
                                                
373 Law on Procedures before Shari'a Courts, supra note 308. 
374 Law of Criminal Procedures, supra note 308. 
375 ABD AL-FATAḤ KHIḌR,  AL-SIMAT AL-MAWDU’IYAH WA AL-IJRA’IYAH LE NIZAM AL-JINA’I 
BI-AL-MAMLAKAH AL-ARABIYAH AL-SAUDIA [The Substantive and Procedural Features of the 
Criminal Justice System of Saudi Arabia] 60-64 (2007) (illustrates the old provisions governing 
the criminal procedures.). 
376 Al-Sudairy, supra note 345, at 2. 
Islamic Law and 
Principles  
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criminal courts for the first time in order to unify the jurisdiction over criminal matters.377 In 
addition to the specialized courts, the judicial system was transformed to a three-tier court system. 
Subsequently, judicial powers were assigned to the newly established Supreme Court instead of to 
the Supreme Judicial Council.378 Courts of appeals were also introduced to create a “fully fledged 
court of appeals” system, in place of the Shari’a Review Court (mahkamat al-tamyiz).379 
Moreover, the Law of the Board of Grievances was also replaced in creating the three-tier court 
system.380  
In 2013, upon the establishment of the new judicial system, the procedures were again 
revisited. This time all the procedures were replaced with new laws, including the Criminal 
Procedures Law,381 the Law on Procedures before Shari'a Courts,382 and the Law on Procedures 
before the Board of Grievances.383 This group of procedural laws were promulgated to include 
provisions regulating the appeals process in accordance with the new judicial system.  
Substantively, though the penal code seems far from being adopted, criminal laws and 
provisions have developed. In the past decade alone, most of the criminal laws have been 
introduced or revised. Nevertheless, there are number of fragments and drawbacks due to the lack 
                                                
377 Under the previous system, the jurisdiction over criminal cases was divided among several 
administrative boards, specialized committees, and commissions, in addition to the Shari'a courts 
and the Board of Grievances.  
378 Law of the Judiciary, supra note 309, art. 11; see also Al-Sudairy, supra note 345, at 12.  
379 Id. See also Abdullah F. Ansary, A Brief Overview of the Saudi Arabian Legal System, 
HAUSER GLOBAL LAW SCHOOL PROGRAM NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW (Nov. 15, 
2016, 8:19 PM), http://www.nyulaw.global.org; see generally Abdulaziz K. Al-Hamoudi, 
Criminal Defense in Saudi Arabia: An Empirical Study of the Practice of Criminal Defense in 
Saudi Arabia 43-4 (2014) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Washington) (on file 
with author). 
380 Law of Board of Grievances, Royal Decree No. M/78 of 1428H (corresponding to 2007) 
(SA). 
381 Law of Criminal Procedures, supra note 308.  
382 Law on Procedures before Shari'a Courts, supra note 308. 
383 Id. 
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of criminal provisions related to certain criminal acts. Another related issue is the absence of a 
sentencing guide.384   
At the international and regional level, Royal Order 7/b/12661 was issued urging all 
governmental agencies to revise and amend laws that are necessary for Saudi Arabia to sign 
international treaties.385 Near the end of 2005, Saudi Arabia joined the World Trade Organization 
(WTO).386 At the regional level, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries have 
started adopting unified laws;387 such laws aim at strengthening the foundation of GCC markets. 
If this cooperation is developed and extended further, this may result in the adoption of a unified 
penal code.  
To summarize, the development of the Saudi legal system shows that the formal system of 
government law retains legitimacy and effectiveness. Despite the challenges posed by the other 
poles, formal laws have their own influence on individuals and their behaviors and acts, which 
                                                
384 Fahad Al-Majed, Al-Tfawt fe Al-Hkam Al-Qadaieh [Disparities in judicial decisions], in AL-
NIZAM AL-ADLI FI AL-SAUDIAH [Justice System in Saudi Arabia] 283-296 (Mansour A. Al-
Haidari & Mohammad Al-Besher eds., 2015). 
385 Royal Order No. 7/B/12661 17/03/1424H (corresponding to May. 18, 2003) (SA); see also 
Hussain Agil & Bruno Zeller, Foreign Investments in Saudi Arabia, 15 INT'L TRADE & BUS. L. 
REV. 60, 61 (2012) (“As many as 55 investment related laws 'and their implementing rules' have 
since been enacted.8 Which as an example include the Commercial Law, the Capital Market 
Law, Foreign Investment Law, and Companies Law, banking Control Law, Cooperative 
Insurance Companies Control Law, and Anti-Money Laundering Law among others.”). 
386 See generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, SAUDI ARABIA INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT 
(2014) (A number of reforms were taken subsequent to accession to the WTO); see Saudi Arabia 
to Begin Major Overhaul of Its Judiciary, IHS MARKET, Mar. 10, 2007, 
https://www.ihs.com/country-industry-forecasting.html?ID=106597596 (noting that the judicial 
reform was enacted in accordance with WTO specifications). But see Steffen Hertog, Two-Level 
Negotiations in a Fragmented System: Saudi Arabia's WTO Accession, 16 REV. INT’L. POL. 
ECON. 650, 668 (2008) (The author is skeptical about the WTO’s legal impact, stating that “some 
domestic reform measures seem to have been pushed through under the WTO label although 
they are not strictly linked to the WTO’s technical requirements, including reform of the Saudi 
court system.”). 
387 See, e.g., Trademark Law of the GCC States, Royal Decree No. M/51 of 1435H 
(corresponding to 2014) (SA). 
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can be observed through the obedience to formal regulations and laws in recent times. The 
demands for reforms in many aspects of the legal system also bear witness to the significance of 
formal laws and regulations.   
D.  Corruption in Saudi Arabia   
Corruption in Saudi Arabia can be found at the highest levels of the government, which, 
however, does not imply that there is no corruption at the middle and lower levels.388 Over the last 
three decades, there has been a gradual increase in the level of corruption at the lower levels, 
boosted by an increase in the cost of living alongside “stagnating wages.”389 Accordingly, the 
corruption level may differ from one institution to another.390 On the other hand, the judicial 
branch remains relatively clean compared to other countries and to other branches of government 
in Saudi Arabia.391 Judicial corruption mainly manifests itself in cases involving land registration 
and disputes.392    
                                                
388 BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG, BTI 2016-SAUDI ARABIA COUNTRY REPORT 29 (2016).  
389 Id. Ghassan H. Alshmrani, Athr Alraqabah Almaliah fi Alhyah Alwataniah le Mukafahat 
Alfasad be Almamlakah Alarabia Alsaudia Lelhad min Amliat Alfasad, [The Impact of Saudi 
National Anti-Corruption Commission in Limiting Financial Corruption] 31 (November, 2013) 
(unpublished MBA Thesis, Arab East College) (on file with author). (63% of Saudis believe that 
financial corruption has become more prevalent in the present time); see also “Nazaha” Fighting 
Corruption in Saudi Arabia, LEX ARABIAE (Oct. 12, 2016, 8:19 PM), http://lexarabiae.meyer-
reumann.com/nazaha-fighting-corruption-in-saudi-arabia/; see also Saudi Arabia's Efforts in 
Protecting the Integrity and Fighting Corruption, ALRIYADH NEWSPAPER, Nov. 1, 2010, 
http://www.alriyadh.com/573272 (Compare the number of the cases investigated by the General 
Directorate of Criminal Investigations and Research Public Security between 2005 and 2009.). 
390 BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG, supra note 388, at 29. (For example, the Central Bank (SAMA), the 
Royal Commission for the Industrial Cities of Jubail and Yanbu, and Aramco remain relatively 
cleaner than other government institutions.); see generally Countries at the Crossroads 2012: 
Saudi Arabia, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/report/countries-
crossroads/2012/saudi-arabia. (last visited Nov. 15, 2016).  
391 Saudi Arabian Judicial System, BUSINESS ANTI-CORRUPTION PORTAL, http://www.business-
anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/middle-east-north-africa/saudi-arabia/judicial-system.aspx. 
(last visited Nov. 15, 2016).  
392 BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG, supra note 388. 
  87 
 The United States came close to investigating and prosecuting a number of corruption 
cases that occurred in Saudi Arabia through the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).393 For 
instance, through the FCPA, the U.S. Department of Justice discovered a bribe of $500,000 a year 
that was paid for five years to a Saudi official in exchange for rewarding HealthSouth a contract 
for operating a hospital.394 Regrettably, a number of other cases that are cited as being among the 
largest settlements in the history of the FCPA took place partly or completely in Saudi Arabia.395  
This can be attributed partly to a lack of disclosure coupled with the absence of 
transparency, which indicates the absence of public accountability. Through the history of Saudi 
Arabia, it is rare to hear of an official being tried on corruption charges.396 Thus, the “naming and 
shaming” strategy of calling attention to corruption does not often take place in Saudi Arabia.397 
Further, the dismissal of public servants is considered a challenge to the officials’ superiors and a 
                                                
393 See, e.g., SEC sanctions two former defense contractor employees for FCPA violations, U.S. 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Nov. 17, 2014), 
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370543472839#.VGpwPWPgfIA.  
SEC charges Pfizer with FCPA violations, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Aug. 
7, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171483696.  
See also SEC v. Pride International, Inc., Civil Action No. 4:10-cv-4335 (S.D. Texas, Nov. 4, 
2010), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr21726.htm.  
394 See Former HealthSouth Officers Indicted in Connection with Bribery Involving Saudi 
Hospital, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (July 1, 2004), 
http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2004/July/04_crm_463.htm    
395 Alstom Pleads Guilty and Agrees to Pay $772 Million Criminal Penalty to Resolve Foreign 
Bribery Charges, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, (Dec. 22, 2014), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/alstom-pleads-guilty-and-agrees-pay-772-million-criminal-
penalty-resolve-foreign-bribery. See also BAE Systems PLC Pleads Guilty and Ordered to Pay 
$400 Million Criminal Fine, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. (Mar. 1, 2010), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bae-systems-plc-pleads-guilty-and-ordered-pay-400-million-
criminal-fine   
396 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, SAUDI ARABIA INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT 17 (2015).  
397 Naming and shaming corrupt officials, THE SAUDI GAZETTE, Feb. 20, 2014, 
http://www.sauress.com/en/saudigazette/196391  
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restriction on their discretion.398 All of these issues derive their support from the patronage 
culture.399  
Thus, the backbone of the patronage culture is favoritism, including, inter alia, the practice 
of nepotism and cronyism, more broadly referred to as wasta, which has a dual function. It 
functions by itself in many cases as a practice of corruption where it takes the form of influence-
peddling. In addition to this function, it can open a path for other corrupt practices to occur. This 
can occur through the collaboration of middlemen and their role in facilitating bribery, for 
instance, which depends in the first place on reciprocity and trust between the parties.  
In 2015, the National Anti-Corruption Commission (Nazaha) conducted a survey to assess 
corruption in Saudi Arabia.400 The survey revealed that the practice of wasta was the most 
prevalent corrupt practice constituting about 62 percent of the corrupt practices in the country. On 
the other hand, around 81 percent of the corruption in Saudi Arabia was attributed to the 
complexity of procedures and to outdated laws.401 Consequently, what can be derived from this 
survey is that wasta forms a challenge to the Saudi legal system, as will be explained in Chapter 
Five. Secondly, the legal instruments available have proved to be inadequate to fight corruption. 
                                                
398 BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG, supra note 388, at 28. 
399 Business Corruption in Saudi Arabia, GAN BUSINESS ANTI-CORRUPTION PORTAL. (Nov. 15, 
2016),  http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/middle-east-north-
africa/saudi-arabia/show-all.aspx  
400 According to a Recent Study: Wasta Is the Most Prevalent Corrupt Practice, NATIONAL ANTI-
CORRUPTION COMMISSION (Feb. 1, 2017, 10:04 AM), 
http://www.nazaha.gov.sa/Media/News/Pages/news953.aspx  
401 See also RIYADH ECONOMIC FORUM, ALFSAD ALEDARY WA ALMALI: ALWAQA' WA ALATHAR 
WA SUBL ALHADD MENH [Administrative and Financial Corruption: Reality, Consequences, and 
Combating it] 52 (2013) (This study also support the same finding. In this study, 1302 
Participants were asked to rate how much they believe that there is a need to a legal reform on 
a Likert scale of 1 to 5, with 1 corresponding to “strongly disagree” and 5 corresponding to 
“strongly agree”. The median was 4.5, which indicates that the majority of participants strongly 
agreed with the need for legal reform to combat corruption.).  
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CONCLUSION  
The present chapter has offered a brief review of the Saudi criminal justice system that has 
surveyed the criminal judicial system itself and the issues of jurisdiction, and criminal procedures. 
This chapter has also examined the development of the laws and regulations in Saudi Arabia and 
the challenges associated with such development. The chapter concluded by examining briefly the 
problem of corruption in Saudi Arabia.   
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CHAPTER FOUR: CORRUPTION AND SAUDI ARABIAN SOCIETY 
INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter explores the Saudi criminal justice system in general and corruption 
in Saudi Arabia and the anti-corruption legal framework in particular. Since society plays a 
significant role in corruption in Saudi Arabia, it is essential to give an overview of Saudi history, 
culture, and society. At the outset, this chapter will examine the relationship between society and 
corruption. After briefly reviewing corruption in Saudi Arabia, it will then proceed to provide 
essential background about Saudi history, culture, and society. Finally, it concludes by 
examining corruption through the lens of sociology and social psychology by outlining the 
argument of Ibn Khaldun, representing a sociological analysis of cultures similar to Saudi 
Arabia, and by examining the influence of power and intergroup biases on corrupt behaviors and 
acts.  
A.  Societies and Corruption 
The question attracting scholars in the early discourse on corruption was, why do certain 
societies or countries seem to be more inclined to be corrupt than others? In an effort to provide 
an answer to this question, scholars have set forth two main analyses.402 The first analysis was 
culturally based, arguing that corruption is a result of social norms which value loyalty and gift-
giving over the rule of law. This analysis also has two main streams; the first expresses the views 
of the moralists, most notably Banfield403 and Wraith and Simkins,404 who considered those 
norms and corrupt behaviors to be both politically immoral and economically harmful. The 
                                                
402 See Gabriella R. Montinola & Robert W. Jackman, Sources of Corruption: A Cross-Country 
Study, 32 BRIT. J. POL. SCC’Y. 147, 148 (2002). 
403 See generally BANFIELD, supra note 60.  
404 See generally RONALD E. WRAITH & EDGAR SIMPKINS, CORRUPTION IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES (1964). 
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second stream, represented by Wertheim405 and other scholars, merely seeks to shed light on the 
differences in norms and the results of such differences. 
The second stream, led by the revisionists, argued that corruption is merely a result of 
political and administrative norms that are different from those adopted in the West.406 Those 
norms, in their view, satisfy political, economic, and administrative demands. Influenced by the 
revisionist school, some have argued in favor corruption, since it enhances the efficiency of 
bureaucrats, helps in avoiding the problems of capital formation, and provides administrative 
flexibility.407 Others, despite adopting the same view—that corruption is a result of the process of 
modernization—remain skeptical about its positive consequences or its necessity.408  
During the 1960s, revisionists and moralists engaged in a lengthy and unresolved debate. 
As the discourse on corruption has advanced, a new approach has emerged that bases its analysis 
on public choice.409 This approach focuses on many economic and political variables and attempts 
                                                
405 Willem F. Wertheim, Sociological Aspects of Corruption in Southeast Asia, in POLITICAL 
CORRUPTION: READINGS IN COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 195, 195–211 (Arnold J. Heidenheimer ed., 
1970). 
406 Montinola & Jackman, supra note 402, at 148 (“corruption stimulated by events in the new 
states … attributed the phenomenon to a country's particular stage of development.”). 
407 See Leff, supra note 12, at 11; see also SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN 
CHANGING SOCIETIES 69 (1968) (“In terms of economic growth, the only thing worse than a 
society with a rigid, overcentralized, dishonest bureaucracy is one with a rigid, overcentralized, 
honest bureaucracy.”); see also MYRON WEINER, THE POLITICS OF SCARCITY; PUBLIC PRESSURE 
AND POLITICAL RESPONSE IN INDIA 253 (1962) (describing the advantage of corruption in India, 
arguing that “[m]any economic activities would be paralyzed were it not for the flexibility which 
bakshish contributes to the complex, rigid, administrative system”). 
408  See, e.g., JAMES C. SCOTT, COMPARATIVE POLITICAL CORRUPTION (1972). 
409 Peter J. Hill, Public Choice: A Review, 34 FAITH & ECON. 1, 1 (1999) (“Public Choice is best 
defined as the application of the rational choice model to non-market decision-making. In a more 
general sense, it has meant the application of economics to political science. … The Public 
Choice Society was established in 1965 by Gordon Tullock and James Buchanan. Founded upon 
the economic model of rational choice, it had the explicit goal of facilitating exchange of work 
and ideas at the intersection of economics, political science, and sociology.”); see, e.g., James M. 
Buchanan, Social Choice, Democracy, and Free Markets, 62 J. Pol. Econ. 114, 114-23 (1954); 
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to find a causal nexus between these variables and corruption.410 However, the answer to the 
previous question remains unresolved and open to debate.  
Thus, scholarly approaches differ in answering the question of why some societies have 
more corruption than others, and consequently what they attribute corruption to and how they 
analyze it differ. While some scholars build their analysis on the organizational and societal level, 
others tend to center their analysis on the individual—that is, some scholars attribute corruption 
primarily to societies rather than to the individual, other scholars do the reverse. In attempting to 
find an answer, we should take into consideration some of the concepts from different approaches 
and analyses.  
The popular explanation adopted by sociologists of the different levels of corruption 
between the countries emphasizes the different norms adopted by different countries which result 
in different perceptions of the same acts. However, it cannot be assumed that non-Western 
countries are not concerned with corruption.411 In fact, in many of the developing countries, 
respondents to public opinion polls consider corruption to be one of the top problems in their 
country. In China, for example, people condemn guanxi (personal and political connections) on 
the one hand, while on the other they still “admire the ingenuity of individual exploits among 
their acquaintances in its use.”412 Moreover, as one scholar has noted, “A major problem with 
                                                                                                                                                       
see, e.g., Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 
224, 224-32 (1967).  
410 See, e.g., Chapter 1 of this dissertation (the studies explaining the causes and consequences of 
corruption). Montinola & Jackman, supra note 402, at 149 (arguing that at their core, public 
choice explanations of corruption attribute the phenomenon to a lack of competition in either or 
both the economic and political arenas).    
411 Pranab Bardhan, Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues, 35 J. ECON. LITERATURE 
1320, 1330 (1997). 
412 Id. at 1331. 
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norm-based explanations is that they can very easily be near-tautological (‘a country has more 
corruption because its norms are more favorable to corruption’).”413 
With that being said, numerous scholars argue that the difference between the public 
perception in different cultures of certain acts as being corrupt or not is the reason for the different 
levels of corruption—that is, what is considered a bribe in the West may be considered a gift in 
other cultures.414 To complicate the issue, however, a number of studies suggest that there is a 
firm moral disapproval of corruption even in the most corrupt countries. For instance, a study 
conducted by the Afrobarometer in the African context asked respondents to evaluate three 
different potential acts by government officials, and whether they would consider these acts to be 
“wrong but understandable” or “wrong and punishable.””415 The vast majority of the African 
respondents considered the acts in all three scenarios “wrong and punishable.”416 
                                                
413 Id.  
414 Anna Person et al., Why Anticorruption Reforms Fail: Systemic Corruption as a Collective 
Action Problem, 26 GOVERNANCE 449, 455-56 (2013); see generally Arnold J. Heidenheimer, 
Perspectives on the Perception of Corruption, in POLITICAL CORRUPTION: CONCEPTS AND 
CONTEXTS 141, 141-54 (Arnold J. Heidenheimer and Michael Johnston eds., 2002) 
(distinguishing between the different forms of corruption and explaining the public acceptance of 
such practices); see, e.g., Jean-Pierre O. de Sardan, A Moral Economy of Corruption in Africa, 
37 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 25, 25–52 (1999) (arguing that corruption in Africa “socially embedded 
in 'logics' of negotiation, gift-giving, solidarity, predatory authority and redistributive 
accumulation.”); see generally Italo Pardo, Who is Corrupt? Anthropological Reflections on the 
Moral, the Criminal, and the Borderline, 23 HUM. AFF. 124, 124-47 (2013) (Compare between 
the Brits and the Italian perception of what is considered as a corrupt act.). Mark Levin & 
Georgy Satarov, Corruption and Institutions in Russia, 16 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 113, 113–32 
(2000). 
415 The three scenarios were if a public official: 
1. “decides to locate a development project in an area where his friends and supporters 
lived.”  
2. “gives a job to someone from his family who does not have adequate qualifications.” 
3. “demands for a favor or an additional payment for some service that is part of his job.” 
416 Carolyn Logan et al., Citizens and the State in Africa (Afrobarometer Network, Working 
Paper No. 61, 2006). WILLIAM L. MILLER ET AL., A CULTURE OF CORRUPTION? COPING WITH 
GOVERNMENT IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE (2001) (Provides a number of empirical studies 
examining inter alia the perception of individuals in Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and 
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Yet despite this firm disapproval, individuals in corrupt countries not only choose not to 
punish corrupt acts, but also continue to perpetuate them. Individuals in such settings are not 
necessarily corrupt, but they are corruptible417—that is, in a given setting, individuals engage in 
corrupt acts even though they morally disapprove of them and comprehend the negative social 
consequences of them, since they know that these are the rules of the game by which they can 
gain more benefit. In the short term, not being corrupt is not only costly, but also will not change 
the rules of the game, and this ultimately drives individuals to continue to engage in corrupt 
behaviors.418    
The most relevant form of corruption that may help in providing a comprehensible view of 
the situation is the concept of systemic corruption introduced by Caiden and Caiden. In their 
words, “Systemic corruption occurs whenever the administrative system itself transposes the 
expected purposes of the organization, forces participants to follow what otherwise would be 
termed unacceptable ways, and actually punishes those who resist.”419 Consequently, corruption 
is structural and systemic rather than incidental. Caiden and Caiden argued that the revisionists 
tend to consider corruption in individual terms, even though the revisionists identify corruption as 
a social phenomenon.  
                                                                                                                                                       
Ukraine about corrupt practices.); see also STEN WIDMALM, DECENTRALIZATION, CORRUPTION 
AND SOCIAL CAPITAL: FROM INDIA TO THE WEST 166-173 (2008) (Based on a survey conducted 
in India, Sten found that corruption is not accepted by the majority of the respondents). 
417 William L. Miller, Corruption and Corruptibility, 34 WORLD. DEV. 371, 371 (2006). 
418 See Bo Rothstein, Anti-Corruption: The Indirect ‘Big Bang’ Approach, 18 REV. INT’L. POL. 
ECON. 228, 231 (2011) (“In general, agents at the bottom of a corrupt system … have no 
incentive to refrain from corrupt practices because even if they as individuals start behaving 
honestly, nothing will change.”). 
419 Gerald E. Caiden & Naomi J. Caiden, Administrative Corruption, 37 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 301, 
306 (1977); see generally SOMA PILLAY, DEVELOPMENT CORRUPTION IN SOUTH AFRICA: 
GOVERNANCE MATTERS 24-27 (2014) (distinguishing generally between systemic corruption and 
individual corruption). 
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Systemic corruption exists not only in poor countries, but also in any country which is an 
organizational society420—those societies that value organizational loyalty more than the public 
interest. It is worth noting that systemic corruption is known to exist and to thrive in certain kinds 
of transactions rather than others.421 The example par excellence is military and defense contracts, 
which become riddled, if not controlled, by systemic corruption.  
Systemic corruption gains its complexity from the characteristics it has, the consequences 
it creates, and the difficulties involved in fighting against it. Systemic corruption has some 
characteristics that distinguish it from individual or incidental corruption. First, organizations 
usually claim adherence to an external code of ethics which in fact differs from the de facto 
internal practices. These internal practices play significant roles not only in hiding the 
infringements of the external code, but also in hiding the rewards the organization gives for such 
infringements.422 Thus, it is not surprising to find strong protections for the violators accompanied 
by punishments for the non-violators for “foregoing the rewards of violation and offending 
violators.”423  
Second, in systemic corruption the exposing of such infringements is diminished 
significantly. On the one hand, the whistle-blowers, unless they enjoy some protection from being 
the victims of future revenge, are forced into silence.424 On the other, institutions and officials 
                                                
420 Caiden & Caiden, supra note 419, at 308. 
421 Id. at 306. 
422 Id. at 307. See also DONATELLA D. PORTA & ALBERTO VANNUCCI, THE HIDDEN ORDER OF 
CORRUPTION: AN INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH 50 (2012) (emphasizing the role of the informal 
rules in the systemic corruption). 
423 Id.  
424 Id. at 306. 
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charged with monitoring, investigating, and uncovering corruption rarely take action. Even if they 
do act, they will consider the incident of corruption as an exceptional act that rarely occurs.425 
Owing to these characteristics, systemic corruption poses a number of risks to a society 
that are greater than those posed by incidental corruption. Since it prevents the reflections of 
social developments from being integrated into institutions, systemic corruption enforces 
restricted access and closed policies on the one hand, and enhances class, economic, and even 
social divisions on the other.426 This situation leads to the suppression of opposition, which 
eventually results in limited reforms and changes in administration and policy.427 
The preceding explanation lays a foundation for introducing the collective reputation 
theory, its interpretation, and its relevance to corruption. As Tirole sensibly argued,  
When belonging to a group is an unalterable trait, poor collective [behavior] in the past 
may make current good [behavior] a low-yield individual investment and thus generate 
poor collective [behavior] in the future. Even more fascinating is the history-dependence 
of collective reputations. In our view, stereotypes are long-lasting because new members 
of a group at least partially inherit the collective reputation of their elders.428  
That is to say, younger generations inherit the reputation of being corrupt from the older 
generations and continue to use corrupt alternatives because they lack incentives to be honest, and 
this eventually results in the persistence of corruption in a given group, culture, or society.429     
                                                
425 Id.  
426 Id. at 307; See, e.g., Donatella D. Porta, Political Parties and Corruption: Ten Hypotheses on 
Five Vicious Circles, 42 CRIME L. SOC. CHANGE 35, 41 (2004) (supporting this point by citing 
the Italian experience). 
427 Id.  
428 Jean Tirole, A Theory of Collective Reputations (With Applications to the Persistence of 
Corruption and to Firm Quality), 63 REV. ECON. STUD. 1, 18 (1996). 
429 Bardhan, supra note 411, at 1334. 
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There is a fine line between a corrupt society and corrupt individuals. Yes, there are 
corrupt norms that exist in some countries, yet the public are not satisfied with them nor do they 
morally believe in them. The use of corrupt alternatives and behaviors existing in a particular 
society does not render a judgement that the society is corrupt when most people in that society 
disapprove of corrupt alternatives and behaviors.430 What can be said instead is that there is a 
corrupt atmosphere forcing individuals to use corrupt alternatives and behaviors. The disapproval 
does not make the individuals who constitute a society corrupt; the fact that they have no option 
but corruption has forced to be corrupt. In fact, when applying the collective reputation theory, 
one may discover the opposite result—that is, there are certain cultures, societies, or countries that 
may benefit from the collective reputation of not being corrupt while they are still having a 
number of corrupt behaviors.431    
This discussion is not merely a theoretical analysis but is beneficial in terms of practice. It 
not only points to the root cause of corruption, it also provides an essential step toward solving 
and curbing corruption. Most of the strategies that successfully identify the root cause of the 
problem have failed to provide adequate solutions, since a number of these strategies tend to 
import already prepackaged remedies. The reliance on over-the-counter remedies and solutions 
does not obviate the need for more precise and sometimes customized cures.  
                                                
430 BO ROTHSTEIN, SOCIAL TRAPS AND THE PROBLEM OF TRUST 7 (2005) (“The reason they 
continue to act treacherously or opportunistically is not necessarily that they (or their culture) 
suffer from some kind of moral defect, but rather that there is no point in being the only honest 
player in a rotten game at which everyone else cheats (or is perceived to be a cheater).”).  
431 This may be applicable to the corruption perception indices, which include Transparency 
International’s CPI and the World Bank’s Control of Corruption index (WB), since they rely 
mainly on the perception of corruption, which may be biased or influenced by “the collective 
reputation.” See, e.g., Dilyan Donchev & Gergely Ujhelyi, What Do Corruption Indices 
Measure?, 26 ECON. & POL. 309, 309-31(2014). 
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B.  Saudi Society in Context  
1. History  
The roots of what we now know as Saudi Arabia go back to 1744 and the establishment 
of the Emirate of Dir’iyyah, which became known as the first Saudi state.432 The first Saudi state 
was the result of an alliance established between the earlier Saudi Sheikh, Mohammed ibn Sa’ud 
(1710–1765), and Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab (1703–1791), which aimed at restoring a pure 
orthodox Islam in the Arabian Peninsula and fighting to abolish heretical practices (Bida’).433 
This politico-religious alliance led to a strong movement that captured an enormous area of the 
Arabian Peninsula.434 
However, the Saudi state did not last very long, as the Ottoman Empire responded to the 
expansion of the Emirate and its seizure of Ottoman territory by launching a military campaign 
to recover their lost territory. At the domestic level, the Saudi state faced the challenge of the 
Banu Khalid, a tribe that had controlled the eastern region of the Arabian Peninsula since their 
rebellion against the Ottoman Empire in 1670.435  The Saudi state was also confronted by the 
Sharifian family in Hejaz.436  
                                                
432 WAYNE H. BOWEN, THE HISTORY OF SAUDI ARABIA 69 (2008). 
433 MADAWI ALRASHEED, THE HISTORY OF SAUDI ARABIA 15 (2010). 
434 BOWEN, supra note 432, at 73 (This included parts of what is now known as the United Arab 
Emirates, Qatar, and Oman. By 1810, the Saudi state was in control of nearly the entire Arabian 
Peninsula). 
435 ALRASHEED, supra note 433, at 34 (In 1795, the Banu Khalid were defeated and their threat 
was eliminated); see also HALA M. FATTAH, THE POLITICS OF REGIONAL TRADE IN IRAQ, ARABIA, 
AND THE GULF, 1745-1900 95 (1997). 
436 See ALRASHEED, supra note 433, at 13 (describing how the Ottoman Empire ruled the Hejaz 
Region in cooperation with Sharifian family beginning in 1517 and continued to rule the area for 
the next four centuries. The Sharifian family were defeated and the Saudi State was able to 
extend its control over Ta’if in 1802, over Mecca in 1803, and over Medina in 1804) 
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The Emirate of Najd, the second Saudi state, emerged in 1824, shortly after the fall of the 
first state, and moved the capital to Riyadh.437 This occurred when Turki bin Abdullah bin 
Muhammad successfully reconquered Riyadh from Egyptian forces.438 In 1891, the Battle of 
Mulayda brought an end to the second Saudi state.439 A number of factors contributed 
significantly to the collapse of the second Saudi state, inter alia, internal conflicts in the house of 
Al-Saud440 coupled with the emergence of the Rashidi Emirate in Ha’il in northern Najd (1836–
1921) as a powerful rival.  
At the beginning of the twentieth century, Abdul-Aziz ibn Saud launched on the path to 
restore the rule of his forefathers. In 1902, Abdul-Aziz led a small group from Kuwait, where his 
family had settled after they fled in 1893,441 to Riyadh, the capital of his ancestors.442 At that 
time, the Rashidi Emirate had expanded its territory to include, in addition to Ha’il in northern 
Najd, Qassim, the center of the Arabian Peninsula, and Riyadh.443 When he successfully 
reconquered Riyadh in 1902, Ibn Saud was able to consolidate other parts of Najd.444  
Between 1902 and 1906, there were series of battles over the Qassim between Ibn Saud 
and the Rashidi Emirate, which had already lost a significant part of their territory in southern 
Najd; these eventually ended with Ibn Saud conquering Qassim.445 However, Ibn Saud’s 
conquest was not fully stable. Faisal Al-Dawish, supported by other leaders of the Mutair tribe, 
                                                
437 BOWEN, supra note 432, at 77. 
438 AFSHIN SHAHI, THE POLITICS OF TRUTH MANAGEMENT IN SAUDI ARABIA 50 (2013). 
439 MUHAMMAD SUWAED, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF THE BEDOUINS 19 (2015). 
440 BOWEN, supra note 432, at 77, 79 (For instance, Turki ibn Abdullah, the founder of the 
second Saudi state, was assassinated by his nephew Mishari in 1843. There was also a civil war 
between the sons of Faysal ibn Turki over the throne.). 
441 ALEXEI VASSILIEV, THE HISTORY OF SAUDI ARABIA 204 (1998). 
442 Id. at 212.  
443 SUWAED, supra note 439, at 19. 
444 Id (Including Washm, Arid, Kharj, and Sudayr, in a short time) 
445 ALRASHEED, supra note 433, at 38.  
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formed a secret alliance with Abdullah Aba Al-Khail and split from Ibn Saud. In 1907, Ibn Saud 
defeated the Mutair in a battle near Al-Majmaa, a town in Najd, and Faisal eventually submitted 
but retained his status as a leader of the Mutair.446 At that time, Abdullah Aba Al-Khail still had 
an alliance with part of the Mutair tribe and the people of Buraida, a town in Qassim, and joined 
Sultan ibn Hamud, a ruler of the Rashidi Emirate. In 1907, the battle of Tarafiya occurred and 
Ibn Saud again emerged successful, but he was not able to return to Buraida until 1908, when his 
support in Buraida grew and enabled him to enter the town.447. 
In 1913, the first hijra (settlement) was founded as a response to the emergence of the 
Ikhwan (Brethren) movement. The first settlement was Al-Artawiya, where the Mutair tribe was 
settled. Although the shift from a nomadic lifestyle to farming was a difficult step for the 
Bedouin, it took only a decade to establish sixty more settlements.448 These settlements were a 
milestone in the consolidation of the Arabian Peninsula, as they provided stability and 
powerbases for the army of Ibn Saud. The purpose of these settlements was not completely 
fulfilled, since individuals who joined the settlements were supposed to abandon the habits and 
duties derived from tribal traditions; instead, settlements continued to be inhabited based on 
tribal affiliation.449 
In 1913, after the stabilization of Najd, Al-Hasa also fell under the sovereignty of Ibn 
Saud.450 Again, Ibn Saud confronted another tribal rebellion. This tribe was the Ajman, and they 
were rebellious and refused to fully submit to Ibn Saud. This rebellion started when, during the 
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battle of Jarrab (1915), Ibn Saud experienced disloyalty from the Ajman, and ended in the battle 
of Kanzan, in which the Ajman were defeated, although only with difficulty.451 The defeat of Ibn 
Saud’s long-time rival, the Rashidi Emirate, came in 1921.452 This was followed shortly by the 
consolidation of Asir. In 1925, Hejaz submitted to Ibn Saud, which ended the rule of the 
Sharifian family.453 
Throughout the history of Saudi Arabia, tribal culture and Islam have exercised a strong 
influence. The role of Islam can be observed in the fact that, without wealth or a confederation 
between the tribes in Najd, there was little if any means of expanding the sovereignty, but 
adopting a religious message enabled Mohammad ibn Saud and his successors to achieve a 
confederation.454 This cannot be overemphasized when the role of tribes is considered.  
The role of tribes in the history of the Saudi state was of central importance. First and 
foremost, the center of Arabia, Najd, was not controlled by the Ottomans and was ruled by the 
amirs (leaders) of each tribe, who maintained their autonomy and independence. 455 This was 
mainly due to the mobility of the tribes, which was part of their very nature, coupled with the 
tradition of autonomy.456 Furthermore, when comparing the Saudi states to their rivals, the 
Rashidi Emirate and the Sharifian family, the role of tribes becomes more obvious. The Rashidi 
Emirate was perceived as dominated solely by the Shammar tribe, which imposed difficulties on 
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the Emirate’s control over other tribes; this was not the case for either the Saudi states or the 
Sharifian family.457  
The Sharifian family, descendants of the prestigious Hashemite tribe, which has a direct 
lineage from the Prophet Muhammad by way of his daughter Fatimah, relied on their lineage to 
impose their sovereignty.458 In Hejaz, nonetheless, there was a sharp division between the rural 
and the urban population,459 coupled with the absence of an “overarching tribal leadership 
capable of claiming authority over the whole confederation.”460 That is to say, the Hejazi tribes 
were separated into different entities, each of which was led by a prominent shaykh (leader), 
resulting in an implicit agreement that no one would claim leadership or authority beyond his 
territory.461 
2. Culture 
The geographic insularity of Arabian Peninsula led to a lengthy period of isolation, 
resulting in a high level of ethnocentricity in Saudi culture. The small exception is the Hejaz 
region, which was exposed to the pilgrims from all over the world visiting Mecca and Medina.462 
In addition to being birthplace of Islam, the Arabian Peninsula is the cradle of the Arabs, whose 
cultural identity was based in the tribe and the extended family as much as in linguistic or 
political bonds, if not more so.463  
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For Arabs, accordingly, bloodline, rather than wealth or success, is what shapes and 
establishes personal status. Thus, the Saudis maintain their pride in their Arabian ancestry and 
deem themselves to be the center of their own universe.464 Further, the Saudis have preserved “a 
proud, closed, and extended family-oriented society that is secure in its own worth and destiny” 
because their area has never been colonized, which also diminishes the “feeling of cultural 
inferiority.”465 More specifically, the family is the cornerstone of the Saudi social structure, 
playing a significant role in maintaining the lineage, reinforcing the social cohesiveness, and 
enhancing the structural integrity of the nation.466 
A number of the Saudi social customs derive their roots from the code of personal and 
collective honor (sharaf).467 As a good example, hospitality for the Saudis is considered a matter 
of honor; this determines their roles as hosts, in addition to the “mutual security consideration,” 
that is, the welfare of the guest.468 As a form of personal honor, sincerity and loyalty (ikhlas) is 
one of chief elements of Saudi social norms.469 The personal-oriented pattern in Saudi society 
boosts the significance of ikhlas, since it is fundamental to these close relationships. Ikhlas can 
blind the eyes of Saudis to an individual’s slips.470 As a result, personal trust and a close personal 
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relationship are considered to be a conditio sine qua non for successful relationships and social 
transactions of any kind.471  
As a form of honor, preserving “face” is one of the most compelling characteristics of 
Saudi society. The essentiality of preserving face can be seen in how it explains the ultimate goal 
of several behaviors. A number of these behaviors generally aim at protecting the image of 
Saudis.472 Thus, Saudi employers, for instance, tend to prefer exaggerated flattery rather than 
honest criticism, which can be considered an insult.473   
Shame (ayb) is a concept which is inversely related to honor. As with many Arab 
societies, Saudi society is driven by shame;474 that is to say, individuals are concerned about 
shame and their behaviors are shaped accordingly.475 Honor, as a matter of supreme importance, 
concerns the individual and group reputation, which must be maintained. Consequently, 
individuals, their families, and even the groups to which they belong are considered to be shamed 
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when their honor is tarnished.476 The scope of behavior that is consider shameful in a given area 
can be broader or narrower than the number of permissible behaviors in Islam477  
Saudi social behavior, thus, is constructed in stylized patterns whose existence has not 
been affected by modern Western social norms, but Saudi interpersonal behavior is contextual as 
well, which adds to the difficulties of understanding these patterns.478 Saudis practice Western 
social patterns while at the same time they maintain their own behavioral patterns between 
themselves, i.e., the Saudi stylized patterns between fellow Saudis.479  
To gain a more comprehensive view of Saudi culture, one needs to take a step back. In the 
heyday when the rapid development and expansion of the Saudi government was coupled with the 
oil boom, there were huge demands for Saudi human resources. Those individuals who seized the 
opportunity at that time have now become family elders. The family elders now hold the 
responsibility of maintaining the welfare of their family members by using their influence in 
either business or public affairs.480 This chain of events has created an overlapping network 
between senior business figures and high officials, on the one hand, and the younger 
entrepreneurs and bureaucrats predominating in both the public and the private sector, on the 
other.481 “The dominant feature of overlapping interpersonal networks was the centrality of 
extended family loyalties in symbiotic public-private sector alliances.”482  
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At an early period in Saudi Arabia, mainly the pre-modern era, the extended family 
system “served a positive purpose by distributing government contracts among the various family 
business concerns.”483 With the economic and governmental expansion and development, the 
situation has changed. The system has become inadequate because, while there has been some 
development in the standards and procedures of accountability and transparency, the senior 
executives and bureaucrats remain the elders of their extended families, which leads to standards 
and procedures being maintained essentially the same as they were in the past.484 
The extended family delineates a difference between Saudi society and Western societies. 
While Western societies have become more youth-oriented and the importance of the extended 
family has diminished, Saudi society still maintains the extended family: great respect is paid to 
age and seniority, and the younger members remain in a place of lower status until they attain a 
certain age.485 These young people, who are the majority of the population as a result of the 
population boom, can be categorized as something of an underclass.486  
The dichotomy between the Saudi business culture and Western business culture can be 
attributed to their sources. While the concept of law governs business relationships and 
transactions in the West, the concept of honor plays the same role in the Saudi context. 
Consequently, in Western culture, business decisions and transactions are made in the light of 
legal principles, and viewed through this lens, the informal and personalized norms the Saudis 
adopt in carrying out transactions are immoral and illegal. On the other hand, from the Saudi 
point of view, the code of honor controls both interpersonal relationships and business 
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transactions. From that point of view, transactions are judged to be immoral, no matter whether 
they are legal or illegal, if they are considered to be dishonorable.487  
3. Social Stratification 
Although Saudi Arabia is often considered ethnically and religiously homogeneous, each 
region has its own unique cultural and historical aspects that existed before the consolidation of 
Saudi Arabia.488 Within Saudi Arabia, although it is administratively divided into thirteen regions, 
culturally there are at least six regions: Najd, Hejaz, Asir, the Eastern region, the Northern Area, 
and Najran.489 Moreover, each tribe has developed its own customs and traditions.  
 
a. Regional Differences  
What follows is an overview of the regional history of the Arabian Peninsula. As 
explained above, the Peninsula can be broadly divided into the different regions. Within one 
region, there is a further stratification based on where one’s hometown is. As in many places 
around the world, regionalism in Saudi Arabia is shaped by how far a region and its population is 
from a center of power. In present-day Saudi Arabia, however, regionalism is considered to be 
somewhat taboo.490 
Loyalty to one’s own region and denigration of other regions operated reciprocally. At its 
zenith, the situation between Najd and Hejaz represented regionalism in a clear way. The Hejazis, 
or inhabitants of Hejaz, saw themselves as more civilized than the Najdis, the inhabitants of Najd. 
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Conversely, the Hejazis “viewed the [Najdis] as ignorant and uncultured.”491 The Najdis, on other 
hand, saw themselves as “ethnically purer” than the Hejazis.492  
Even today, the people of different regions of Saudi Arabia remain relatively divided and 
distinctive. When people from different regions immigrate to the big cities, there is a subtle 
tendency among them to develop their relationships with people from their own region, rather 
than others, indicating the existence of regionalism in the country.493 However, this cannot be 
considered a tendency promoted by the government, at least officially. A number of decisions 
taken by the government indicate a dissatisfaction with regionalism.494   
The existence of regionalism has led to a dangerous form of discrimination. Regionalism 
has created a form of favoritism in many areas. The most obvious example can be seen in the 
process of hiring or promoting of individuals, and this can also be extended to the appointment of 
officials to high positions.495 As an extension of creating unequal opportunity, regionalism affects 
the distribution of services based on regions, which means that some regions enjoy more services 
than do others.496   
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b. Tribal Differences 
Tribes (qab’il, sing. qabila) in Saudi Arabia play a major role in shaping the culture of the 
country.497 The significance of the tribes manifests in the role of the tribes as the “source of the 
Saudi value system,” which includes “[p]olitical decentralization, minimal administration, kin-
related political behavior, social solidarity, and economic cooperation,”498 and also as a fertile 
ground for bias and discrimination. The Saudi nation has been influenced and shaped by their 
traditions and heritage, both the bad and the good. Saudis have inherited, along with chivalry, 
courage, and generosity, tribalism (asabiyya qabaliyya), which could decimate all their other 
benign cultural inheritances.499 
Arab genealogists rely on a structure of descent extending back to “Adam” in order to 
define the qabila, or tribe.500 The structure is based on a segmentary lineage, or a unit model 
consisting of, from top down, the tribe (qabila), and then ever smaller units, such as the clan, the 
extended family, and so on down to an individual’s father.501 This model can be seen in Figure 2. 
To put it simply, the ego is a part of the family at the smallest and closest segment in which the 
siblings stand next to each other. At the next level, the previous segment becomes part of a larger 
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segment consisting of the closest cousins and their families. The segments become larger and 
larger at every level.502   
  
Figure 2. Segmentary Lineage Folk Model503 
It is not unusual to find a copy of the family tree either placed on display or kept for 
reference in Saudi houses.504 Such a family tree visually displays to a boy “the precise way in 
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which he is related to his patrilineal kin and he can see the ancestors after whom he has been 
named: his great grandfather, his grandfather, and his father.”505 In the modern urban context, 
people are often not completely conversant with their segmentary lineage, unlike their personal 
ancestries, but they know their al-qabila, as the highest segment; al-fakhid, the middle segment; 
and definitely their families, the bottom segment.506 
The social divisions caused by tribalism exist in different forms, but the most significant 
forms are between tribesman and non-tribesman (qabila and non-qabila) or between tribesmen 
from different tribes. The former (qabila member and non-qabila member) division has replaced 
the traditional division of “Arab society into nomadic (bedouin) and sedentary (hadar) 
populations.”507 The basis of this division is, to put it simply, the pure lineage, which leads the 
qabila members to deem themselves of superior status.508 In contrast, the division between 
tribesmen from different tribes results from loyalty to one’s tribe as well as taking pride in one’s 
tribe.509 
c. Religious Differences 
Saudi Arabia is an Islamic country, as stated in First Article of the Basic Law of 
Governance.510 The majority of the population are Sunnis, whereas the Shiite population makes 
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up 5 to 10 percent of the whole population.511 Sufism is a minority that also exists in the Hejaz 
region.512 Within the Sunnis a division exists between the four schools of Islamic jurisprudence 
(madhãhib): the Maliki, the Hanafi, the Shafiʿi, and the Hanbali.513 It is worth noting that there is 
no article of the Basic Law of Governance that defines the school of jurisprudence (madh'hab) or 
the religious sect of the country.514 
Regional differences add more complexity to this aspect of the culture. The overlap 
between the religious differences and regional differences can be seen more clearly in the fact that 
the religious differences exist in certain regions.515 Sufism, for instance, exists mainly in the 
Hejaz, and the Shiite population live in the eastern region and tend to inhabit certain cities.516 On 
the other hand, madhãhib differences seem to be regional, but are not as distinctive and obvious 
as the sectarian differences.517  
With the rapidly increasing mobilization of the population, it has become more ambiguous 
whether these religious distinctions have begun to lose their importance or not;518 that is to say, 
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the regional or tribal differences may overcome or undermine the religious differences. 
Furthermore, the madhãhib differences have also begun to lose their significance, which can be 
seen in the appointment to the Council of Senior Scholars (Majlis Hay’at Kibar Al-Ūlama  ) of 
members who adopt schools of jurisprudence other than the Hanbli.519   
d. Nationality Differences 
Saudi Arabia is a country that has one of the largest numbers of foreign workers, with 
more than six million foreign workers living in it.520 Like its neighboring countries, Saudi Arabia 
has employed a huge number of foreign laborers due to a lack of local laborers.521 Thus, the 
foreign workforce plays a crucial role in the Saudi economy. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia has 
managed to keep the number of foreigners in the workforce lower than in many of the other Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) Countries.522  
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The great number of foreigners and the need for their labor do not seem to have eased 
Saudi xenophobia. As in many other cultures, the relationship between Saudis and their foreign 
workers cannot be characterized as warm, and this can be attributed to religious, cultural, and 
language differences,523 but above all to Saudi Arabia’s long period of isolation, as noted 
above.524 This isolation has created a highly secretive society in which individuals trust their 
families and tribes rather than outsiders.525  
Moreover, economic aspects also play a significant role in shaping the strained 
relationship between Saudis and foreign workers. The imposition of the expatriate income tax in 
1988, for example, led to the resignation of a number of foreigners.526 This was perceived by 
Saudis as foreign workers’ refusal to contribute to or sacrifice for the common good of the 
country. From their perspective, the Saudis argue that foreigners have access to a number of free 
and subsidized services, which has created an unjust situation.527 In general, the dislike can be 
described as mutual, and even worse, the foreigners themselves dislike each other.528 “The Saudis 
and their Western [and other foreigners] work force coexisted in a state of tension that was not the 
                                                
523 WILSON, supra note 342, at 31. 
524 See generally MACKEY, supra note 466, at 30 (“This self-perception has little to do with the 
Saudis' immense wealth but rather extends back through the centuries when the vast majority of 
Saudis lived within the confines of family and tribe, experienced nothing of the outside world.”). 
525 Id. at 4. 
526 WILSON, supra note 342, at 31. See Taxing expats under spotlight, ARAB NEWS March. 31, 
2012, http://www.arabnews.com/node/409782 . Imposing taxes on expats is hot topic again – 
Saudi Arabia, SAUDI LIFE STYLE NEWS, Apr. 5, 2012, 
http://saudilifestyle.com/2012/04/imposing-taxes-on-expats-is-hot-topic-again-saudi-arabia/ 
(Note that the imposition of expatriate income tax was suspended four days after the imposition 
of the law. In recent years, the law has once again been under deliberation by the Shura 
Council.). 
527 See, e.g., Here's Why Germany Is Welcoming Migrants with Open Arms, FORTUNE NEWS, 
Sept. 8, 2015, http://fortune.com/2015/09/08/germany-migrant-crisis/ (arguing that the foreigners 
are considered as a drain on state resources; the same argument has been going in a number of 
European countries).  
528 WILSON, supra note 342, at 32. 
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result of ill will on the part of either, but rather resulted from a combination of Saudi insecurities 
and Western insensitivities.”529 
C.  The Application of Social Psychology to Saudi Arabian Society  
1. Ibn Khaldun’s Analysis 
In the Muqaddimah (the “Introduction”), Abdul Rahman Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406), an 
Islamic historian who lived in North Africa, provided a theoretical framework that sought to 
illustrate relevant group dynamics. The importance of this work is that it explains the character of 
tribal psychology within a general analysis that begins with the establishment of a state, continues 
through its growth and prosperity, and ends finally with its breakdown.   
Ibn Khaldun initially argued that Bedouins and sedentary people are both natural groups. 
Yet the lifestyles these different groups adopt result in differences of conditions among them.530 
As a result, people form social organizations in order to cooperate in making their living, starting 
with the essential necessities of life.531 In time, people eventually improve their conditions, 
increase their wealth, and reach a state of more comfort than before, and even one that is more 
comfortable than what they essentially need, which results in a shift in the cooperation toward 
secondary needs rather than primary needs.532 This leads Ibn Khaldun to conclude that sedentary 
peoples emerged after the Bedouins, which means that the desert was the basis and the source of 
civilization.533 
                                                
529 MACKEY, supra note 466, at 24. 
530 1 ABDUL RAHMAN IBN KHALDUN, AL-MUQADDIMAH: AN INTRODUCTION TO HISTORY 91 
(Franz Rosenthal & Nessim J. Dawood trans., 1969). 
531 Id. 
532 Id. (“They use more food and clothes, and take pride in them. They build large houses, and 
lay out towns and cities for protection. This is followed by an increase in comfort and ease…”). 
533 Id. at 93. 
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Ibn Khaldun then asserts that the existence of an effective and distinguished leader is a 
precondition for the success of any group.534 Such a leader can either rule through commands or 
with the support of a group feeling that induces others to obey him.535 The second method, the 
support of the group, leads to asabiyya—a term for which it is hard to find a translation that  
reflect[s] the real significance and dynamism of asabiyya as meant by Ibn Khaldun. This 
has led some writers to use the Arabic term as it is, while others tended to use synonyms 
such as the “sense of solidarity”, “group feeling”, “group loyalty”, and “esprit de corps”. 
This may reflect in different circumstances various connotations like faithfulness to the 
group, will for defense, internal unity, common will for power, or the group itself.536  
For Ibn Khaldun, asabiyya is a cornerstone of the dynamic human quality which 
“produces the ability to defend oneself, to offer opposition, to protect oneself, and to press one’s 
claims,” as without asabiyya, no one could do any of these things.537 Aware of Islam’s 
condemnation of and firm opposition to asabiyya,538 Ibn Khaldun, in order to preserve his 
theoretical approach, sought to find a meeting place between Islamic principles and asabiyya.539  
Ibn Khaldun emphasized that there is a strong causal relationship between Badawa 
(primitive culture) and asabiyya because people in a primitive culture rely on asabiyya to survive 
the rough life of the desert.540 In his view, the strength of the tribal unity depends on purity of 
                                                
534 Id. at 47. 
535 Id.  
536 See MUḤAMMAD M. RABIʻ, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF IBN KHALDŪN 49 (1967) (Due to these 
difficulties in translation, this dissertation retains the Arabic term asabiyya.). 
537 IBN KHALDUN, supra note 530, at 111. 
538 RABIʻ, supra note 536, at 49 (noting that “as a pre-Islamic word, [asabiyya] was used to 
indicate a kind of making common cause with one’s agnates, which might lead to blind support 
of one’s group without regard for the justice of its cause,” which is inconsistent with the 
egalitarian character of Islam).   
539 Id.  
540 IBN KHALDUN, supra note 530, at 97. 
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lineage and common descent.541 Thus, pure Bedouins maintained an untainted and pure lineage 
when they isolated themselves by living in the desert.542 Furthermore, asabiyya can be of different 
types, such as wala (clientship) or hilf (alliance),543 yet silat al-rahim (blood ties) are supreme 
above the other kinds since they are something natural among almost all human beings. Such ties 
motivate affection for one’s blood relatives and a desire that no harm come to them.544  
2. Power and Corruption  
Human beings are considered to be hierarchical animals, a facet of human behavior which 
can be observed and noticed clearly across cultures, even though cultures vary greatly in their 
level of hierarchy.545 Within the hierarchical relationship, the restrictions of autonomy and 
obedience are imposed on both powerful and less powerful individuals.546 Though less powerful 
individuals are subject to more restrictions and must demonstrate more obedience, powerful 
individuals must follow the strictures of their role in the society and fulfill its demands and 
obligations also if they wish to remain in power.547   
Thus, power plays a significant role in many aspects of human life. More particularly, a 
discussion of corruption and dishonesty highlights the role of power captured by Lord Acton’s 
well-known saying that “power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.” This 
                                                
541 Id. at 99. 
542 Id.  
543 Id. at 100-01. 
544 Id. at 98. 
545 Dacher Keltner & Jonathan Haidt, Approaching Awe, a Moral, Spiritual, and Aesthetic 
Emotion, 17 COGNITION & EMOTION 297, 307 (2003).   
546 Jennifer R. Overbeck & Bernadette Park, When Power Does Not Corrupt: Superior 
Individuation Processes Among Powerful Perceivers, 81 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL 549, 550 
(2001). 
547 Id. at 550. 
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quote not only summarizes the conclusion of scholarly studies and research, but also highlights 
the layperson’s understanding of power and hierarchy.548  
Generally, the findings of a number of studies on power have shown that power is 
associated with unethical behavior and decision making.549 Specifically, empirical studies indicate 
“that powerful individuals and members of powerful groups differ from powerless individuals and 
members of powerless groups with regard to (a) how they perceive and judge others, (b) how they 
are evaluated as targets, and (c) how they behave.”550  
In term of judgement, powerful individuals and groups are more likely than powerless 
individuals and groups to negatively evaluate the out-group, and consequently they show more in-
group bias, leading the dominant group members to exercise more discrimination against 
subordinate out-group members than vice versa.551  A number of studies provide support for this 
view. Guimond et al., in examining the relationship between social positions, social dominance 
orientation (SDO),552 and prejudice, found that when an individual is assigned a powerful 
position, this increases her social dominance orientation, causing her ultimately to show more 
prejudice against lower status groups.553 Social power has also been positively associated with 
                                                
548 Steven L. Blader & Andy J. Yap, Power, Dishonesty, and Justice, in CHEATING, CORRUPTION, 
AND CONCEALMENT: THE ROOTS OF DISHONESTY 208, 208 (Jan-Willem van Prooijen & Paul A. 
M. van Lange eds., 2016). 
549 Id. at 33-41. 
550 Markus Brauer & Richard Y. Bourhis, Social Power, 36 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 601, 601 
(2006).  
551 Id. at 607. 
552 JIM SIDANIUS & FELICIA PRATTO, SOCIAL DOMINANCE: AN INTERGROUP THEORY OF SOCIAL 
HIERARCHY AND OPPRESSION 61 (1999) (“SDO is defined as a very general individual 
differences orientation expressing the value that people place on non-egalitarian and 
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domination of certain socially constructed groups over other socially constructed groups, 
regardless of the manner in which these groups are defined.”).  
553 Serge Guimond et al., Does social dominance generate prejudice? Integrating individual and 
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reliance on stereotype,554 leading to a favoring of powerful in-group members when distributing 
rewards.555 This can be attributed to the likelihood that “high power individuals indeed apply the 
out-group homogeneity bias to a greater extent than individuals belonging to a group with little 
power.”556 Those in power, thus, “may be motivated to neglect or oppress their subordinates in 
order to maintain the status quo … [and] to legitimate their privileged position.”557 
Power also affects the way that powerful individuals and groups are perceived and 
evaluated. While powerful individuals and groups tend to evaluate other individuals and groups 
negatively, as noted, they are evaluated positively, as people attribute more positive 
characteristics and less negative characteristics to powerful individuals and groups than they do to 
powerless individuals and groups.558 Though the reason behind this is unclear, system 
justification theorists suggest that individuals tend to attribute positive characteristics to powerful 
groups in order to defend and rationalize the social system.559 As a target, powerful individuals 
and groups, then, are subject to less stereotyping.  
                                                                                                                                                       
Contextual Determinants of Intergroup Cognitions, 84 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 697, 697–721 
(2003); see also Brauer & Bourhis, supra note 550, at 607. 
554 See Susan T. Fiske, Controlling Other People: The Impact of Power on Stereotyping, 48 AM. 
PSYCHOL. 621, 621-628 (1993). 
555 Overbeck & Park, supra note 546, at 576 (citing Serena Chen et al., Relationship Orientation 
as a Moderator of the Effects of Social Power, 80 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL, 173-187 (2001). 
And Itesh Sachdev & Richard Y. Bourhis, Power and Status Differentials in Minority and 
Majority Group Relations, 21 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 1-24 (1991)). 
556 Brauer & Bourhis, supra note 550, at 608. 
557 Susan T. Fiske & Jennifer Berdahl, Social Power, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: HANDBOOK OF 
BASIC PRINCIPLES 678, 685 (Arie W. Kruglanski & E. Tory Higgins eds., 2007).  
558 Brauer & Bourhis, supra note 636, at 609. 
559 John T. Jost et al., A Decade of System Justification Theory: Accumulated Evidence of 
Conscious and Unconscious Bolstering of the Status Quo, 25 POL. PSYCHOL. 881, 881–919 
(2004). Brauer & Bourhis, supra note 550, at 609. See also Fiske & Berdahl, supra note 557, at 
586 (“Low-status groups favor high-status groups and attribute intelligence and responsibility to 
them, and they do this especially when explanations (even meaningless) are provided for the 
power difference.”).  
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Lastly, power affects the way individuals act. The approach inhibition theory of power, 
which deals with power’s influence on behavior, distinguishes between the behavior of high 
power and low power individuals.560 According to this theory, power triggers “approach-related 
processes” for two main reasons.561 Firstly, power is associated with resources—material, 
financial, and social resources—by which powerful individuals are surrounded.562 Secondly, 
power is associated with the awareness that an individual can act on her dispositions with less 
social restrictions.563 “Acting within reward-rich environments and being unconstrained by 
others’ evaluations or the consequences of one’s actions, people with elevated power should be 
disposed to elevated levels of approach-related affect, cognition, and behavior.” Conversely, lack 
of power is correlated with inhibition, which means that low power individuals have a limited 
access to resources and are more attentive to the evaluation and restrictions of others and society, 
making them more vulnerable to threats and punishments.564  
According to the approach inhibition theory, powerful individuals are more sensitive to 
material and social rewards, consider others as means to satisfy their goals and targets, adopt a 
systematic way of processing information, act on their dispositions with less consideration of 
social restrictions, and transgress those restrictions.565 Conversely, less powerful individuals are 
more attentive to punishments and threats, perceive themselves as a means to others’ goals and 
ends, adopt a controlled and complex way of processing information, act and behave in 
accordance with social norms, and adopt an inhibited manner.566 
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In light of this, the activation of the behavioral approach system can offer a link between 
power and corruption. Powerful individuals’ sensitivity to and focus on rewards rather than 
punishments, coupled with the elimination of restrictions that can be imposed on their behavior, 
lead them to seek after their self-interested ends, disregarding limitations that would inhibit the 
pursuit of self-interest.567 The result of this is “increased risk-seeking and unethical behavior 
among the powerful, … both of which indicate an enhanced propensity for dishonesty and 
corruption.”568  
Further, the focus on self-interest and ends may affect the perception of justice and 
consequently “how justice criteria are prioritized.”569 Knowing that powerful individuals tend to 
emphasize ends rather than means may lead to a greater focus on distributive justice and the 
elimination of the significance of procedural justice. Within the different criteria of distributive 
justice, equity is mostly adopted in pursuing productivity goals.570 Consequently, the powerful 
may tend to adopt the equity form of distributive justice rather than equality or need, even when 
others believe the latter forms are appropriate.571 Consider the situation where the powerful adopt 
equity criteria, believing those criteria to be just, to assign employee benefits or other resources. 
In such a case, less powerful individuals are likely to suspect that allocating these resources via 
equity occurs due to corrupt acts that seek to benefit those favored by the powerful.572   
On the other hand, power may decrease the resistance of less powerful individuals to 
corrupt practices. Due to the behavioral inhibition system, less powerful individuals are more 
likely to be attentive to punishments and threats and to perceive themselves as a means to others’ 
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goals and ends, leading them to adopt a conforming approach.573 This also may explain the 
frequent and undeterred attempts of powerful individuals to influence less powerful individuals’ 
behaviors and acts.574 The reduced resistance may also be attributed to less powerful individuals’ 
positive perception of the powerful enhanced by the system justification mechanism which the 
former may adopt.   
We have focused on the individual level, but what is the relationship between power and 
corrupt behaviors at the organizational level and the ideological level generally? Among the 
power theories, it seems that the Social Dominance Theory (SDT) can offer an explanation for 
that.575 It also provides an explanation for favoritism behaviors between groups and individuals. 
The theory aims at identifying the processes of social psychology that establish and maintain 
group-based social hierarchy.576 It distinguishes between the dominant groups, controlling a 
disproportionately large amount of valued resources, and subordinated groups, possessing a 
“disproportionately large share of negative social values.”577  
                                                
573 Cameron Anderson & Jennifer L. Berdahl, The Experience of Power: Examining the Effects 
of Power on Approach and Inhibition Tendencies, 83 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1362, 1364 
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In essence, SDT proposes that the human tendency toward group-based hierarchy 
contributes to group conflicts and oppression.578 Legitimizing myths579 influence such tendencies 
toward group-based hierarchy and may take the form of hierarchy-enhancing myths, i.e., 
promoting group-based inequality, or hierarchy-attenuating myths, i.e., promoting group-based 
equality. To an extent, what influences an individual’s endorsement of either form of legitimizing 
myths is her psychological orientation toward group-based social hierarchy (i.e., her Social 
Dominance Orientation (SDO)).580 Accordingly, individuals higher in SDO are likely to adopt the 
belief that societies are fundamentally stratified and that those at the top of the stratification 
deserve to be in the dominant position, whereas those at the bottom of the hierarchy deserve to be 
in the subordinate position.581 Conversely, individuals lower in SDO are likely to adopt 
egalitarian ideologies and endorse group-based equality.582  
Thus, SDT suggests that a greater endorsement of SDO is derived from high status and 
dominant members attached to their own group, rather than low status and subordinate groups.583 
This seems to be in line with other studies suggesting that powerful individuals and groups desire 
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to defend and maintain their power and the status quo.584 To justify and maintain power and the 
status quo, powerful individuals and groups may rely on information confirming stereotype-based 
expectations, such as the incompetence or laziness of outgroups and individuals.585    
As noted above, a number of studies have linked SDO to prejudice and discriminatory 
behaviors. For instance, SDO has been identified as a factor that increases prejudice against 
disadvantaged and minority groups, in addition to increasing “the tendency to allocate fewer 
economic resources to ethnic outgroups compared to ethnic ingroups, even if doing so can lower 
the absolute profit of the ingroup.”586 To explain more clearly, dominant groups may exercise 
favoritism toward their in-groups, yet subordinate groups may exercise out-group favoritism 
toward the dominant groups rather than toward their own in-groups.587 In this situation, thus, 
subordinate groups’ members shift from being an object of discrimination to being active 
participants in the process.588  
Since individuals with high SDO are less aware of losses and harms associated with their 
behaviors and feel entitled to exercise power to obtain resources and positive social value for their 
groups or themselves, they are less likely to recognize that their behaviors or acts involve a 
misuse of power in order to gain personal or organizational benefits.589 They are more prone to 
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use moral disengagement to frame their actions and attitudes as less harmful and to diminish their 
own sense of guilt or responsibility.590 On the other hand, motivated to show loyalty to be in a 
dominant position benefiting from positive social values associated with the position, the 
members of subordinate groups are more likely to engage in corrupt practices rather than 
challenging them.591 
At the organizational and ideological level, studies have found a positive association 
between the level of corruption and the endorsement of hierarchy and power inequality.592 That is, 
a high level of corruption is found in cultures that tend to endorse hierarchy and power inequality 
(SDO). Moreover, the more vertical that hierarchical social structures are, the more prone they are 
to corruption.593 In order to provide an explanation for the previous relationship, the gap between 
the factor (hierarchy) and the result (corruption) has to be filled.  
Building on the previous discussion, it has been shown that 1) high SDO individuals 
endorse group-based hierarchy 2) through legitimizing myths. The role of the latter is critical and 
central in the process by mediating the relationship between the tendency of individuals to 
endorse group-based hierarchy and their awareness of corrupt behaviors at the organizational 
level.594   
At the organizational level, the establishment and enforcement of norms, structures, and 
bureaucracy that “promote informational ambiguity and maximize organizational focus on 
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592 See, e.g., Husted, supra note 68, at 339–59. 
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dominance and advancement” reduces individuals’ awareness of corrupt practices around them.595 
The support of schemas and scripts encourage a focus on efficiently accomplishing tasks rather 
than thinking about what end result is achieved through such efficient activities.596 Moreover, 
hierarchical structure can reduce awareness of organizational corruption by facilitating the 
diffusion and normalization of practices and values that promote “inequality, dominance, 
favoritism, and the misuse of power or positions.”597  
To illustrate the role of legitimatizing myths, we may consider the practice of guanxi 
discussed above. One of the norms promoted by guanxi is gift-giving, a practice that aims at 
exhibiting honor, respect, and gratitude.598 Such a practice creates and establishes a cultural norm 
and script that may lead eventually to organizational corruption or nepotism.599 In a similar vein, 
wasta involves cultural scripts and norms on which individuals rely to overcome bureaucracy and 
routines. However, following these scripts and norms, individuals may easily and without full 
awareness come close to committing bribery, abuse of power, or even influence peddling. On the 
other hand, informational ambiguity facilitates the practice of wasta or other corrupt practices by 
creating an ambiguous situation in which a person may argue easily that no harm or violation of 
rules has taken place. Even if that happens, i.e., even when there is knowledge of a violation of 
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rules or harm, an individual may resort to moral disengagement600 as a type of legitimizing myth 
or rationalization allowing her to restructure such an act so that it appears harmless or to place the 
responsibility on others and consequently eliminate the sense of guilt.601  
3. Corruption and the Role of Intergroup Bias and the Culture of Collectivism   
Bias, as a term, covers a scope of intergroup orientations encompassing “beliefs about the 
traits and characteristics of groups, or individuals by virtue of their group membership, as well as 
unfair evaluative, affective, or behavioral responses to groups and their members.”602 Generally, 
these types of bias can be linked to stereotypes (overgeneralized beliefs), discrimination (biased 
behaviors), and prejudice (biased attitudes).603 Broadly, bias can be defined as “an unfair 
evaluative, emotional, cognitive, or behavioral response toward another group in ways that 
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devalue or disadvantage the other group and its members either directly or indirectly by valuing 
or privileging members of one’s own group.”604  
A large number of studies show that the perception of in-groups differs from the 
perception of out-groups in several aspects. The most highlighted difference appears in the 
“tendency to evaluate the in-groups more favorably than out-groups.”605 This phenomenon, which 
may take different forms, is what is referred to as in-group bias. One of the forms that in-group 
bias may take is the evaluation of the efforts of in-groups “as superior to the efforts of out-
groups.606 Another form is the tendency to treat the members of in-groups more favorably than 
the members of out-groups.607   
Essentially, human beings are social animals, which implies that group living is a 
significant aspect of their lives. Since the activities of human beings are by and large rooted in 
interdependence, group living constitutes a survival strategy. Through the cooperation between 
the members of groups, group systems provide significant survival benefits over other systems 
that lack “reciprocally positive social relations.”608 However, trust is a fundamental element in 
deciding whether to share resources with nonrelatives to benefit from them, since “the ultimate 
benefit for the provider depends on others’ willingness to reciprocate.”609  
To accomplish this, group boundaries and social categories establish the foundation for 
achieving the advantages of cooperative interdependence. Thus, in-group membership can be 
considered as a form of conditional cooperation that eliminates the risk of non-reciprocation by 
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restricting the cooperation to in-group members.610 In light of this, in-groups “can be defined as 
bounded communities of mutual trust and obligation that delimit mutual interdependence and 
cooperation.”611 Group boundaries, whether they are based on culture, race, or other bases, 
ultimately serve the purpose of distinguishing who is “in” and who is “out.”612  
Categorization has profound consequences that manifest in behavioral orientations toward 
other individuals and groups. As to behavioral outcomes and social relations, cooperation and 
trust is extended to in-group members rather than out-group members.613 Further, positive forms 
of social behavior are more likely to be displayed between in-group members.614 When deciding 
whether to share scarce resources with in-group members, individuals are more likely to exercise 
personal restraint over scarce resources which they share with in-group members and tend to be 
more generous in their reward distribution to in-group members rather than to out-group 
members.615 Additionally, “empathy for a person in need of assistance is more strongly predictive 
of helping behavior when that target is an in-group member than an out-group member.”616 Thus, 
individuals tend to provide more help to in-group members rather than to out-group members.617  
Though it plays a fundamental role in intergroup bias, social categorization is not the sole 
cause of it. Different researchers on intergroup bias have provided different explanations. 
Competition has been highlighted as a main cause of intergroup conflict and has been adopted by 
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a number of theories. Realistic group conflict theory proposes that the perception of competition 
over scarce resources generates attempts to limit the access of out-groups to such resources.618 
Sherif posited that win-lose competition between groups produces positive outcomes for the in-
group and negative outcomes for out-groups.619 What must be noted is that this theory emphasizes 
the perception of competition rather than actual and explicit competition.620  
Furthermore, a number of studies point to the feeling of interdependence on the in-group 
as a cause of intergroup bias. The behavioral interaction model, for instance, proposes that 
dependence on in-group members by itself is sufficient to stimulate intergroup biases, and thus 
the more dependence, the more intergroup bias.621 In a similar vein, Gaertner and Insko showed 
that individuals are more likely to discriminate in favor of their in-group members when there is 
an outcome dependency.622  
The instrumental model of group conflict, built on the framework of realistic group 
conflict theory, proposes that resource stress coupled with the awareness of potential competition 
from outgroups generates a perception of other groups competing for resources. 623 The perception 
of competition takes the form of zero-sum beliefs—beliefs that when the other groups obtain 
                                                
618  Michael A. Hogg, Intergroup Relations, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 533, 538 
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within a society, access to resources may be limited for certain groups”). 
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more resources, this decreases the resources available for an individual’s own group. Such 
perceived competition then produces strategic attempts to remove the source of competition.624 
Those attempts may take the form of discrimination, outgroup derogation, or avoidance of other 
groups.625 A number of factors play a significant role in determining the degree of perceived 
resource stress, including, inter alia, the scarcity of resources and the desire for the unequal 
distribution of resources.626  
Other studies opt to emphasize the role of collective identity. Influenced by such 
perspectives, social identity theory (hereinafter SIT) examines the effect of collective identity on 
intergroup relations.  Essentially, SIT posits that individuals possess a strong desire to maintain or 
enhance the personal and the social identity that is entwined with in-group membership. The 
members of an in-group distinguish themselves positively from members of out-groups.627 Such 
an “evaluation of one's own group is determined with reference to specific other groups through 
social comparisons in terms of value-laden attributes and characteristics.”628 The distinction of 
social groups then creates what is known as the “we” v. “they” concept, which leads ultimately to 
favoring members of the in-group to satisfy social identity and the need for positive self-
esteem.629    
                                                
624 Esses et al., supra note 620, at 702. 
625 Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 602, at 1092.  
626 Esses et al., supra note 620, at 702 (“scarcity of resources, whether real or only perceived, 
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627 Henry Tajfel & John C. Turner, An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict, in THE SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS 33, 40-1 (William G. Austin & Stephen Worchel eds., 
1979); see also Meni Koslowsky et al., Moderators of Social Power Use for In-Group/Out-
Group Targets: An Experimental Paradigm, 38 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 3036, 3093 (2008). 
628 Id. at 40. 
629 See generally id; see also Miles Hewstone et al., Intergroup Bias, 53 ANN. REV. 
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It follows that conformity to in-group norms can aggravate bias. The decision of 
individuals to distribute rewards and resources is influenced by in-group norms.  Jetten et al. 
found that the norms of the in-groups influenced members’ behaviors, making them favor their 
own group more and show more discrimination to those outside of the group.630 That is, if in-
group members discriminate against others, other in-group members will conform as well, so that 
they fit the in-group norms. The research also showed that these norms can change discrimination 
strategies.631 The members of groups tend to conform to what the other members are doing, even 
as regards discrimination.632 The study also discusses how in-group norms change in-group biases 
and actions.633 These norms moderate biases from the group, so the other members will follow the 
ideals of the rest of the group.634  
Thus, the allocation of resources and rewards constitutes the intersection between 
intergroup bias and corruption. Fundamentally, corruption refers to an abuse of power for private 
benefit where the object of the abuse of power is the allocation of resources and rewards. 
Intergroup bias involves the allocation of resources favorably for in-group members, suggesting 
that favoring in-group members constitutes utilitarian behavior which maximizes the resources 
and rewards of the in-group. On the other hand, intergroup bias influences the perception of 
corrupt practices and those who commit such practices.  
There are certain factors that play a significant role in intergroup bias which deserve to be 
highlighted because of their relevance both to Saudi society and to corruption. Status is 
considered one of the moderators determining the level of intergroup bias. Generally, high-status 
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groups are more likely to exhibit bias toward low-status groups.635 Nevertheless, if such status is 
perceived as illegitimate, low-status groups tend to show more bias than high-status groups.636 In 
the same vein, power determines the level of bias. When power is associated with high status, 
members of such groups tend to be more discriminatory, even if they are members of a numerical 
minority.637 
 In light of this, it can be argued that members of powerful and high-status groups tend to 
favor their in-groups in their allocation of resources and rewards. Thus, status and power can fuel 
corruption, as will be explained in the next section, by the favorably allocating resources to 
members of the in-group. This can be seen in the real world where certain groups of people 
dominate the top tiers of hierarchies and perform the job of gatekeepers in order defend the 
existing social structure that benefits them.  
The other factor that influences the level of intergroup bias is represented in the perception 
of threats.  “Threat can be perceived in terms of the in-group’s social identity, its goals and 
values, its position in the hierarchy, even its existence.”638 A threat can be tangible, as in the case 
of competing over limited resources, or it can be symbolic, as in the case of protecting the values 
or traditions of the in-group.639 Essentially, realistic group conflict theory posits that conflict of 
interest between different groups is the basis of discrimination and prejudice.640 One of the 
premises of this theory is that “the greater the intergroup threat and conflict, the more hostility is 
                                                
635 See, e.g., Brian Mullen et al., Ingroup Bias as a Function of Salience, Relevance, and Status: 
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expressed toward the source of the threat.”641 In accordance with SIT, it was also found that in-
group bias is exhibited more when a threat to the distinctiveness of the group is perceived.642  
 Groups in Saudi Arabia, therefore, may exercise and show more in-group bias to protect 
their identity, as seen in scenarios involving tribalism or regionalism. The competition over scarce 
resources and behavior showing in-group bias can be seen explicitly between Saudis and 
foreigners, though it may also exist between different groups. As an example of the effect of 
feeling threatened, consider the racist attitudes exhibited by the skilled blue-collar workers in the 
United States and Britain who are “most vulnerable to competition from other (e.g., immigrant) 
groups and thus feel most threatened and fraternalistically most deprived.”643 Another example of 
the role of a sense of threat is manifested in hate crimes and xenophobia against other groups, 
mainly minorities. When a high influx of immigrant minorities is associated with an unsteady 
economic situation, the perception of threat and the incidence of violence are escalated, and this 
can be exacerbated by far-right political leaders.644  
In line with the interdependence of the in-group, reciprocity represents an influential 
factor in intergroup bias. The hypothesis of in-group reciprocity proposes that in-group favoritism 
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in reward allocation in the minimal group paradigm constitutes utilitarian behavior aiming at 
increasing economic self-interest.645 Specifically, “category members follow a norm of reciprocity 
and exchange favorable allocations with [in-group] members.”646 Accordingly, Yamagishi et al. 
found that “subjects in MGEs [minimal group effects] do not practice [in-group] favoritism in 
reward allocation unless they expect similar favorable treatment from [in-group] members.”647   
Building on the distinction between “restricted exchange” and “generalized exchange”,648 
Yamagishi et al. noted that when a favor is provided to a member of in-group, reciprocation of 
such a favor is expected from any member of the in-group, and not directly and particularly from 
the same member for whom the favor was performed.649 Thus, the reciprocation of such favors is 
diffuse; it is not restricted to mutual exchange between particular dyads (“restricted exchange”), 
but rather takes the form of multilateral and indirect exchange (“generalized exchange”).650 
Reciprocation aiming at enhancing the economic self-interest is also an essential factor in 
corruption, both in interpersonal corrupt practices and in practices involving the abuse of power. 
As will be explained in Chapter 5, individuals are “aware of the fact that certain behavior (e.g., 
corrupt cooperation) in the present might lead to positive outcomes in the future (e.g., reciprocal 
payback).”651 
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For those committing corrupt practices, norms, as explained above, influence the 
perception of such actions. Following the “black sheep effect,” in-group members whose 
attributes (i.e. behaviors, attitudes, etc.) are inconsistent with in-group norms are judged more 
negatively than normative in-group members and even more negatively than are members of out-
groups.652 Such derogation of non-normative members of the in-group can be seen as “a 
cognitive-motivational strategy to purge from the group those [in-group] members who negatively 
contribute to social identity.”653 However, if the leader of the group behaves in a socially 
undesirable way, the situation may differ. De Moura and Abrams found that “transgressors were 
judged less punitively if they were [in-group] leaders than [in-group] members, outgroup 
members, or outgroup leaders.”654  
Having discussed the nature and origins of intergroup bias, we turn to the roles and the 
forms it takes in different cultures. Cultures can be divided into two main categories: individualist 
and collectivist cultures. In individualist cultures, “attitudes, beliefs, definitions, norms, values, 
and other elements of subjective cultures … are centered on the individual.”655 The situation is 
different in the collectivist cultures, where these elements “are centered on the ingroup.”656 Four 
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main attributes distinguish the two cultures: “(a) how individuals perceive themselves, (b) how 
they relate to others, (c) the goals they follow, and (d) what concerns drive their behavior.”657  
In collectivist cultures, individuals tend to identify themselves “as interdependent with an 
ingroup” (which can be a family, tribe, region, etc.); social relationships are characterized as 
communal rather than individual; communal or group goals are prioritized over individual goals; 
and norms, duties, and obligations strongly guide and predict social behaviors.658 Thus, “the 
major gap for collectivists occurs between [in-group] and [out-group], [i.e. we and they]; the 
major gap for individualists occurs between self and others, [i.e. I and others].”659  
Thus, “obedience, conformity, acquiescence and loyalty” are essential elements of 
collectivist cultures, and these play a significant role in the thriving of corruption and the decline 
of whistle-blowing roles.660 Further, individuals in collectivist cultures tend to violate the rules, 
especially if they come in conflict with the traditionally established norms.661 Notably, individuals 
in collectivist cultures consider loyalty to the group as an ethical standard which leads them to be 
“more likely to seek consensus and [they] might be more prone to nepotism because networks of 
friends and family tend to create loyal relationships that encourage [favoritism].”662  
Nevertheless, collectivist cultures are not all the same; there is a further distinction among 
these cultures which also applies to the individualist cultures. Depending on whether the culture 
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emphasizes hierarchy or equality, the culture can be described as vertical or horizontal.663 If the 
culture’s emphasis is on hierarchy, it can be described as vertical, whether it is individualist or 
collectivist, whereas if the culture’s emphasis is on equality, this society is then characterized as 
horizontal, whether it is individualist or collectivist.  
In the vertical collectivist cultures, which include Saudi Arabia, members are not 
perceived as equal; rather, some members are considered more important than others. 
Consequently, obedience to the authorities and sacrifices for the group are valued, or even 
required.664 On the other hand, horizontal collectivist cultures place the emphasis on equality, 
where members of the group are perceived as equal.665  
Both vertical and horizontal collectivist cultures tend to maintain group harmony, but this 
tendency is more emphasized and obvious in the vertical collectivist cultures. This implies that 
individuals will be guided by the norms of their groups and act in accordance with “what is 
expected of them.”666 Though both vertical and horizontal collectivist cultures share a similar 
character, in vertical collectivist cultures, the tendency toward nepotism, favoritism, and 
deception is higher than in horizontal collectivist cultures.667 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter began by exploring the nexus between societies and corruption. This nexus 
necessitated providing the reader with some background on Saudi history, culture, and society, in 
addition to brief review of corruption in Saudi Arabia. The chapter ended by exploring Ibn 
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Khaldun’s discussion of asabiyya as a sociological analysis relevant to corruption and Saudi 
culture. From the social psychological perspective, this chapter has sought to highlight the 
impact of power and intergroup bias on corrupt behaviors and acts. This chapter has aimed to lay 
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CHAPTER FIVE: WASTA IN SAUDI ARABIA 
INTRODUCTION  
To this point, it has been shown that corrupt practices may not only take different forms, 
they are also contextual. Consequently, cultures and regions may vary in their perceptions of 
those practices, for what is good in the East may not be perceived the same way in the West. In 
fact, within the same area such different perspectives may exist. This applies to the practice of 
wasta, a practice has been recognized by the Nazaha as the most prevalent corrupt practice in 
Saudi Arabia. 
  Wasta generally refers to an act of favoritism on any basis, whether that of race, region, 
religion, tribe, or family. In this chapter, wasta will be defined and a comprehensive explanation 
will be provided. This chapter will also shed light on the background and evaluation of wasta in 
Saudi Arabia. Since the practice of wasta can be categorized as a form of informal influence 
processes that exist in a number of countries around the world, wasta will be distinguished from 
other similar practices. Finally, wasta will be examined from a legal and a moral perspective.  
A.  Wasta and Similar Concepts  
Wasta is an Arabic word that is often loosely translated as “nepotism,” but in fact the 
meaning of the word is somewhat wider than that. Wasta, in contemporary Arab societies, is 
generally an act of favoritism. Yet such a characterization may not be accurate since wasta, as 
will be explained, requires mutual interdependence and reciprocity in most cases, i.e., an 
expectation of quid pro quo, which may be immediate or may remain in the future -- features 
which favoritism may lack.668    
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Wasta, or wasata in general, in Arabic means essentially “the middle” and is related to the 
verb yatawassat, which means a compromise between the needs of two conflicting parties in 
order to reach a middle ground.669 A distinction is made in classical Arabic between wasata, 
which refers to the act itself, and wasta or wasit, which refers to the person carrying out the act; 
despite this distinction, wasta is commonly used in contemporary spoken Arabic to refer to both 
the act and the person carrying it out.670  
Defining wasta creates some difficulties, and probably Justice Stewart’s famous phrase, “I 
know it when I see it,” is applicable to wasta. Wasta can be defined as “the intervention of a 
patron in favor of a client in an attempt to obtain privileges or resources through a third party.”671 
Others suggest that wasta is an implicit social contract between members of a group, mainly tribal 
groups, which imposes certain kinds of obligation upon the group members to provide favorable 
treatment.672  
The role of wasta creates another distinction. Wasta may serve the purpose of mediation 
or intercession. Wasta as mediation involves a family intervention to solve a conflict between one 
of a family’s members and a member of another family. Mediation also can be conducted by a 
third party. The reliance on mediation, a trait intrinsic to Arab societies, can explain the hesitance 
of individuals to rely on government officials to resolve their issues. Judges, influenced by this 
trait, still frequently urge and prefer mediation rather than issuing a judgment.673 Historically, 
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even the central authorities, which have included the Ottoman Empire and various occupiers, 
refrained from imposing full control over the tribes and opted to give them more independence in 
the area of settling disputes.674   
The other role played by wasta is one of intercession, in which individuals utilize wasta to 
gain advantages and seek benefits from the government. With the rapid development and increase 
of the size of government, wasta as a form of intercession has become more notable. In this role, 
wasta departs from the impartiality and neutrality that can be found in its role as mediation, where 
a person serves the benefits of both parties. In contrast, in wasta as intercession, a person is acting 
as a patron of, rather than as a mediator for, a client aiming at securing a benefit or advantage 
from a third party. 
In contemporary Arab societies, wasta rests on family loyalty as the foundation of its 
existence, and thrives, since family performs the traditional role of intervening to solve 
difficulties or to obtain a benefit of any kind.675 Though blood relationships (i.e., the family 
unit)676 remain the cornerstone of loyalty within which wasta plays a twofold role—to show 
loyalty and to enhance family ties and relationships—other loyalties based on membership in 
various groups, whether ethnic, religious, regional, or even political, may facilitate the use of 
wasta. Thus, wasta may not be only an act of nepotism, but may also extend to include others 
such as close friends, and may eventually become cronyism.677  
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Wasta may also extend beyond such groups to serve the stranger who is willing to pay for 
such a service.678 In such a case, a wasta or wasit receives a sum of money to utilize his influence 
or connections to secure benefits for another. An “expediter” (mueaqqib), for example, can be 
contacted by a total stranger who offers a sum of money to receive certain government services, a 
passport, or any of several different kinds of licenses. However, this is not always the case; in 
some circumstances, a wasta or wasit becomes a middleman in bribery transactions. Since Arab 
culture is heavily regulated by personal relationships and personal loyalty, the role of the 
middleman in a legal or illegal transaction is fundamental.    
At this point, the use of wasta may fall into one of three categories. First, wasta is sought 
to obtain an advantage for a family member or for a member of one’s tribe. Second, wasta is 
sought to gain benefits for a friend outside the family or tribal unit. Third, wasta is sought by a 
stranger with whom there is no kinship or friendship. The first two categories are relevant to the 
issue under discussion, while the third category must be distinguished in some ways from the 
previous two scenarios. In the first scenario, the wasit will fall into one of the first two categories, 
which makes it partly relevant to the issue, unlike the third scenario, which does not fall 
completely within the category of wasta due to the financial incentives involved.  
As explained in Chapter 2, shafa’ah is the term used in Islamic jurisprudence to refer to 
wasta. However, the approved and legal form of shafa’ah or wasta is contrary to the 
contemporary form of wasta. The permissible shafa’ah was fundamentally aimed at supporting 
solidarity for the whole society (takaful al Ijtima’i), which is not the same as the contemporary 
form of wasta. Aspects of Islam work to promote social solidarity: a “strong emphasis on social 
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cohesion, charity, social justice, collective responsibility for the welfare of society, the legitimate 
claims of the weak upon community, and the duty to help the poor and strangers at all times and 
regardless of economic and social circumstances.”679 Though wasta helps to enhance social 
solidarity, it does so between a smaller group of individuals and with a clear emphasis on 
economic and social circumstances.680  
Having explained briefly the concept and the practice of wasta, we should note that 
similar practices and concepts have existed in different societies around the globe. Guanxi is a 
similar concept in China, as is jeitinho in Brazil, and sv'ázi thrives in Russia, while “pulling 
strings” is still recognized in Britain. These concepts and practices definitely share some similar 
characteristics, though they exist in different societies and cultures.  
Guanxi literally means connections, relations, or relationships. Generally, guanxi is “an 
indigenous Chinese construct” that is defined as “an informal, particularistic personal connection 
between two individuals who are bound by an implicit psychological contract to follow the social 
norms of guanxi such as maintaining a long-term relationship, mutual commitment, loyalty, and 
obligation.”681 A distinction must be made between the existence of guanxi and the practice of 
guanxi in the context of Chinese society. While the existence of guanxi depends on personal 
                                                
679 Hamed El-Said & Jane Harrigan, “You Reap What You Plant”: Social Networks in the Arab 
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681 Xiao-Ping Chen & Chao C. Chen, On the Intricacies of the Chinese Guanxi: A Process Model 
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relationships and human sentiments, the practice of guanxi involves the utilization of these 
relationships to make exchanges or generally to obtain advantages.682  
The existence of guanxi requires a relatively low threshold, which is a familiarity between 
two individuals resulting from past interactions. However, special guanxi requires personal 
relationships which involve sentiment and obligation.683 Rather than demographic or personal 
similarities, guanxi is based on specific social institutions, kinships, or regions, or sharing the 
same alma mater or work unit.684 Accordingly, and similar to Arabs, Chinese people categorize 
others within three categories, moving from the closest ties to the most distant: family, familiar 
people, and strangers.685  
Guanxi and wasta both depend heavily on the trust between parties, which derives from 
long-standing relationships. In both Arab and Chinese cultures, the family is fundamental. Such 
an importance imposes on the individual the obligation to maintain the honor of the family and to 
be loyal to its members.686 Both cultures place an emphasis on reciprocal obligations, leading to 
the reciprocal relationships that are essential for guanxi and wasta to exist and thrive.687  
The dichotomy may be observed in how each society considers and perceives these 
practices. The Chinese are able to distinguish good guanxi from bad guanxi or other corrupt 
practices. Consequently, they primarily perceive and consider guanxi to be a positive aspect of 
                                                
682 Chao C. Chen et al., Guanxi Practices and Trust in Management: A Procedural Justice 
Perspective, 15 ORG. SCI. 200, 201 (2004). 
683 Id.  
684 Id; see also Chen & Chen, supra note 681, at 311.  
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interpersonal relationships.688 In contrast, the Arab societies still view wasta suspiciously. Despite 
the classifications of shafa’ah in Islamic jurisprudence, which fundamentally shapes Arab 
societies, wasta is still widely practiced even though individuals in these societies tend to 
associate wasta with corruption and to perceive wasta negatively.689  
 Another similar practice existing in Brazil is called jeitinho, which literally means a “little 
way out”; the term “refers to creative ingenuity in rapidly achieving short-term solutions to 
problems.”690 The application of jeitinho, then, can be a way to avoid bureaucratic boundaries and 
rules or to avoid any potential difficulty with higher-level officials within a strictly hierarchical 
system.691  
Barbosa placed jeitinho in the middle of a spectrum between two extremes, with a favor-
like action at the positive end of the spectrum and corruption at the negative end.692 Accordingly, 
he distinguished between dar um jeitinho (to find a way out), which aims at achieving a goal and 
solving a problem, regardless of whether the way is legal or illegal, and jeitinho brasileiro (the 
Brazilian way out), in which creativity is employed to deal with daily circumstances and 
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situations.693 In this sense, the first form is perceived to be close to corruption, while the second is 
perceived more as a part of Brazilian social life.694  
In this regard, jeitinho and wasta are double-edged swords that may be used to create 
social justice which privileges the individual human and natural rights instead of legal and 
institutional rights.695 Thus, both are appeals to emotion, rather than to reason, employing 
behavioral tactics like excuses and justifications which are “based on a personal situation that 
differentiates the person asking for the jeitinho from others in society.”696 However, what 
distinguishes jeitinho from both guanxi and wasta is that a long-standing relationship is required 
between the parties in the latter two, but not necessarily in the former.697 
Generally, the previously mentioned concepts are recognized as indigenous forms of 
informal influence processes. These processes involve a reliance on informal linkages to achieve 
and gain certain advantages and benefits.698 The differences appear mainly in the “emphasis on 
the intensity, duration, and hierarchical nature of the relationship between the parties.”699  To 
illustrate, guanxi and wasta occur within a hierarchical system and context and require long-
standing emotional commitments, which is not necessary in the case of jeitinho.700 Thus, a 
number of studies consider these practices to be forms of informal influence processes that are 
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societally related rather than societally bound, which suggests that the variation between countries 
is a matter of quantity, rather than of the distinctive qualities of certain processes701—meaning 
that there are certain factors which make these processes more salient in one country than another.  
Finally, based on various grounds, wasta can be distinguished from the mentoring and 
networking systems adopted in Western nations. In the Western notion, the mentor is traditionally 
a senior manager within the entity itself, whereas wasta is not limited within the borders of the 
entity involved: in fact, it is notable that wasta is obtained from outside the entity.702 The other 
major difference lies in what is provided by wasta in contrast to what is provided by the 
mentoring system. For Westerners, a mentor is expected to help individuals navigate through the 
system, which can be a form of coaching, counseling, or advising, whereas wasta is more along 
the lines of intervening on behalf of an individual to guarantee that person certain advantages or 
benefits.703  
Furthermore, networking does not involve reciprocal obligations, as is the case with 
wasta, since the qualifications and merits of the individual are the basis of networking, but not 
always of wasta.704 Most notable is the individualistic characteristics of networking in the 
Western context vs. the collectivistic characteristics of wasta in the Arab context. From the 
Western perspective, networking has an individualistic character and exists primarily between 
individuals. In contrast, wasta has a collectivistic character in which the family or groups are 
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involved; that is, the element of dependence is more salient in the case of wasta than in the case 
of networking.705       
B.  The Background and Evolution of Wasta in Saudi Arabia  
The history of the evolution of wasta seems to be similar in the various Arab societies, but 
there is no exact time period at which wasta was initiated.706 Nevertheless, old publications, such 
as Ibn Khaldūn’s Intruduction to History, in which he noted the significance asabiyya and the 
connections between members of a group in order to obtain a benefit or profit, inform us that the 
practice of wasta or similar acts of favoritism existed and can be traced to at least the fourteenth 
century. Thus, it can be said that wasta is a long-standing practice that evolved and spread 
throughout Arab societies, among which was Saudi Arabia.  
The goal of wasta is historically related to the two forms of wasta, the old form and the 
contemporary form. The old form of wasta, which existed before the formation of the new 
nations, was used to reach a solution to conflicts raised between tribes, as mentioned above; that 
is, wasta was a tool through which the peace, solidarity, unity, and integrity of the tribe itself and 
of the society in general was achieved and maintained. Thus, wasta was a form of social 
insurance in in the past, mainly before the emergence of the new states in the second half of the 
twentieth century. This is in line with Ibn Khaldūn’s analysis when he noted that asabiyya is a 
necessity to overcome the rough life of the desert and its risks.707 In the Arabian Peninsula, which 
was populated largely by nomadic tribes, people lived in isolation and when raids occurred 
                                                
705 Id. at 479. 
706 Barnett et al., supra note 672, at 42 (“The wasta network, on the other hand includes 
influential protagonists such as senior managers, family members, acquaintances and important 
figures in social, political and economic spheres from inside and outside the organization.”). 
707 IBN KHALDUN, supra note 530, at 97.  
  150 
between different tribes there were limited channels through which to solve such conflicts.708 
Hence, the most effective avenue was wasta, through which tribes could live in peace and survive 
the harsh environment in which they lived.   
When the nation-states were formed and governments developed, a new form of wasta 
emerged. Wasta shifted to be more of a means of intercession. The emphasis consequently shifted 
toward the interests of the individuals constituting the tribe, rather than on enhancing tribal 
status.709 The shift from the collective benefit to a relatively individual benefit was due to 
modernity and and has been boosted by globalization, which imposed more competition and more 
services provided by the state, resulting ultimately in more stress on Arab societies.710  
Despite this shift, the welfare of the tribe and family remains a motivating factor, even if 
only implicitly and subtly: wasta is used to obtain and serve individuals’ interests, but this 
ultimately enhances the status of the tribe itself.711 This results from the fact that wasta was 
initially used to promote a person to a position of high rank, which not only provided that 
individual with benefit, but also increased the resources that the tribe had at its disposal and 
enhanced their status among other tribes due to their having more people in higher positions. 
Those now in higher positions are expected to do the same for their group members, and the 
vicious circle goes on.  
 This shift in the nature of wasta from mediation to intercession created another shift in 
the mechanism of wasta itself. The new mechanism diminished and altered the role of middlemen 
in two main ways.  First, individuals who had powerful acquaintances could go beyond the 
middlemen and reach their goals directly. Second, the role of middlemen has become more 
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personal, since the middlemen now tend to enhance their own status, fame, and even their 
wealth.712 Thus, the new mechanism allows for a more extensive practice of wasta and less family 
or tribal coordination in the prioritizing of the goals of wasta.  
Basically, the differences between the old form of wasta and the contemporary form of 
wasta can be narrowed down to two specific areas. First, the process of directing wasta, in the old 
form, was a top-down one, as the leaders of the tribe or group obtained benefits on behalf of their 
tribe or group, whereas the process in its contemporary form tends to operate from the bottom up, 
where individuals seek to gain advantages for themselves initially which will benefit the group 
ultimately.713 Second, the role of middlemen, which once provided the elders and leaders of the 
tribe or the group with authority and high status, receded when the contemporary form of wasta 
evolved.714 Consequently, wasta has become a tool for seeking advantages rather than peace, and 
the wasit, the person who is performing wasta, has become a dispenser of benefits instead of 
being a problem-solver.  
It must be emphasized that the nature of tribal society is central to the development and 
evolution of wasta. In Saudi Arabia, as discussed in Chapter 4, the role of the family and the tribe 
is crucial in shaping the society and interpersonal relationships. The history of Saudi Arabia’s 
consolidation is replete with events and incidents that illustrate the significance of the tribes. 
Since the first Saudi state, the role of the tribe has been pivotal.715 The Banu Khalid, for instance, 
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was a tribe that created difficulties for the Ottoman Empire and for the Saudi state as well. The 
Sharifian family and the Rashidi family were also obvious examples of tribes that had a 
significant role.716 Further, some elite and powerful tribes or figures were supported financially 
and exempted from the taxes, either by the Ottoman Empire or by the British, to provide safety 
for trade routes and to prevent tribal raids.717       
During the consolidation period, the concept of tribal solidarity, the belief in tribes and 
families as the fundamental unit of organization and identity, and the emphasis on the leading role 
of tribal leaders were elements of the consolidation process. Historically, as discussed in Chapter 
4, settlements were inhabited on the basis of tribal affiliation. Thus, settlements were mainly 
inhabited by the members of the same tribe.  
 In the twenty-first century Saudi Arabia, affiliation with the tribe and the support for its 
members can be seen most clearly in the elections of municipal councils. Tribalism has revived in 
the process of the municipal elections and has played a significant role in the results of these 
elections.718 Although it is illegal to run as a candidate based on tribalism, informal tribal 
                                                                                                                                                       
state, on the one hand, and the need to control an embryonic state and save it from potential 
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alliances have been formed not only to win elections, but also to exclude non-tribal candidates 
from an election.719   
The role of tribal leaders was strong during the consolidation of Saudi Arabia, as can be 
seen, for instance, in the role of Faisal Al-Dawish and Sultan ibn Bijad as leaders of the Ikhwan 
movement.720 More recently, the political role and influence of tribal leaders has been weakened 
with the emergence of the new technocrats and elites.721 This has not, however, undermined the 
relationship between the government and some of these leaders, mainly those of the leading 
tribes.722 In fact, the degree to which tribal or customary law serves as an obstacle to the 
development of the legal system shows how effective the role of the tribes is. The leaders or elites 
of tribes may act as arbitrators to settle internal or inter-tribal disputes. In their arbitration, they 
rely on customary law, which is based on the idea that reconciliation should provide the victim 
with compensation.723  
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With that being said, the seed of wasta was initially planted in the system early in the 
consolidation of Saudi Arabia.724 As emphasized repeatedly after the consolidation, the backbone 
of the tribal system is honor, which by its nature is tightly linked with loyalty;725 that is, to be 
honored, an individual must be loyal to those around him, to friends and acquaintances, but more 
importantly, to members of his family and tribe. This creates a closed structure, based on family, 
tribe, or blood ties generally, which is a fertile ground for wasta to flourish in. Such a closed 
structure assures members within it “that their efforts are pooled for the benefit of all and that 
recipients are thus predisposed to act favorably in return, a ‘tit-for-tat’ for the group.”726 
Thus, it is not always the case that those performing wasta personally know the individual 
who sought their services; instead, they may provide wasta as a favor to their acquaintances in 
order to maintain their trust.727 Since trust and performing favors are highly regarded, those 
performing wasta are semi-obligated to make the necessary efforts to provide the advantages 
sought by the requestor in order to maintain that trust.728 On the other end, the person who is 
performing wasta may not personally know, and need not know, the individual who has the 
authority to provide the advantages or the benefits sought. Hence, if the wasta does not personally 
know the individual who has the power to provide the advantages or the benefits, he will rely on 
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his own network circle and acquaintances to make contact with that individual and achieve his 
goal.729 
In essence, then, wasta requires and involves implicitly reciprocal and cooperative 
obligations presupposing the existence of a loyalty which has expanded wasta relationships to 
cover other ethnic, religious, or regional groups.730 Even the political structure itself has been 
influenced by this concept of loyalty, which can be seen in the government’s assignment of 
educated tribal elites and their close relatives to major positions in the government in order to 
gain their loyalty.731 All in all, these networks and relationships eventually lead an individual to 
be dependent on rather than independent from others. The welfare and fate of a member of a 
group depends heavily on the actions of other members and the network in general.732  
In practice, wasta depends mainly on the group an individual is considered to be a 
member of, that is, the individual’s family, tribe, village, region, or nationality. Thus, people tend 
more often to identify themselves with their tribal or regional affiliation.733 Individuals from the 
same group largely rely on each other by practicing wasta in order to gain certain advantages. In 
this sense, individuals are defined by their family, tribe, or region, rather than by their own 
achievements and qualities. Thus, “who you are” significantly influences the relationships 
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between individuals and wasta.734 The relationships between individuals require a certain 
familiarity between them which the answer to “who you are” provides; that is, people sharing the 
same family, tribe, or region form a relationship more quickly and easily. This quick formation of 
relationships assumes implicitly the existence of the loyalty which enables wasta to be practiced 
and favors to be exchanged more fluently.735  
Within an organizational context, a wasta can be anyone with sufficient power to 
influence the behavior of others.736 The sources of such power do not always derive from a formal 
position, but can also derive from a socio-economic position which has a high level of respect 
from others in the society.737 Thus, people tend to build good relationships with those who are 
powerful and influential in a society, since they naturally “like to be associated with those in 
power.”738 Accordingly, activities individuals perform to build and establish interpersonal 
connections with influential and powerful people, whether in the political, the economic, or the 
social sphere, explain the networking aspect of wasta.739 The aim of these relationships with 
powerful and influential people is not merely to provide for one’s immediate needs, but to prepare 
for whatever exigencies may arise in the future.740   
In Saudi Arabia, wasta is a deep-rooted practice in the society. Wasta can be used to 
obtain a license or permit or a favorable legal ruling. The hierarchical system of power is parallel 
with the similar hierarchical system of resources—that is, not everyone has the same access to the 
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same resources; thus, the scarcer the resource that is sought, the stronger the wasta represented by 
a powerful individual who has a higher rank in the hierarchal system. In this sense, though the use 
of wasta is essentially to overcome a barrier, wasta itself can be a barrier in some cases. To 
illustrate, resources or services can be restricted to those who have a strong wasta, despite their 
merits or eligibility. It also worth noting that the frequency and intensity of using wasta varies 
from one institution to another and also from one object sought to another.   
In ordinary life, wasta can be sought in order to avoid burdensome bureaucratic 
procedures, in recruitment or promoting, or to obtain certain services.741 In Saudi Arabia, as in 
many Arab nations, wasta seems to be an effective means of dealing with weak institutions. Thus, 
“the family network functions as a ‘state within a state’.”742 Nowadays, the existence and practice 
of wasta cannot be denied, despite the debate about whether it is beneficial or not. It is 
unfortunate that people use wasta to get things that they are entitled to by law, and that without 
wasta a person may not be able to get them.743 In these situations, wasta itself acts as a barrier.  
The most notable situation in which wasta is used and practiced is in recruitment or 
promoting scenarios.744 The family-based nature of Saudi society means that “the prestige and 
wealth of families … determine the level of power and influence, i.e. wasta, not only to position 
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their members in desired jobs but to influence their career advancement as well.”745 Regional 
background is another factor in the use of wasta in the recruitment or promoting process.746 
Generally, wasta eliminates the merits and qualifications requirements in either recruitment or 
promoting. A number of incidents have clearly demonstrated the existence and the thriving of 
wasta practices in employment procedures.747  
Further, individuals use wasta to obtain certain services provided mainly by the 
government, most notably education and health services. Though most health services in Saudi 
Arabia are provided by the government for free, access to these services is not necessarily equal. 
Thus, individuals may use wasta in scheduling an appointment or even in some cases to be 
admitted to see a doctor.748 Education, mainly higher education, is also an area where wasta plays 
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more advantageous position when it comes to promotion. This is especially true in large and 
public sector organizations.”). 
748 Al-Bishr, supra note 747 (For example, this story was narrated by a writer in one of the 
newspapers: “My relative said there was a long line of people waiting to see the doctor and some 
of them must have been waiting for hours. However, it took him and his wife only a few minutes 
to see the doctor and have him examine their three children. The doctor requested an X-ray for 
the children. Usually, it takes a few months to have an X-ray done at a government hospital 
because you have to wait your turn. But they did not need to do that.”). 
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a significant role, though the introduction of an electronic application process has reduced the 
practice of wasta to some extent.749      
Lastly, lengthy and cumbersome bureaucratic procedures have forced Saudis to use wasta. 
In this grey area, wasta is used to overcome costly and difficult bureaucratic red tape. The dark 
side to this, however, is that wasta is used by those who might not succeed if decisions were 
based on individual merit.750 This can occur in obtaining a permit or license of any kind, all the 
way up to winning a government contract.751 The introduction of e-government in some 
governmental agencies, such as the Ministry of the Interior, has successfully reduced the number 
of interventions and uses of wasta, yet some of the e-government processes remain as slow as, if 
not even slower than, they were before.752   
In general, this can be attributed to the absence of clear rules, which aggravates citizens’ 
unfamiliarity with the legal system.753 The lack of clarity is associated with the wide discretionary 
powers that are vested in the hands of officials, who tend to extensively, and in some cases 
inconsistently, issue regulations and procedures.754 This situation seems to be consistent with the 
                                                
749 Al-Hussain & AI-Marzooq, supra note 745, at 111 (“Some Saudis have been impacted 
negatively by their connection to influential people such as father, uncle, husband, or in-laws. 
They, like their connections, are very successful as they have got the benefit of good education in 
reputable schools, fluency in more than one language, and international experience.”); see also 
Female students demonstrated against lack of fairness in the admissions process, Saudi female 
students storm Mecca’s Umm Al Qura university campus, AL-ARABIYA NEWS, July. 26, 2011, 
http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/07/26/159336.html.  
750 Barnett et al., supra note 672, at 41.   
751 MOHAMED A. RAMADY, THE SAUDI ARABIAN ECONOMY POLICIES, ACHIEVEMENTS, AND 
CHALLENGES 208 (2010) (“Others argue that the system can sometimes lack transparency, with 
government tenders linked to [favors] and whom you know or wasta, especially for large 
government tenders.”).  
752 Kropf & Newbury-Smith, supra note 725, at 19. 
753 VLIEGER, supra note 340, at 222 (“It is thus not surprising that Emirati and Saudi citizens 
demand clarity on rules in their dealings with more powerful parties such as the government, but 
they refrain from doing so in their dealings with less powerful parties such as migrant workers.”)   
754 See, e.g., Pillay & Dorasamy, supra note 660, at 363-78. 
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characteristics of high uncertainty avoidance societies, in which individuals to some extent 
become preoccupied with need for rules and regulation; the extensive promulgation of regulations 
and rules leads to the existence of inconsistent, or even dysfunctional, rules.755  Eventually, this 
situation leaves a wide open door for wasta to be practiced and to thrive.          
C.  Is Wasta an Act of Corruption? When and How? Legal or Moral?  
Wasta can be perceived either as a form of corruption or as a form of networking. At 
either end of the spectrum, wasta can be viewed differently. On the one hand, wasta can be 
viewed as a useful means of resolving disputes. On the other hand, wasta may involve the use of 
power in order to secure certain advantages, which can be perceived as corruption.756 
Distinguishing between these dimensions of wasta is not an easy task. From one perspective, 
wasta is viewed as a means of reducing and overcoming red tape, and therefore as legitimate, 
while from another perspective, mainly that of those who do not have wasta, it is viewed as a 
mere act of corruption.757 Clearly, wasta is an ambiguous practice. It can serve to enhance fairness 
and help the disadvantaged, but it also inappropriately benefits family members or those who are 
financially powerful. In reality, today wasta seems to be a negative term that most often refers to 
corruption.758 
In its origins, wasta had a more positive function; today, however, it is a pervasive 
problem.759 Manifestly, wasta has some of the consequences that corrupt practices do. Although, 
                                                
755 HOFSTEDE ET AL., supra note 66, at 209. 
756 Al-Ramahi, supra note 724, at 38. 
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759 Charles D. Adwan, Corruption terminology in the Arabic language, MIDDLE EAST AND 
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as in the case of corruption, some research argues that wasta is beneficial,760 yet it is definitely 
more beneficial for those who have access to it or those who are influential and powerful.761 As 
noted above in regard to the consequences of corruption, wasta negatively affects economic 
competition and the development of nations where it is widely practiced. Since it depends more 
on connections than on merits and qualifications, wasta provides entities with unqualified 
resources, which eventually affects the productivity and performance of these entities, as well as 
destroying fair competition.762 In a similar vein, wasta decreases individuals’ incentives to 
develop their skills or merits, since they become more dependent on wasta than on their skills or 
capabilities.763    
 Socially, wasta, similar to corruption, leads to social inequality. To have a strong wasta, 
one must already have connections, and thus “wasta may create a reinforcing cycle where the 
powerful receive the resources while the weak becomes weaker.”764 Broadly speaking, wasta 
provides undue advantages and benefits to certain individuals or groups rather than others, and 
does not do so based on merit, and thus, rather than reinforcing social equality, wasta corrodes it. 
Though this may be clearly seen in scenarios of recruitment or promotion, it can also be seen, 
even if less clearly, in other domains, including the provision of services and rule of law 
applications.  
                                                
760 Tlaiss & Kauser, supra note 702, at 469 (“[W]asta can strengthen social ties and networks and 
deepens social cohesion, reinforce social relations and strengthen ties within kinship groups.”); 
see also Fawaz B. ALHussan et al., The Benefit of Wasta Network: The Arab Middle East region 
(Kolding, Denmark 31st IMP Conference 2015). 
761 Tlaiss & Kauser supra note 702, at 473 (quoting a junior public sector manager in Syria who 
said, “I think wasta is not good because there is little fairness. It is only good for the person who 
has wasta [. . .] the majority of people are disadvantaged because they have no wasta [. . .] or 
even access to a wasta [. . ] wasta benefits only the few and influential.”).  
762 Robert B. Cunningham & Yasin K. Sarayrah, Taming “Wasta” to Achieve Development, 16 
ARAB STUD. Q. 29, 36-37(1994). 
763 Tlaiss & Kauser supra note 702, at 479. 
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 Similar to what has been noted above about the consequences of corruption, wasta has a 
negative legal impact. Effectively, wasta negatively affects equality before law and the equal 
enforcement of the law, which eventually leads to having less effective laws.765 At a trivial level, 
for instance, many violators of traffic laws who are subject to imprisonment according to the law 
will be released simply because they have wasta.766 This phenomenon is not limited to such cases; 
other cases can be subject to the influence of wasta, though they vary in intensity and frequency.    
 In general, wasta is a form of favoritism that involves discrimination in favor of an 
individual’s tribe or group. Though it provides benefits and advantages to those using and 
practicing it, wasta comes with a cost that increases and decreases with the size of discriminated-
against groups. In his analysis, Bucker provided a comprehensible explanation. He distinguished 
between the situation in the United States and that in South Africa, where the size of the 
discriminated-against groups differed; that is, the majority in the United States are whites, 
whereas whites are a minority in the context of South Africa. In essence, if the discriminated-
against group is small, the cost of such discrimination is relatively small in comparison to a 
situation where the size of the discriminated-against group is large, in which the cost will be large 
as well.767  
Applying the previous analysis to the practice of wasta, it can be argued that if the use of 
wasta, as a form of discrimination, is carried out by the majority group to favor its members 
rather than the minority group, the cost is relatively small since the minority, rather than the 
                                                
765 See, e.g., VLIEGER, supra note 340, at 216 (“In both countries—but especially in Saudi 
Arabia—many interviewees complained about the fact that the elite seem to be above the law 
entirely.”).  
766 Id. at 222 (“One explained that his son was arrested when he was in a neighborhood where a 
car had been broken into: ‘There was no evidence at all, but nevertheless they refused to let him 
go. So I called my boss and he called a prince, and then he was released.’”). 
767 See generally GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2010). 
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majority, will bear the cost.768 The reverse situation is one that imposes more cost on both sides—
the majority who is discriminated against, and the minority who practice discrimination, or wasta, 
as well. In the Saudi context, the latter situation seems to be more applicable, since the minority 
are carrying out discrimination, whereas the size of the group being discriminated against is not 
small.769 For example, if the members of one regional group are practicing wasta, then the size of 
this group is small, since the size of this group is one region out of thirteen. The same can be said 
in the case of tribal groups when there is one tribe against many, and so on. However, if several, 
or most, regional groups or tribes are practicing wasta, then the cost to the society becomes very 
high. 
After considering generally the main consequences of wasta, it is important to consider 
how individuals perceive it morally. Among the Arab nations, for instance, 90 percent of 
Jordanians surveyed said they would continue using wasta in the future, even while 87 percent 
expressed a desire to see wasta eliminated.770 This suggests that individuals perceive wasta 
negatively despite the de facto widespread practice of wasta, even by those who perceive it 
negatively. Another study, targeting people’s perception of the competency and morality of those 
who obtained their employment via wasta, showed that those who were appointed by wasta were 
perceived as less moral and less competent.771 Interestingly, however, respondents of lower 
socioeconomic status perceived those who used wasta more positively than did respondents of a 
more affluent status.772 Ironically, another study showed that students who had completed an 
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769 Id. 
770 SA’EDA KILANI & BASEM SAKIJHA, WASTA: THE DECLARED SECRET 17 (2002). 
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ethics class tended to use wasta in the future, which suggests that such classes are ineffective in 
promoting the change of such a resistant practice.773    
In the Saudi context, a similar pattern exists where individuals of lower socioeconomic 
status perceive those using wasta in recruitment and promotion relatively less negatively. The 
difference can be seen in how men and women perceived those who were promoted due to wasta. 
In this context, 77 percent of men perceived an individual promoted through wasta as less 
competent, while only 46 percent of women did.774 From the morality perspective, 54 percent of 
men perceived anyone promoted because of wasta as less moral, while only 33 percent of women 
did.775  
More broadly, the same survey revealed a pattern of perceptions similar to those of other 
Arabs, where respondents perceived wasta as an unfair practice and corruption but still believed it 
was a tool to overcome barriers. Though both women and men agreed, by 67 percent and 66 
percent, respectively, that wasta was a means to overcoming barriers, there was a difference in 
how they perceived wasta generally:776 among women, 57 percent believed that wasta was a form 
of corruption that introduced low morality into the organization, and 61 percent perceived it as an 
unfair practice.777 Among men, 80 percent considered wasta as a form of corruption and 76 
percent considered it an unfair practice.778  
To illustrate the role of socioeconomic status in perceiving wasta, a comparison between 
the generations may be significant. Though Saudi men hold a negative view of wasta regardless 
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of their generation, a difference in views can be noted between the younger and older generation 
of women. While only 44 percent of the older generation of women perceived wasta as an unfair 
practice, this rose to 65 percent among the younger generation.779 The same pattern is apparent in 
terms of viewing wasta as a corrupt practice, where 48 percent of the older generation of women 
did so, whereas among the younger generation, 61 percent did so.780 A significant difference 
between the perceptions of the younger and the older generation of women was found in regard to 
the belief that those who were promoted through wasta were less competent. While 27 percent of 
the older generation perceived them as less competent, 52 percent of the younger generation did 
so.781 
This seems to be in line with the findings, mentioned above, that people of lower 
socioeconomic status tend to view wasta more positively. Accordingly, the difference between 
the view of wasta among the younger and the older generation of Saudi women can be attributed 
to the change in their socioeconomic status. In Saudi Arabia, the socioeconomic status of women 
has changed significantly during the last decade, which can be seen in the dramatic increase in the 
percentage of Saudi women participating in the private sector, whereas Saudi men’s 
socioeconomic status was not subject to the same shift.782  
Regardless of whether they perceive wasta negatively or positively, individuals seem to be 
continuing to use wasta in their life. It is also important to emphasize that the contemporary form 
of wasta is clearly inconsistent with Islamic teachings and jurisprudence. As explained in Chapter 
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2, Shari'a has a firm position against wasta, which is similar, to some extent, to the prohibited 
forms of shafa’ah. For instance, the emphasis on hiring based on qualifications and merit can be 
found in several Qur’anic and Sunnah texts.783  
The broader psychological explanation for the dissonant behavior of condemning wasta 
while continuing to use it is provided by self-justification theory. The inconsistent attitude 
towards wasta and its widespread practice is simply a form of what is known as cognitive 
dissonance, where people hold two incompatible beliefs at the same time.784 Since people “are 
motivated not so much to be right as to believe [they] are right (and wise, and decent, and good), 
they tend to reduce such dissonance.”785 This dissonance reduction, though irrational, is mainly 
aimed at protecting the ego and providing a positive image of the self.786 Thus, individuals 
committed to a certain attitude develop a strong desire for self-justification, leading them to resist 
any attempt to change such an attitude.787 What cognitive dissonance theory provides, then, is an 
illustration of the efforts people undertake to live with troublesome situations: if the situation is 
unpleasant and at the same time negative, people seek to cognitively minimize the 
unpleasantness.788   
In addition to self-justification, individuals develop system-justification, in which they 
engage in motivated psychological processes “to imbue the status quo with legitimacy and to see 
                                                
783 See Ahmed A. Mohamed & Hadia Hamdy, The Stigma of Wasta: The Effect of Wasta on 
Perceived Competence and Morality 2 (German University in Cairo, Working Paper No. 5, 
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it as good, fair, natural, desirable, and even inevitable.”789 System dependence and a sense of 
inevitability play significant roles in developing and motivating system-justification processes.790 
Similar to self-justification, individuals within the system attempt to defend the legitimacy of the 
system in order to reduce their cognitive dissonance.  
This may be particularly applicable to wasta practices, and more generally to systemic 
corruption. Since individuals are dependent on the system and wasta practices, they tend to 
defend not only the use of, but also the legitimacy of such practices. This suggests that the more 
dependent the individuals are, the more likely they are to defend and justify the practices, which 
can partly explain the differing views among those of low and high socioeconomic status.791   
Individuals may be also motivated by the system’s seeming inevitability, which, as with 
self-justification, leads them to make the best of an inevitable situation. In reality, it is difficult to 
abandon most social systems or norms, since that would involve significant loss.792 Thus, 
ironically, although “rational people should judge systems from which they cannot escape most 
harshly, system-justification theory instead predicts that, all else being equal, people will show 
more system defense within inescapable systems.”793   
Cultural differences exist in the dissonance reduction processes. For instance, dissonance-
reducing behavior in less individualistic societies may exist in a more communal form.794 North 
American researchers have shown that people who agree to tell a lie for a small monetary reward 
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tend to resolve the cognitive dissonance this creates by believing the lie; however, in the Japanese 
context, which is considered a communal culture, individuals who only watched a friend who 
participated in the experiment telling a lie to someone else experienced cognitive dissonance and 
resolved it by believing the lie their friend had told. This suggests that the experience of certain 
widespread practices by individuals in a communal culture may strongly encourage them to 
reduce their cognitive dissonance by in some way justifying or excusing those practices.795  
Shifting focus from the issue of morality and wasta, it is appropriate to consider wasta 
from a legal perspective. In this regard, wasta practices overlap with a number of criminal corrupt 
acts. Viewed more narrowly, wasta may involve nepotism or cronyism, where an official uses his 
authority to advantage a relative, friend, or acquaintance. More broadly, wasta may include the 
abuse of power, which involves, inter alia, trade in influence practices. Thus, the legal 
characterization and practice of wasta may involve a grey area, where wasta may fall outside the 
scope of legal provisions.  
Before approaching more complex issues, we should highlight the Saudi legal provisions 
related and applicable to wasta. First, Article 4 of the Saudi Anti-Bribery Law states that “any 
public official who has violated any of the functions of his duty by committing or abstaining from 
any functions of his duties, as a result of a request, recommendation, or mediation, is deemed to 
be tantamount to having received a bribe; he shall be punished with imprisonment for a period not 
exceeding three years or a fine not exceeding 100,000 Riyals [equivalent to $26,664], or both.”796   
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The phrase “by committing or abstaining from any functions of his duties” can be 
understood in two different ways based on one of two different judgements that can be reached. 
Applying the law broadly, it can be read literally, as saying that, whether whatever action the 
official took fell under his duty or not, he violates the provision only by doing so “as a result of a 
request, recommendation, or mediation.” To put it another way, when a public official acts 
because of wasta, this act is a violation of Article 4, whether he acts within his authority or not. 
Reading the law more narrowly, the violation occurs when the act of a public official is not within 
his duty or authority.797 This latter is what seems to have been adopted in Saudi courts.798  
Accordingly, the actus reus in this crime is the act that violates the duty of the public 
official or the mere abstaining from performing the duty. Unlike bribery, the mere acceptance of 
the request, recommendation, or mediation (wasta) does not hold the actor criminally liable. Thus, 
the act or abstaining must be taken to be held criminally liable.799 Further, the causation between 
the actus reus and the acceptance of the request, recommendation, or mediation (wasta) must be 
proven. This crime also requires a mens rea, which is a general intent to accept the request, 
recommendation, or mediation (wasta). Thus, if the public official believes that he is acting in 
accordance with his duty and authority, the mens rea is absent.800 This may occur, for instance, in 
the case that a public official believed that he was carrying out an order of a supervisor.801   
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The second related provision is Article 5 of the same law, which states that “any public 
official shall be deemed to have received a bribe if he has solicited for himself or for others, or 
accepted, or received a promise or gift for exercising real or alleged influence, in order to obtain 
from any public authority any act, matter, decision, obligation (contract), license, supply 
agreement, or to obtain a job, services, or any other kind of benefit or advantage; he shall be 
punished with the penalty provided in Article 1 hereof.”802  
This article requires three elements: (1) a public official who has real or alleged influence 
and who (2) demands or accepts a promise or benefit of any kind (3) to use this influence to 
obtain any advantages from any public authority.803 The intention required for this act is a general 
intent. Accordingly, the mens rea element is met once the actor demands or accepts what has been 
offered, knowing that this was in exchange for using the influence, which then does not require 
carrying out the promise.804  
Though there are some similarities between wasta and trade in influence, they might differ 
depending on whether the legal provisions can be applied or not. As explained above, it is not 
always the case that the source of such influence is occupying a certain office or formal position, 
i.e., being a public official.805 Further, trade in influence and wasta might be distinguishable, 
since the return in trade in influence can be visible and semi-immediate, which is not the case in 
wasta. As noted previously, wasta might be prospective, rather than immediate.  
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Lastly, a distinction must be made between trade in influence, criminalized by Article 5, 
and abuse of power. The abuse of power is criminalized in Article 2 (A) of Royal Decree No. 43, 
which states that  
any public official who commits, and any individual, whether a public official or not, who 
aids and abets in the commission of one of the following offenses shall be punished by 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years or a fine not exceeding twenty thousand 
Riyals [equivalent to $5,333] ….  
A. Abuse of power for private interest806  
From an analysis of most of the cases published by the Board of Grievances,807 it seems that the 
scope of this particular provision and Royal Decree No. 43 in general are similar to the scope of 
U.S. Color of Law violations.808 Furthermore, the promulgation of the previous provision, and 
including it with the Anti-Bribery Law offenses, suggests and supports such conclusion and 
finding.809 This does not, however, eliminate the possibility of applying this provision to wasta.810 
This provision offers some advantages in fighting wasta, yet it causes some difficulties in proving 
such a violation. 
On the positive side, the scope of this provision does not require the legal character of 
public official in the aider and abettor, allowing the prosecution of those whose source of power is 
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not the public office. Further, it sets private interest as the threshold to be charged under this 
provision. Thus, the scope of this provision is broader than Article 5 of the Anti-Bribery Law. On 
the negative side, the difficulty manifests in the proving and providing sufficient evidence for 
such a violation. Providing sufficient evidence for private interest and the abuse of power, 
especially if the decision was made within the scope of an official’s authority, is not an easy task, 
let alone proving aiding and abetting.  
Even with these provisions, there is a grey area that remains legally questionable. To give 
a comprehensive view, scenarios must be provided. Consider the situation where an official 
provides certain advantages falling under his broad discretion to one of his relatives or 
acquaintances, yet he does not provide such an advantage for others. In this case, what this 
official does is with no doubt legal, but it is not necessarily fair. Another scenario is one in which 
wasta is an additional factor—that is, among many individuals who are eligible for certain 
advantage, the chosen individual is one who has wasta. This situation thrives in recruitment and 
promotion scenarios, where wasta provides a fast track for one employee rather than another. 
Since a person’s family can be recognized by his family name, which usually indicates a 
person’s tribe and the region of origin, more complicated scenarios exist. Consider an individual 
who applies for a certain position without using wasta during any of the procedures involved. Yet, 
when reviewing the files, an official responsible for such procedures recognizes that his family 
name was familiar or that the applicant belongs to the same region or tribe as the official does, 
which leads this official to act in favor of the applicant. To further complicate the situation, an 
official might do so not because the applicant belongs to the same region or tribe as the official 
but because the official knows that the father of the applicant holds a high position in another 
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entity. Consequently, the official exercises favoritism toward the applicant in order to develop a 
prospective relationship with his father.   
 Clearly, the fight against wasta is not an easy one since it involves economic, social, and 
political elites promoting a dual system that involves both informal social patterns and formal 
institutions.811 Furthermore, the success or failure of an individual will be influenced by the strict 
hierarchies of power and interpersonal relations in particular circumstances.812 Thus, “[n]o 
amount of external criticism can change the inner structure of a patronage system, for wherever 
patriarchal relations exist … patronage dominates.”813 In short, wasta is a cumulative and hydra-
headed problem such that “distinguishing the many dimensions of [it] is problematic.”814  
To summarize, as with many corrupt practices and acts, wasta is highly contextual. 
Consequently, whether it is a negative or positive phenomenon may be determined on the basis of 
the individuals involved, their intentions, the qualifications, and the context. What must be taken 
into consideration is that opting out of the system of wasta is difficult, as the societies in which it 
is practiced are highly collectivistic and use high-context communication. Thus, one is expected 
to say “yes” to an individual asking for wasta in a face-to-face situation, but then not carry out the 
promise. One is also expected to use another escape clause, such as the evasive bukrah 
(tomorrow) or in sha Allah (if God wills) instead of saying “no.” The judgment, therefore, 
whether it is a moral or a legal one, will vary significantly depending on the context.815  
                                                
811 Al-Ramahi, supra note 724, at 53. 
812 Id.  
813 Id (quoting HISHAM SHARABI, NEOPATRIARCHY: A THEORY OF DISTORTED CHANGE IN ARAB 
SOCIETY 47 (1988)). 
814 Id. 
815 Kropf & Newbury-Smith, supra note 725, at 20. 
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CONCLUSION  
It is evident that wasta constitutes a significant problem in Saudi Arabia. From the Shari’a 
and Islamic law perspective, wasta is rejected on a number of bases. The current form of wasta 
clearly departs from the permissible shafa'ah and takes the opposite form, i.e. the forbidden 
shafa'ah which violates the principles of Shari’a. Further, Shari’a in its essence aims at protecting 
morality, which includes the promotion of the principles of honesty and justice that the practice of 
wasta contradicts. Such a practice is based on favoritism and discrimination, which essentially 
hinder the equal application of law.  
The short reach and the scarcity of the provisions prohibiting the practices of favoritism 
and discrimination generally and the practice of wasta particularly aggravates the issue and 
facilitates its prevalence. This is coupled with a culture that also provides a fertile ground for 
wasta to be practiced frequently. Those factors and others highlighted in this chapter contribute to 
the difficulties of fighting wasta.    
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CHAPTER SIX: THE SAUDI ANTI-BRIBERY LAW 
INTRODUCTION 
Like a number of countries, Saudi Arabia enacted several regulations to fight corruption 
rather than adopting an inclusive anti-corruption law. Since the establishment of Saudi Arabia, a 
number of laws were enacted and amendments were issued in order to fight corrupt practices. 
The Anti-Bribery Law is considered to be the main legal instrument on which the government 
relies to fight bribery and related corrupt practices.  
The Law defines the offense of bribery, in addition to other related corrupt practices, 
including inter alia trade-in-influence and the acceptance of wasta. It also regulates the defense 
and the rewards of whistleblowers. After exploring the Saudi anti-corruption legal framework, 
this chapter will be devoted to explaining in general the offenses included in the Law. It also 
underlines other aspects of the Law’s provisions: the jurisdiction of the application of the Law, 
penalties, the rewards of whistleblowers, the role of effective regret, and other defenses.  
A.  The Saudi Anti-Corruption Legal Framework 
 In the first instance, a National Strategy for Protecting Integrity and Combating 
Corruption was promulgated in an effort to strengthen the measures to fight corruption.816 The 
Strategy in its Introduction embraces a wide view of corruption, stating that corruption “includes 
every act that threatens the public interest as well any abuse of the civil service in order to earn an 
individual advantage.”817 The broad view can be also seen in the targets and the means adopted by 
the Strategy.818  
                                                
816 Council of Ministers Decision No. 43, 1/2/1428H (corresponding to Feb. 19, 2007) (SA).  
817 See National Strategy for Protecting Integrity and Combating Corruption, NATIONAL ANTI-
CORRUPTION COMMISSION (Nov. 15, 2016, 8:05 AM) 
http://www.nazaha.gov.sa/en/About/Pages/Strategy.aspx  
818 Id. 
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 The Strategy’s significant impact can be seen in two main results. First, Saudi Arabia has 
ratified the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, which was signed by Saudi Arabia 
three years before the promulgation of the Strategy.819 The ratification should increase the 
measures a country adopts in fighting corruption. Second, the Strategy established specifically a 
National Commission for Combating Corruption and generally an apparatus to fight corruption.820 
In the Saudi legal system, laws and decrees have been promulgated that aim at fighting a 
number of corrupt practices. Royal Decree No. 43821 is the one of oldest legal documents 
criminalizing number of corrupt practices and acts. The Decree criminalizes the engagement of a 
public servant in commercial or business activities without permission, which is punishable by a 
fine of between 1000 Riyals and 10,000 Riyals (equivalent to $266 and $2,660).822 Further, in 
Article 2 the Decree criminalizes a number of acts including, inter alia, abuse of power and 
authority, embezzlement, and the use of excessive power and coercion.823 The acts and practices 
falling under Article 2 are punishable by a maximum of 10 years in prison, monetary penalties of 
a maximum of 20,000 Riyal (equivalent to $5,333), or both. Those practices were then included 
                                                
819 Saudi Arabia Signed on 9 Jan 2004, and ratified on 29 April, 2013; see United Nations 
Convention against Corruption Signature and Ratification Status as of 12 December 2016, 
UNITED NATION OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIMES (Nov. 15, 2016, 8:05 AM) 
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html  
820 See National Strategy for Protecting Integrity and Combating Corruption, supra note 824 
(“establishing a National Commission for Combating Corruption that takes over the following 
tasks: 
A. Tracking the implementation of the strategy, monitoring its results, evaluating and auditing it, 
and setting its programs of action and its application’s mechanisms.  
B. Coordination of the efforts of both the public and the private sectors concerning planning, 
monitoring and evaluating the anti-corruption systems. 
C. Receiving, analyzing and producing analysis sheet for the periodical reports and statistics of 
the relevant bodies. 
D. Collecting, classifying, assessing, analyzing and exchanging the information, data and 
statistics with the relevant specialized agencies.”). 
821 Royal Decree No. 43, supra note 806. 
822 Id. art. 1(A). 
823 Id. art. 2. 
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as being prohibited for civil servants and public officials in the Civil Service Law, but that law 
did not specify the penalties.824   
The Employee Discipline Law focuses on the administrative, rather than the criminal, 
aspect of corrupt practices. Thus, the law does not include the prohibition of acts per se; rather, it 
includes any “financial and administrative violations.”825 Accordingly, the penalties in this law 
are administrative, and range from warning to dismissal.826 The administrative character of this 
law can be derived from Article 25, which indicates that if the accusations are crimes, the 
investigation must be terminated and transferred to the authority holding jurisdiction over those 
matters.827  
  Public-Fund Management Act also criminalizes embezzlement, considering such 
custodians’ positions as an aggravating circumstance,828 though the maximum monetary penalty 
is 100,000 Riyal (equivalent to $26,664) and the prison time remains the same, a maximum of 10 
years.829 It is noteworthy that the Bill for a Law of Abuse of Public Trust has languished for 
                                                
824 Civil Service Law, Royal Decree No. M/49 of 1397H (corresponding to 1977) (SA) (Article 
12 prohibits public servants from the following:  
1. Abuse of functions 
2. Active and passive bribery.  
3. Accepting gifts. 
4. The disclosure of secrets of offices. 
Article 13 prohibits public servants from engaging directly or indirectly in outside commercial or 
business activities.); see also Officers Service Law, Royal Decree No. M/43 of 1393H 
(corresponding to 1973), art. 17 (SA) (Prohibiting the same acts in Article 12 of Civil Service 
Law.). 
825 Employee Discipline Law, Royal Decree No. M/7 of 1391H (corresponding to 1971), art. 3 
(SA).  
826 Id. art. 32.  
827 Id. art. 25.  
828 Note that the reformed law issued by Royal Decree No. M/18 on 23/2/1436H (corresponding 
to Dec. 15, 2014) invalidated the previous law except for Article 9. 
829 Public-Fund Management Act, Royal Decree No. M/77 of 1395H (corresponding to 1975), 
art. 9 (SA).  
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almost a decade awaiting approval.830 If approved, it will invalidate Royal Decree No. 43 and 
Article 9 of the Public-Fund Management Act.831 Several other laws were also amended, such as 
the Anti-Forgery Law832 and the Anti-Money Laundering Law.833 Similarly, the Government 
Tenders and Procurement Law was amended to enhance transparency and competition in the 
bidding for government contracts.834 
 In addition to the previously mentioned laws, the Impeachment of Ministers Law 
criminalizes several acts and prohibits the ministers from being involved in a number of 
actions.835 Article 5, in particular, criminalizes a number of corrupt acts.836 In line with this law, 
                                                
830 Majlis Al-Shura Approved Law of Abuse of Public Trust Bill, AL-JAZIRAH NEWSPAPER, Apr. 
4, 2005, http://www.al-jazirah.com/2005/20050404/hs1.htm.  
831 Id. 
832 Anti-Forgery Law, Royal Decree No. M/11 of 1435H (corresponding to 2013) (SA). 
833 Anti-Money Laundering Law, Royal Decree No. M/31 of 1433H (corresponding to 2012) 
(SA).  
834 Government Tenders and Procurement Law, Royal Decree No. M/58 of 1427H 
(corresponding to 2006), art. 75 (SA) (States that “A violation of any provision of this Law shall 
subject the violating employee to disciplinary measures in accordance with provisions of the 
Employee Disciplinary Law and other criminal provisions applicable to employees of 
government sectors and public institutions, without prejudice to the agency’s right to file a 
criminal or civil suit against violators.”); see also G20 Anti-Corruption Working Group Progress 
Report 2013, COMPILATION OF G20 RESPONSES ON PROCUREMENT (Feb. 15, 2017, 1:59 PM). 
http://www.g20.org/English/Documents/PastPresidency/201512/P020151228414820695527.pdf. 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], Compendium of Good 
Practices for Integrity in Public Procurement, GOV/PGC/ETH(2014)2/REV1 (Jan. 21, 2015). 
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=GOV/PGC/ETH(2014)
2/REV1&docLanguage=En. 
835 Impeachment of Ministers Law, Royal Decree No. 88 of 1380H (corresponding to 1961) 
(SA). 
836 Id. art. 5 (The acts criminalized in Article 5 are as follows:  
A. Behaviors and actions that would impact the increase or decrease in the price of goods, 
real estate, currency, or stock, to obtain personal benefit to him or to others. 
B. Acceptance of a benefit—of any kind—to himself or others, to perform official act or 
refrain from formal work. 
C. Influence peddling, whether the fraud is for the benefit or advantage of himself or of any 
other body or company, or organization. 
D.  Deliberate violations of laws, regulations, and orders that result in financial loss of the 
state’s rights, or the rights of individuals. 
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the Royal Decree No. M/16 establishes a committee within the Council of Ministers to audit the 
ministers’ finances. The committee also has the authority to audit the finances of ministers’ 
family members.837 With that being provided, the Anti-Bribery Law remains one of the oldest 
anti-corruption laws promulgated and encompasses a number of crimes under its umbrella.838 
Thus, the remainder of this chapter will focus on providing a comprehensive survey of the Law.   
B.  General Legal Analysis  
Saudi Arabia is one of those countries that has neither an explicit definition of corruption 
nor an inclusive corruption law. Rather, as explained briefly above, there are a number of laws 
that define and criminalize a number of corrupt acts. Bribery, along with related offenses, is one 
of these crimes that is inclusively regulated, defined, and criminalized within one law (the Anti-
Bribery Law). This law went through several stages and amendment to arrive at its current form.  
As mentioned previously, bribery is a crime that is categorized among the ta’zir crimes 
which were prohibited by shari’a, yet no specific punishment was assigned to them. In the early 
1930s, the crime was first criminalized by the Nizam Alm’amoreen (the Public Official Law), 
which only criminalized active bribery. The Public Official Law was amended in the 1940s to 
include more offenses in addition to active bribery, and aggravated the punishments.839 
In the following decade, Saudi Arabia entered the era of bribery crimes by the 
promulgation of Royal Decree No. 43, which criminalized bribery, abuse of power, and 
                                                                                                                                                       
E. The disclosure of cabinet decisions and deliberations relating to national security, the 
state’s foreign affairs, financial and economic affairs, and the trial of ministers. 
F. Personal intervention in the affairs of the judiciary and other government bodies and 
departments.).  
837 Royal Decree No. M/16, 7/3/1382H (corresponding to Aug. 8, 1962) (SA). 
838 Anti-Bribery Law, supra note 796.   
839 OSAMA M. NOUR, JARIMAT ALRASHWA FI ALNIZAM ALSAUDI [Crime of Bribery in Saudi 
Law] 30-31 (1996).  
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gratuity.840 In 1962, the first Anti-Bribery Law (the Old Law) was promulgated, overturning 
paragraphs (c) and (d) of Article 2 of Royal Decree No. 43.841 The Old Law derives its 
significance from the fact that it established clearly who is subject to the law and the nature of 
the offenses. The offenses are not limited to bribery, but also include the extortion of a public 
official to make him perform or omit aspects of his duties.842 Finally, the New Anti-Bribery Law 
amended the Old Law three decades later. The amendments did not affect the offenses but 
instead slightly amended who is subject to the law.843  
In order to provide a comprehensive view of the Anti-Bribery Law, we must define who 
is subject to this law before discussing the offenses and the punishments. The Law’s main focus 
is on public officials and public offices, yet it also includes other individuals who are not 
necessarily within that category. Thus, Article 8 of the Law defines the persons who are subject 
to the application of its provisions. Article 8 reads as follows:  
For the application of this Law, the following are deemed to be public officials: 
(1) Persons employed by the State or any of the public administrative authorities, 
regardless of whether the employment is permanent or temporary; 
(2) An arbitrator or expert appointed by the Government or any entity having judicial 
specialization; 
                                                
840 Royal Decree No. 43, supra note 806, art. 2 ((c) criminalized both active and passive bribery 
while Article 2 (d) criminalized the acceptance of commissions which prevent implementation of 
the government’s orders.).  
841 Anti-Bribery Law, supra note 796. 
842 NOUR, supra note 839, at 32. 
843 Id. at 33; see also Alexander S. Kritzalis, Saudi Arabia, 28 INT'L L. 449, 456 (1994) (“Under 
the Old [Anti-Bribery] Law fines ranged from SR 5,000 to SR 100,000, and imprisonment 
ranged from one to five years. Under the New [Anti-Bribery] Law fines generally may be 
imposed up to SR 1,000,000, and prison sentences may extend for as long as ten years for each 
offense.”). 
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(3) Persons assigned by a Government authority or any other administrative authority to 
perform a specific assignment; 
(4) Persons employed by a corporation or a sole corporation, which manages and runs, or 
maintains (services) a public facility or which is performing a public service; the same 
applies to persons employed by joint stock corporation or corporation in which the State 
has a holding, as well as corporations and sole corporations which carry out banking 
operations; 
(5) Chairmen and members of board of directors of corporations provided for in (the 
preceding) paragraph 4 of this Article.844 
 As has been noted previously, the Law is mainly concerned with and centered on public 
officials and offices. Thus, paragraph (1) shows that the Law applies to public officials in any 
branch of the government or public servants who are employed or contracted by any public 
entity established by the government, whether they are a Saudi nationals or foreigners. This 
provision also applies on those who are temporarily appointed if they commit any offense within 
these legal statutes.  
 Paragraph (2) adds arbitrators or experts to those to whom the Law applies. However, the 
Law may not be enforced on them unless they have been appointed or assigned by a government 
entity or agency or by an entity performing a judicial task. In light of this paragraph, experts who 
are assigned by private party or individuals are not subject to the Law even if they are 
performing a task in front of a court or any other judicial body.845 Consequently, the Law applies 
on experts who are assigned, for instance, by the Saudi Customs Commission to examine certain 
subjects.  
                                                
844 Anti-Bribery Law, supra note 796, art. 8. 
845 NOUR, supra note 839, at 42-43. 
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The main focus of this paragraph seems to be those who are appointed by an entity 
performing a judicial duty. Within the Saudi legal system, there are a number of semi-judicial 
committees, such as the Committee for the Adjudication of Banking Disputes, which reviews 
significant economic cases.846 Members of these committees are generally appointed by a 
government entity to perform as arbitrators in the litigations that come before these committees. 
The members can be professors, judges, or other high-ranking officials in another government 
entity or agency. From the text of Article 8, it would appear that arbitrators assigned by parties 
other than the government are not subject to the Law.847   
Paragraph (3) is also related to the center of this Law, which is public officials and public 
service. The paragraph includes only persons who are assigned by direct or delegated authority 
to perform official duties. Thus, a person to whom the Law applies must be assigned by a 
government entity holding legitimate authority over the assigned duty.848 It is also worth 
distinguishing between the assignment of a person, which imposes an obligation to perform such 
a duty, and permission, which may take the form of a license.849 To explain, consider a company 
that has a license to perform drivers’ training and another that is assigned by the government to 
train and test within the Traffic Bureau; the latter is an entity to which the Law applies, but the 
former is not. Further, Courts have tended to adopt a narrow interpretation of a “specific 
assignment” to public service rather than any other kind of duty.850  
                                                
846 Rayan Alkhalawi, Legal Education Reform in Saudi Arabia: A Case Study of Taibah 
University 13 (unpublished LL.M. thesis, Indiana University) (May. 22, 2015) (on file with 
author) (“[T]here are more than 100 semi-judicial committees.”). 
847 NOUR, supra note 839, at 42-43.  
848 See generally KHIDR, supra note 798, at 288-92. 
849 NOUR, supra note 839, at 46-47.  
850 AHMED L. MAREI, ALJARAYIM ALMASSAH BE NAZAHAT ALWAZIFAH WA ALTHTHIQAH 
ALEAMMAH [Offenses Against the Integrity of the Job and Public Trust] 97 (2007). 
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An extension of the application of the Law is introduced in paragraph (4), which covers a 
number of persons in the private sector. This application is conditional and limited rather than 
unrestricted. Paragraph (4) includes three main categories:  
(a) Persons employed by a company or a sole corporation, which manages and runs, or 
maintains (services) a public facility or which is performing a public service …; (b) 
persons employed by joint stock companies or companies in which the State has a 
holding …; (c) [persons employed by] companies and sole corporations which carry out 
banking operations….851  
The first category includes persons who are employed in a corporation involved in any 
form of operating, managing, or performing a public service. This includes inter alia companies 
operating or maintaining public facilities such as the Bin Laden Group, which operates The Holy 
Mosques in Mecca and Madinah, or providing public services such as those corporations 
contracted by the municipal authorities to perform sanitation or sewage operations. This also 
includes non-profit organizations if they are providing or performing public services.852 For this 
category, the emphasis is again similar to the previous paragraphs—the focus is on public 
officials or services. This paragraph also extends to subcontractors with a main contractor that 
performs public services.853   
The second category is what can be considered, at least partly, an exception from the 
main focus on public officials or services since it covers “persons employed by joint stock 
                                                
851 Anti-Bribery Law, supra note 796, art. 8(4). 
852 MAREI, supra note 850, at 100 (For instance, the King Khalid Foundation and the Prince 
Sultan Foundation are among the legal entities to which the Law applies since they are 
performing and providing public services.). 
853 Id. at 99 (indicating that there is unnecessary redundancy in this category since the mere 
inclusion of joint stock corporations covers those in which the government has a holding.).     
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companies or companies in which the State has a holding.”854 Unlike the persons in the previous 
categories and paragraphs, persons in this category are subject to the Law without the condition 
of performing public services or being assigned by a government authority.  
Finally, the Law extends its application to persons who are employed by any corporation 
performing banking operations. Though Article 3 (1) of the Banking Control Law requires any 
banking business to be licensed to be “a Saudi joint-stock company,”855 this paragraph seems to 
be intended to extend the application of the Anti-Bribery Law to companies that are exempt from 
Article 3 (1).856 Similar to the persons covered in the previous category, the application of the 
Anti-Bribery Law is not conditioned by the same conditions in paragraph (2) and (3).  
The last paragraph extends the application of the Law to chairmen and members of board 
of directors of corporations provided for in paragraph (4), since not all the members of the board 
directors are necessarily employees in the corporation. Thus, this provision extends the coverage 
of persons not only to executive members, but also to non-executive board members and 
independent board members. Further, the importance of this paragraph is derived from the fact 
that the Law of Companies prohibits the conjoining of the position of chairman of the board of 
directors and any executive position, including the chief executive officer, the managing director, 
or the general manager.857  
                                                
854 Anti-Bribery Law, supra note 796, art. 8(4). 
855 Banking Control Law, Royal Decree No. M/5 of 1386H (corresponding to 1966), art 3(1) 
(SA). 
856 MAREI, supra note 850, at 100. 
857 Law of Companies, Royal Decree No. M/3 of 1437H (corresponding to 2015) (SA) (Article 
81 (1): “it shall not be permissible to combine the position of Chairman of the Board and any 
executive position of the company.”); see also Corporate Governance Regulations Resolution 
No. 1/212/2006 of 2006, art. 12 (c)(d) (SA) (Article 12 (c) The majority of the members of the 
Board of Directors shall be non-executive members. Article 12 (d) It is prohibited to conjoin the 
position of the Chairman of the Board of Directors with any other executive position in the 
company, such as the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or the managing director or the general 
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 This legal status must be available at the time of committing the crime and not at the time 
of investigating or prosecuting the crime.858 Thus, if a person accepted a bribe while he was 
covered by any of the previous paragraphs, the Law is applied to that person even if he is not 
holding one of the legal statuses during the investigation or trial process. What must be also 
noted is that the legal status of the persons is not affected by the nationality of the person as long 
as the provisions of Article 8 are met.859 However, the public official in another international or 
foreign entity is not deemed to be a Saudi public official even if he is a Saudi national, which 
restricts the application of the Law to him.860   
Having identified the persons to whom the law applies, the statutes defining the offense 
of bribery shall be illustrated. Initially, the Law does not adopt the notion distinguishing between 
active and passive bribery. Rather, the Law mainly focuses on the action of public officials and 
their counterparts included in Article 8. The two initial articles of the Law, Articles 1 and 2, can 
be read similarly except that Article 1 criminalizes the active action performed in exchange for a 
bribe, while Article 2 criminalize the passive action represented in the abstention from 
performing a duty in exchange for a bribe.861 Article 3, though it is related to these articles, 
                                                                                                                                                       
manager.). (“The Board of the Capital Market Authority issued resolution Number (1- 36 -2008) 
Dated 12/ 11 /1429H corresponding to 10/ 11 /2008G making paragraphs (c) and (d) of Article 
12 of the Corporate Governance Regulations mandatory on all companies listed on the Exchange 
effective from year 2009.”). 
858 MAREI, supra note 850, at 118. 
859 Id. at 118-19. 
860 Id. 
861 Anti-Bribery Law, supra note 796, art. 1 & 2 (Article 1 of the Saudi Anti-Bribery Law states 
that “[e]very public official shall be deemed as having received a bribe, if he has solicited for 
himself or a third party, or accepted or received a promise or gift to perform any duties of his 
function or claims that such act falls within the scope of his duties, even where the act is lawful, 
[and] shall be punished with imprisonment for a period not exceeding ten years or a fine not 
exceeding one million Riyals or both; the offense shall be deemed as having been committed, 
even if the official did not intend to carry out such act.” Article 2 states that “[e]very public 
official shall be deemed as having received a bribe, if he has solicited for himself or a third party, 
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requires more illustration since it involves a different act, which is the violation of public official 
duties and also involves the crime of gratuity.862   
1. Bribery Offense in Anti-Bribery Law   
In general, Articles 1 and 2 require proof that there is (1) a public official with actual or 
ostensible authority; who (2) solicited, received, or requested; (3) a thing of value or a promise of 
such thing for himself or a third party; (4) an official act; and (5) criminal intent.   
 First, for the Law to be applied to a person requires that a person within the scope of 
Article 8 have the authority or discretion to perform or abstain from the action for which he was 
bribed as long as the delegation of authority is legally valid.863 It is not also required for the 
person to have complete or sole authority to perform or omit the action as long as the bribe was 
paid on such a basis.864 Thus, if the person is a member of a committee where the decision-
making process is held by vote, this person is subject to the Law as long as the bribe was paid 
only to gain a favorable opinion.  
Nevertheless, courts have extended the application of the Law to persons who have 
indirect authority over the subject of the bribery where such a person is sufficiently able to 
influence the official act.865 In a similar vein, the act of violating the lawful duties of the person 
                                                                                                                                                       
or accepted or received a promise or gift to abstain from carrying out  any function of his duties, 
or pretend that such act falls within the scope of his duties, even where the abstention is lawful, 
[and] he shall be punished with penalty provided in Article I hereof; the offense shall be deemed 
to have been committed, even if the official did not intend to carry out such act.”). 
862 Anti-Bribery Law, supra note 796, art. 3 (Article 3 states that “Every Public official shall be 
deemed to have received a bribe, if he has solicited for himself or a third party, or to accept or 
received a promise or gift for violating the function of his duties or for remunerating him for his 
actions even where the same happened without prior agreement; he shall be punished with the 
penalty provided [in] Article 1 hereof.”).  
863 MAREI, supra note 850, at 121-22. 
864 Id. at 124. 
865 Id. at 125. 
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does not negate the requirement of authority. In this case, if a judge acquitted a guilty person, he 
acted in violation or abuse of his authority rather than outside of his authority.866  
In addition to the actual authority, the Law is applied in the case of ostensible authority. 
The mere claim of authority directly or indirectly meets the threshold of this requirement.867 
However, there is a fine line between impersonating a public official and claiming authority as 
regards this Law. Thus, there must be a close nexus between the position that person holds and 
the position he claims to hold.868 Further, this claim of authority must be in the form of an 
implicit or explicit active action deceiving a reasonable person to pay the bribe.869 Though the 
Law does not indicate this, courts have tended to even include a person who mistakenly assumed 
the authority existed even if such authority was outside of the scope of an official’s authority 
over the promised action.870  
Second, the Law does not distinguish, as noted previously, between accepting and 
soliciting a bribe.871 In this matter, the mere solicitation or request for a bribe by any active form, 
whether directly or indirectly, meets this requirement regardless of whether the briber agreed to 
pay or provide anything of value, so long as this act was committed by a public official and the 
                                                
866 Id. at 129-30. 
867 Id. at 132. 
868 Id. at 135. 
869 Id. at 136-37. 
870 NOUR, supra note 839, at 84 (citing Board of Grievances Order No. H/2/42. Case No. 
314/1/Q in 1402H (corresponding to 1982)).  
871 See THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, CORRUPTION: A 
GLOSSARY OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL STANDARDS, 22 (2007) (In general, “[b]ribery offenses 
against national public officials fall into two broad categories: (1) when an official ‘requests’ or 
‘solicits’ a bribe, and (2) when an official ‘receives’ or ‘accepts’ a bribe.”). 
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beneficiary of the act received and knew of such a demand.872 In a similar vein, the acceptance of 
an offer or promise, even if the benefit was not actually received, fulfills this requirement.873  
The third element to be proven is a thing of value or a promise of any benefit. The nature 
of the benefit is defined broadly in Article 12 as “every benefit or advantage which may be 
obtained by the bribe, regardless of the form or description thereof, be it monetary or not.”874 
Hence, the source, whether legitimate or illegitimate and whether owned by the beneficiary or 
not, of such benefit is immaterial in this situation.875 With regard to this element, courts have 
adopted a broad interpretation which includes invisible benefits, such as exemption from paying 
rent, providing a service with no fees, or even an exchange of official acts between two 
officials.876 They also consider facilitating the process of providing loan as a benefit.877 Finally, 
it is inconsequential whether the benefit was for the person who asked for it or for a third party, 
which could include inter alia spouses, sons, daughters, siblings, or parents.878  
The fourth element is the official act, which is the return for the benefit provided by the 
beneficiary (quid pro quo). This can be an active act within the official’s authority, as indicated 
in Article 1, where the official, for instance, asks for a benefit to facilitate the proceedings.879 
                                                
872 MAREI, supra note 850, at 143-45 (Thus, it is not possible for there to be “attempted bribery,” 
since once the demand for or the solicitation of the bribe has taken place and the other party 
knows of it, bribery has been committed in the eyes of the Law.).  
873 Id. at 147-49 (Consequently, if the official regrets his act of receiving the benefit and returns 
it, such regret does not negate the committing of the crime; rather, it is considered as a mitigating 
circumstance.).   
874 Anti-Bribery Law, supra note 796, art. 12. 
875 MAREI, supra note 850, at 152 
876 Id. at 153 (citing Board of Grievances Order No. H/1/62. Case No.  384/1/Q in 1400H 
(corresponding to 1980)). 
877 Id (citing Board of Grievances Order No. H/1/86. Case No.  552/1/Q in 1400H 
(corresponding to 1980) (“A public official in a department of tenders received a loan from a 
company deemed to be a benefit.”)). 
878 Id. at 156. 
879 Anti-Bribery Law, supra note 796, art. 1. 
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The official act may also take the form of abstaining from performing the official’s duty, as 
noted in Article 2.880 The last form of this element is introduced in Article 3, where the official 
act or abstention is considered a violation of the official’s duties.881 This form is distinguished 
from the previous two forms since in this form the benefit is offered for an official to carry out 
an illegitimate act.882 This element is required at the initial stage; meaning that the beneficiary is 
offering a benefit or the official is asking for a benefit because of the official act. However, 
whether the official intended to act or abstain from the promised act is immaterial.883 Thus, the 
completion of the promised act is not required to satisfy this element.884  
Finally, those crimes are intentional crimes that require an intention to commit these 
crimes in order for one to be criminally liable. Articles 1, 2, and 3 of the Law make the public 
official’s intent relevant. Thus, the intent element is satisfied by proving that the public official 
knew of his authority and the quid pro quo and intended to accept or solicit the bribe or the 
benefit.885 What must be noted, however, is that it is immaterial whether the public official 
performed the intended act or not.886  The issue raised is when the public official knew of the 
quid pro quo nature of the arrangement. That is, if the public official came to know about the 
quid pro quo nature awhile after he received the benefit and performed the official act, is he still 
                                                
880 Anti-Bribery Law, supra note 796, art. 2.  
881 Anti-Bribery Law, supra note 796, art. 3 (“Every Public official shall be deemed to have 
received a bribe, if he has solicited for himself or a third party, or accept[ed] or received a 
promise or gift for violating the function of his duties or for remunerating him for his actions 
even where the same happened without prior agreement; he shall be punished with the penalty 
provided [in] Article 1 hereof.”).  
882 MAREI, supra note 850, at 162. 
883 Id. at 165 (Similarly, Articles 1 and 2 state that the offense is committed “even if the official 
did not intend to perform such act.”).  
884 Id. 
885 See generally NOUR, supra note 839, at 119 (citing Board of Grievances Order No. H/1/68. in 
1400H (corresponding to 1980) & Board of Grievances Order No. H/1/64. in 1400H 
(corresponding to 1980)).  
886 See generally id. at 116-24. 
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criminally liable? The majority of scholars argue that concomitance between the bribe and the 
intent is required.887 Consequently, if an individual received a gift and he did not know the nature 
of the payment or the benefit at that time, i.e., that it was a bribe or gratuity, and he then 
performed or abstained from an act benefiting the person who provided the benefit, he then did 
not have an intent and he is not criminally liable for Articles 1 or 2.888   
Having defined the elements of the crime of the bribery, it is important to identify the 
differences between Articles 1 and 2 on the one hand and Article 3 on the other. First, Articles 1 
and 2 can be distinguished from Article 3 since in the former the public official may abstain or 
act within the legal authority designated to him; it is intent that constitutes the crime of bribery; 
in the latter, in contrast, the act or the abstaining by itself constitutes the improper performance 
of a duty.889 The second difference is manifest in the fact that the second part of Article 3 targets 
the crime of gratuity, rather than bribery, as will be illustrated in the next point.890  
2. Punishments 
The Law initially assigned certain punishments to each act. For the crimes indicated in 
Articles 1, 2, and 3, offenders are subject to imprisonment for a period not to exceed 10 years 
and/or fines not to exceed a million Saudi Riyal (equivalent to 270,000 USD).891 In addition, 
Collateral Punishments are indicated in Articles 13 and 15. Where Article 15 orders the 
confiscation of the benefit, Article 13 orders the dismissal of the offender from public service 
                                                
887 Id. at 125-28.  
888 Id. 
889 Anti-Bribery Law, supra note 796, arts. 1, 2, & 3. 
890 Id. art. 3.  
891 Id. art. 1 (note that Articles 2 and 3 include references to Article 1 with regard to 
punishments).  
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and places a prohibition on the appointment of the offenders to any position indicated in Article 
8 subsequent to the conviction.892  
The dismissal can be reviewed by the Council of Ministers, which can revoke the 
dismissal after the period of five years, which makes a repeat offense possible. Thus, Article 18 
imposes an aggravated punishment on repeat offenders that may not exceed twice the indicated 
punishments in the Law, i.e., for the crimes indicated in Articles 1, 2 or 3, 20 years’ 
imprisonment and a fine of 2 million Saudi Riyals (equivalent to $540,000).893 Further, the Law 
orders the Ministry of Interior to publish convictions under the Law.894 
On the other hand, legal persons, a category which includes the corporate entities 
mentioned in Article 8, are subject to other punishments. Article 19 imposes a set of different 
penalties on the criminally liable entities under this Law, which requires proof of a nexus 
between the act and the benefit to such an entity.895 In part, Article 19 increases the maximum 
monetary penalty to ten times the value of the bribe and/or imposes a ban on those entities from 
being in a future contract with government agencies and organizations.896 In circumstances 
where the entity has an existing contract with a government agency, the ban is not final since the 
agencies with which the convicted entity has contracts must file recommendations as to whether 
to allow the entity to complete the contract or not.897       
3. The Effective Regret Defense 
 The law grants the briber a defense if the briber or a middleman discloses the incident of 
bribery before being discovered, stating in Article 16 that “the briber or middleman shall be 
                                                
892 Id. art. 13 & 15.  
893 Id. art. 9.  
894 Id. art.  21. MAREI, supra note 850, at 184. 
895 MAREI, supra note 850, at 179. 
896 Anti-Bribery Law, supra note 796, art. 19. 
897 Anti-Bribery Law, supra note 796, art. 20; see also MAREI, supra note 850, at 208. 
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exonerated from both the penalties and collateral sanctions if he has reported the offense to the 
authorities prior to its discovery by the authorities.”898 Nevertheless, the payment or the benefit 
provided by the beneficiary is always subject to confiscation, as stated in Article 15 of the Law: 
“In all cases, the judgment shall order confiscation of any benefit provided in this transaction, 
where this is possible in practice.”899 The return of the benefit is banned by the Law, unless the 
benefit was provided in good faith.900 This can be seen in cases where the payer was acting in 
accordance to the advice of a middleman where the payer is deceived as to the original purpose, 
i.e., bribery. On the other hand, the bribee does not benefit from this affirmative defense.901  
4. Rewards 
 The Law rewards a whistleblower monetary awards ranging from a minimum of 5,000 
Riyals (equivalent to $1,340) to a maximum of half the confiscated benefit or payment.902 
According to the Law,  
Every informer providing information regarding an offense, which is provided herein, 
which information led to establishing the commission of the offense, shall, if he is not a 
briber, accessory or intermediary, be granted a reward of not less than 5,000 Riyals and 
not exceeding one half of the confiscated property; assessment of rewards at the 
discretion of the authority adjudging the case but the Ministry of Interior may pay a sum 
                                                
898 Anti-Bribery Law, supra note 796, art. 16 (This article overruled Article 229 (4) of the Law 
of Public Security issued by Royal Order No. 3594 dated in (29 Rabi’ I, 1369H – 18 January, 
1950) indicating that if the briber was under coercion to pay the bribe and disclose the incident 
within the period of three days, he shall be immune from the criminal liability and the sum paid 
shall be returned to him.). 
899 Anti-Bribery Law, supra note 796, art. 15.  
900 MAREI, supra note 850, at 208 (This can occur in cases where the payer was acting on the 
advice of a middleman and the payer is deceived as to the original purpose, i.e., bribery.). 
901 Id. 
902 Anti-Bribery Law, supra note 796, art. 17.  
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higher than the sum which would be fixed in pursuance of this Article, subject to the 
approval of the Council of Ministers.903 
C.  Classifications of the Crimes  
In addition to the crime of bribery, the Law identifies certain acts as crimes punished 
under its provisions. These include the following:  
1. The offering of bribery 
2. Knowingly enjoying a benefit resulting from bribery   
3. Gratuity 
4. The offer and the acceptance of wasta 
5. Trade in influence  
6. The use of force and threatening of a public official  
7. Following up on a case being processed outside a public official’s authority: being an 
“expediter”  
Each of these acts is defined by the Law and subject to different punishments, as will be 
articulated in this section.   
1. The Offering of Bribery 
In general, this offense occurs primarily when the briber offers a benefit and the public 
official declines to receive it. Without Article 9, there would have been a great gap resulting in 
legal unaccountability, since Articles 1, 2, and 3 require the involvement of the public official to 
legally exist. Thus, if an offer was declined, the briber could not be legally held liable, nor could 
an accomplice, since there would be no crime in the first place.904 Article 9 states that “any 
person who has offered a bribe, which is not accepted, shall be punished with imprisonment for a 
                                                
903 Id. art. 17. 
904 MAREI, supra note 850, at 226. 
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period not exceeding ten years or a fine not exceeding one million Riyals [equivalent to $ 
266,638] or both.”905 
This offense requires certain elements to be satisfied. The first and foremost element is 
that the offer must be made to a person that falls within the scope set forth in Article 8. That is, if 
an individual offers a bribe to another who is not within the scope of Article 8, e.g., an individual 
working in a limited liability company that has no contracts with the government, then this crime 
cannot be prosecuted under this provision.906 In addition to the requirement of being within the 
scope of Article 8, this offense requires, as a bribery offense, that the person has actual or 
ostensible authority.907 
The actus reus in this offense is the mere offering. The Article does not specify a certain 
type of offer or benefit which expands the scope of this element.908 Thus, the offer includes the 
immediate giving of a benefit or a promise of future giving. The offer does not have to be an 
explicit and direct, but can be an implicit offer. Further, the Law adopts an open-ended 
timeframe for this offense, which means that even if the offer was made after the completion of 
the intended result, the offense would have been committed.909  
In order to have a complete actus reus, the offer has to be made to a public official and 
must be rejected.910 Consequently, if an individual intentionally withdraws her offer before the 
public official declines it, she cannot be liable under this provision. A disputed case manifests 
where the withdrawal is involuntary and where the offer was not delivered to the public official 
for some unintended reason. Some scholars argue that the offense has already occurred, since the 
                                                
905 Anti-Bribery Law, supra note 796, art. 9. 
906 MAREI, supra note 850, at 227. 
907 Id. at 228 (See the explanation of this requirement in the previous section.). 
908 Id. at 229. 
909 Id. at 230. 
910 Id. 
  195 
public official’s knowledge of the offer is not required.911 Others consider that as an attempt, 
since it was not because the person who made the offer voluntarily withdrew it that the delivery 
was not made, and the offense is distinguished from the offenses in Articles 1, 2, and 3.912     
In addition, this offense is an intentional offense requiring that the individual offering the 
bribe know the legal character of the individual to whom the offer is made, i.e., that the 
individual is a public official or someone else who falls within the scope of Article 8 on the one 
hand, and that she intended to solicit the public official to accomplish the intended result.913 
Nevertheless, coercion is considered to be an affirmative defense if it is proven.914   
Finally, Article 9 imposes a penalty of a maximum of 10 years’ imprisonment and/or a 
million Riyals (equivalent to $ 266,638).915 This is in addition to the collateral penalties 
mentioned previously, which include dismissal from public office if the offender is holding one 
and the confiscation of the benefit that was intended to be delivered when possible.916 Moreover, 
offenders are subject to the rule that deals with repeat offenders provided in Article 18.917  
2. Knowingly Enjoying a Benefit Resulting from Bribery   
In circumstances where the briber and the bribee appoint a beneficiary outside of the 
bribery schema, this beneficiary can be prosecuted under the provision of Article 11 indicating 
that “Every person who has been appointed by the briber or the bribed to receive the bribe and 
                                                
911 MAḤMUD N. H ̣USNI, SHARḤ QA ̄NU ̄N AL-ʻUQU ̄BA ̄T: AL-QISM AL-KHA ̄ṢṢ [The Explanation of 
Criminal Law: Special Part] 64 (1988); see also KHIDR, supra note 798, at 402-04.  
912 MAREI, supra note 850, at 231.  
913 Id. at 232. 
914 Id. at 234. 
915 Anti-Bribery Law, supra note 796, art. 9.  
916 MAREI, supra note 850, at 235-36; see also Anti-Bribery Law, supra note 796, art. 13 & 15. 
917 See Anti-Bribery Law, supra note 796, art. 18. MAREI, supra note 850, at 236. 
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accepts knowing the reason therefor shall be punished with imprisonment for not more than two 
years or a fine not exceeding 50.000 Riyals [equivalent to $13,333], or both.”918  
 Article 11 generally criminalizes the beneficiary who accepts the benefit knowing the 
reason for it. The Law distinguishes this offense from the role of complicity indicated in Article 
10, since the beneficiary may not be involved in the offense, and may neither have aided nor 
abetted it, which makes the crime occur with or without her involvement.919 Thus, the 
punishment and the liability of the actor in this case is not dependent on the principal actors in 
the crime of bribery, i.e., the briber and the bribee.920 The offense must be also distinguished 
from the situation where benefits were provided to a public official in order to benefit another 
individual who is not the briber, since the objective of the punishment in this offense is the 
benefit provided to the public official, rather than the benefit provided by her.921  
Unlike the other offenses in this Law, this offense does not require that the actor have 
certain legal character that falls within the scope of Article 8.922 Further, the beneficiary can be 
any individual; there is no restriction in terms of the individual’s relationship to actors in the 
bribery schema, although the reality requires a close relationship between the beneficiary and the 
bribee.923 It is also worth noting that the beneficiary can appointed by the briber without a 
previous agreement with the bribee. Consequently, if the benefit was provided to the beneficiary 
by the briber and the beneficiary accepted the benefit knowing its purpose, she meets the 
                                                
918 Anti-Bribery Law, supra note 796, art. 11. 
919 MAREI, supra note 850, at 245.  
920 Id.  
921 KHIDR, supra note 798, at 430-31. 
922 MAREI, supra note 850, at 246. 
923 Id. at 246.  
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requirement of this offense regardless of whether the public official performs the briber’s 
intended result.924   
As previously noted, the Law defines the benefit broadly to include more than the 
monetary benefits.925 Further, Article 11 expands its application to include the gratuity provided 
to the beneficiary, so long as she knew the reason for such a benefit.926 Hence, as can clearly be 
seen, this offense pivots around the intention of the beneficiary. In order to hold an individual 
liable under this provision, the intention to keep a benefit despite knowing the illegitimate reason 
for such a benefit must be proven.927  
Offenders convicted of this provision are subject to not more than two years’ 
imprisonment and/or a fine of no more than 50,000 Riyals (equivalent to $13,335). This is not to 
mention the collateral penalties for repeat offenders, which include confiscation and dismissal 
from public office. Nevertheless, an individual can be prosecuted under Article 10 in addition to 
Article 11 if he meets the threshold and acts as middleman or encourages the bribee to agree to 
perform the briber’s intended result.     
3. Gratuity 
As has been mentioned earlier in this chapter, the Law criminalizes the offense of 
gratuity under Article (3), stating that “[e]very Public official shall be deemed to have received a 
bribe, if he has solicited for himself or a third party, or accept[ed] or received a promise or gift 
for violating the function of his duties or remunerating him for his actions even where the same 
                                                
924 Id. at 247.  
925 See Anti-Bribery Law, supra note 796, art. 12.  
926 MAREI, supra note 850, at 247. 
927 KHIDR, supra note 798, at 433-34. 
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happened without prior agreement; he shall be punished with the penalty provided [in] Article 1 
hereof.”928 
Article 3 includes, as previously noted, the crime of bribery in which the act or abstention 
from acting of a public official is considered a violation of his duty and constitutes a gratuity 
offense. As with the crime of bribery, the jurisdiction of Article 3 only covers those who were 
indicated in Article 8. However, this offense can be distinguished slightly from the crime of 
bribery since bribery requires previous agreement between the briber and the bribee. A further 
distinction is manifest in the requirement that an official have actual authority in Article 3, while 
Articles 1 and 2 include ostensible authority also.929  
In this offense, unlike other laws that only recognize the acceptance of a gratuity,930 the 
Anti-Bribery Law does not distinguish between the solicitation, acceptance, or requesting of a 
reward or gratuity.931 Moreover, this offense, similar to the other offenses that fall under this 
Law, is an intentional offense requiring proof that the public official accepts the reward knowing 
that it is because of an official act;932 that is, there must be a nexus between the act and the 
reward, a quid pro quo. Thus, the Law imposes the same penalties imposed in Articles 1 and 2.933  
In general, Article 3 aims at closing the loophole that exists in a scenario where there is 
no previous agreement between the briber and bribee and the rewarding of public official for the 
acts been performed, yet it also requires the proof of quid pro quo. In part, it extends the 
                                                
928 Anti-Bribery Law, supra note 796, art. 3.  
929 MAREI, supra note 850, at 252. 
930 See, e.g., Law No. 58 of 1937, art. 105 (Criminal Code of 1937, reformed in 1952), Al-
Jaridah Al-Rasmiyya (Egypt) (Stating that a penalty shall be imposed on “public official/civil 
servant who accepts a present or a donation from a person for whom he performs a work of his 
position duties or refrains from performing any duty thereof….”). 
931 MAREI, supra note 850, at 255. 
932 Id. at 256. 
933 See Anti-Bribery Law, supra note 796, art. 3 (“he shall be punished with the penalty provided 
[in] Article 1 hereof.”). 
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application of the Law to include those offenses not covered by Articles 1, 2, and 9, but also 
imposes a heavier burden.  
4. The Offer and the Acceptance of Wasta 
In the previous chapter, a brief summary of this offense was provided, leaving other 
aspects to be legally illustrated. Article 4 requires certain elements, some of which are not any 
different from the other offenses covered under the Law, among which is the requirement of 
being within the scope of Article 8.934 However, other elements deserve a further interpretation 
including (1) wasta or other similar forms of influence peddling, and (2) whether acceptance 
results in violation of an official’s duty.  
First, the core of wasta generally is the solicitation of others based on relationship with 
them in order to obtain a certain advantage as a favor.935 Thus, such an act may take the form of 
mediation or a request so long as the basis of such an act is the exchange of favors. The difficulty 
arises in the situation where no wasta or similar forms of influence peddling have taken place, 
but rather the official was influenced by the mere favoritism that may result from social status, 
familial relationship, or other causes, with implicit suggestion of future quid pro quo. In such a 
case, the act would fall outside the purview of Article 4.936 The second element is that the 
acceptance of wasta results in a violation of an official’s duty. As noted in the previous chapter, 
to be held liable under Article 4, the act or the abstention has to be in violation of the official’s 
                                                
934 Anti-Bribery Law, supra note 796, art. 4 (Article 4 states that “any public official, who 
violated any of the functions of his duty, by committing or abstaining from any functions of his 
duties, as a result of a request, recommendation or mediation is deemed to be tantamount to 
having received a bribe; he shall be punished with the imprisonment for a period not exceeding 
three years or a fine not exceeding 100,000 Riyals [around 26,000 USD] or both.”). 
935 MAREI, supra note 850, at 260. 
936 Id. 
  200 
duty.937 Thus, a nexus between the violation and the wasta has to be proven in order to satisfy the 
atcus reus element.938  
With the respect to the penalties, In addition to the collateral penalties, Article 4 imposes 
a penalty of imprisonment not to exceed three years and/or a fine not to exceed 100,000 Riyals 
(equivalent to $26,666).939 However, unlike bribery, the conviction of the public official is 
required to convict the individual exercising wasta since the latter will be punished in accordance 
to Article 10, which establishes liability on the basis of complicity rules.940 Thus, if the public 
official rejects the wasta, the individual who practiced it in the first place cannot be punished due 
to the fact that Article 4 does not separate the two acts, nor does the Law establish such a thing 
as a case of bribery where the offering of a bribe is punished by Article 9 and the solicitation, 
acceptance, or requesting of a benefit is punished by Articles 1, 2, and 3.  
5. Trade in Influence 
As has been illustrated briefly in the previous chapter, in Article 5, the Anti-Bribery Law 
criminalizes trade of influence practices. Such an offense can be distinguished from bribery on 
certain grounds; first and foremost, this offense initially does not require a public official 
character in the individual who is using her real or supposed influence,941 yet the Law requires 
such an element in this offense.  The second difference is that the core of bribery is the authority 
over the advantage provided, while the core of trading influence is the influence itself being 
                                                
937 See generally Al-Enzi, supra note 797.  
938 MAREI, supra note 850, at 261. 
939 Anti-Bribery Law, supra note 796, art. 4. 
940 MAREI, supra note 850, at 264. 
941 See, e.g., UNCAC, supra note 29, art. 18.1 (a) (“The promise, offering or giving to a public 
official or any other person, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage in order that the public 
official or the person abuse his or her real or apparent influence….”). 
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used, which means that the individual using the influence may not have authority, but has the 
influence to secure an advantage.942  
The Law requires, as noted, three elements in this offense. As with the most of the 
offenses in the Law, Article 5 applies only to those individuals within the scope of Article 8, 
those who have real or supposed influence. Thus, this restricts the meaning of influence in that 
the influence results from a public office or position.943 The second element resembles the 
bribery element of the solicitation, acceptance, or requesting of a benefit of any kind.944 Finally, 
the influence, to be prosecuted under Article 5, must be exercised over a public authority, which 
mainly includes the government and its agencies and organizations.945 Consequently, if the 
influence was exercised over private organizations, corporations, or foreign entities, this does not 
fall within the scope of Article 5.  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, this offense requires a general intent which is met 
merely by the solicitation, acceptance, or requesting of the benefit knowing that it occurs because 
of the exercise of real or supposed influence.946 Since the Law did not extend the application of 
the Article 5 nor mitigate the burden of proof, it seems rational that it imposes the same 
punishments provided in Article 1. This is not to mention the collateral penalties and the 
confiscation of the benefit.    
                                                
942 See generally KHIDR, supra note 798, at 442-51. 
943 MAREI, supra note 850, at 269. 
944 Anti-Bribery Law, supra note 796, art. 5 (Article 5 reads, “any public official shall be deemed 
to have received a bribe if he has solicited for himself or for others, or accepted, or received a 
promise or gift for exercising real or alleged influence….”). 
945 MAREI, supra note 850, at 271. 
946 KHIDR, supra note 798, at 452. 
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6. The Use of Force and the Threatening of a Public Official  
Among other offenses, Article 7 criminalizes the practice of extortion against a public 
official, stating that “[a]ny person who uses force, violence or threats against a public official in 
order to force him to act illegally, or to instigate him to refrain from doing any of the acts of 
which he has legal charge, shall be punished with the penalty provided for in Article 1 hereof.”947  
In this article, the character of the individual who is using force or threatening is 
immaterial; rather, what is important is the character of the individual against whom such 
practice is carried out. Thus, if any individual uses force or threatens another individual within 
the scope of Article 8, he shall be prosecuted under this provision.948 It is worth noting that 
courts distinguish this act from the crime of resisting arrest, excluding such an act from the scope 
of this article.949 This article requires that the force or threat aims at forcing the public official to 
violate the duty of his job.950  
Having illustrated Articles 5 and 7, it seems that offense of extortion remains in a grey 
area. On one hand, Article 7 does not specify the act of extortion as an offense within its 
provision; instead, it specifies a “threat,” which cannot carry out the same meaning of extortion.  
Article 5, on the other hand, requires the existence of the solicitation, receiving, or requesting of 
a benefit to abuse of power, which includes inter alia the exercise of extortion. Thus, if a public 
official or another practices extortion without the solicitation, receiving, or requesting of a 
benefit, this may exclude such an act from the application of Article 5. This leaves no option but 
                                                
947 Anti-Bribery Law, supra note 796, art. 7.  
948 KHIDR, supra note 798, at 460 (2007). 
949 See Board of Grievances case No. 6916/2/Q in 1431H – 2010 and case No. 229/6/Q in 1431H 
– (corresponding to 2010) (the court distinguished between the use of force and the threatening 
of a public official and the assault and battery against a police officer.). 
950 KHIDR, supra note 798, at 462. 
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to rely on Article 2 (A) of Royal Decree No. 43, as explained above in Chapter 5, in order to 
cover such a loophole.951 
7. Following up on a case being processed outside the public official’s authority:  being an 
“expediter”  
Article 6 states that  
[e]very public official who solicits for himself or a third party,  or accepts or receives gift, 
on account of his position, to follow up a formality in a Government authority (service), 
if the other provisions set down herein do not apply with respect to him, shall be 
punished with imprisonment not exceeding two years or a fine not exceeding 50,000 
Riyals [equivalent to $13,335] or both; the same penalty shall be imposed on such a 
person who has given, offered or promised to make a gift for the aforementioned 
purpose; the intermediary shall also be liable to the aforementioned penalty, in any of 
these cases.952 
This mainly aims at extending the application of the Law to cover an area uncovered by 
Article 5, which deals with the trade of influence, since it is not always the case that the public 
official has a real or even a supposed influence to obtain a certain advantage, and consequently 
the provision of Article 5 does not apply to him.953 For instance, an official may follow up on a 
case moving through the Department of Immigration and Homeland Security either to expedite a 
process or to obtain an undue advantage. In such a situation, this official does not have influence 
                                                
951 Royal Decree No. 43, supra note 806, art. 2(A) (Article 2(A) states that “any public official 
and any individual aids and abets, whether a public official or not, commits one the following 
offenses shall be punished by imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years or a fine not 
exceeding twenty thousand Riyals [equivalent to $ 5,332]:  
“A. Abuse of power for private interest.”).  
952 Anti-Bribery Law, supra note 796, art. 6.  
953 MAREI, supra note 850, at 276. 
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over this Department, but rather he jeopardizes his fiduciary duty by creating a potential for a 
future exchange of benefits between himself and an official in the Department of Immigration 
and Homeland Security.  
In this offense, like the majority of the offenses included in the Law, the requirement of a 
public official character is required, but it is not required to have an authority over the formality; 
otherwise the practice would be covered by Article 1, 2, or 3. It is also required that a 
governmental entity or multiple entities have authority over case the public official is following 
up on.954 It does not also negate this element if the same entity in which the public official works 
has authority over the case, so long as he has no actual authority or ostensible authority over it.955 
However, Article 5 does not cover a situation where a corporation or other private entity has 
authority over the case being processed.  
This offense shares the same elements of the bribery offense, including the actus reus, 
representing the solicitation, receiving, or requesting of a benefit of any kind. This offense is also 
considered an intentional offense which requires proving that the public official intentionally 
solicited, received, or requested a benefit knowing the purpose of it, i.e., that the purpose of the 
benefit was to follow up on a case being processed by in another government entity.956  
Finally, the scope of this offense includes official who follow up on a case being 
processed by another government agency, the person who offered a benefit, and the intermediary 
in such offense.957 Thus, those individuals, when convicted, are punished by “imprisonment not 
                                                
954 Id. at 277. 
955 Id. 
956 Id. 
957 This can be an additional emphasis since those individuals are already subject to the 
provisions of Article 10 of Anti-Bribery Law covering the rule of aiding and abetting in these 
offenses.  
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exceeding two years or a fine not exceeding 50,000 Riyals [equivalent to $13,335] or both.”958 
The other penalties noted above, including confiscation, dismissal, and the aggravating of 
punishments when committed by repeat offenders, are also imposed.  
CONCLUSION  
This chapter has sought to provide an explanation of the Saudi anti-corruption legal 
framework in general and of the Anti-Bribery Law in particular. The Law in general went 
through different stages before it arrived at its current form, which can be considered as 
developed as other regulations enacted before it. In addition to the offense of bribery, the Law in 
general criminalizes a number of offenses. The Law restricts its application, however, to a 
certain group of individuals. The Law also highlights effective regret as a defense and the 
rewards of whistleblowers.   
Though the Law represents an advance in a number of respects, it possesses certain 
loopholes and weaknesses. The weaknesses cannot be attributed solely to the Law; instead there 
are other related aspects within the general legal framework that may hinder the effectiveness of 
the Law. The next chapter will explore these strengths and weaknesses in light of the explanation 
provided in this chapter.  
  
                                                
958 Anti-Bribery Law, supra note 796, art. 5.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: EVALUATION OF THE FRAMEWORK OF ANTI-BRIBERY LAW  
INTRODUCTION 
Because other regulations intersect with the Anti-Bribery Law, the evaluation of some 
aspects of the Law may require researching these provisions in order to provide a comprehensive 
evaluation. Thus, in this chapter, certain issues will be evaluated based on the Anti-Bribery Law 
and on other aspects of the Saudi legal framework. Such an evaluation will be conducted in light 
of general anti-corruption standards and other countries’ legal apparatus to combat corruption.  
This evaluation will shed light on the advantages of the Saudi legal system as well as its 
disadvantages, specifically in regard to six aspects. These aspects include the liability of legal 
persons, the wasta provision, immunity, penalties and rewards, the protection of whistleblowers 
and witnesses, and the jurisdiction of the Anti-Bribery Law. For each aspect, the examination 
will be based primarily on the provisions of the Anti-Bribery Law and secondarily on the 
provisions related to them.   
A.  The Liability of Legal Persons 
 The liability of legal persons for the offenses of corruption is enforced and included in 
number of international conventions against corruption.959 Opponents of this notion remain 
skeptical about its rationality since it is not practical to impose a liability on corporation “as if it 
has a blameworthy state of mind.”960 Further, it is sufficient to impose civil liability, which 
makes criminal liability unnecessary.961 Nevertheless, the advocates of this notion emphasize the 
                                                
959 See, e.g., UNCAC, supra note 29, art. 26. OECD Convention, supra note 29, art. 2.  
960 THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, FIGHTING 
CORRUPTION IN EASTERN EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA: THE ISTANBUL ANTI-CORRUPTION 
ACTION PLAN PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES 55 (2008). 
961 Sara Sun Beale, Response to the Critics of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1481, 1486 (2009). 
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heavy impact of corporations on the economy, which makes them capable of inflicting serious 
harm.962 Thus, the imposing of criminal liability is necessary to prevent such harm. 
 The Anti-Bribery Law made an advance in establishing the liability legal persons in 
Article 19 as follows:  
The authority having power to adjudge the offences of bribery must impose a fine not 
exceeding tenfold the value of the bribe, or banning from concluding contracts with 
ministries, Government services or public juristic persons, for providing purchases or 
execution of their projects and works, or both penalties; this penalty is imposable on any 
company or private firm national or foreign- whose manager or any personnel thereof has 
been found guilty of committing any offences provided for herein, if the said offence has 
been committed to serve the interest of such company or firm; the Council of Ministers 
may reconsider the banning penalty aforementioned after the lapse of at least five years 
from the date of passing judgement.963  
Further, Articles 69964 and 147965 of the Criminal Procedures Law impose civil liability 
on legal persons, which does not eliminate the criminal liability established by the Law. In 
                                                
962 Id. at 1482 (“imposing criminal liability on corporations makes sense, because corporations 
are not, fundamentally, fictional entities. Rather, they are very real and enormously powerful 
actors whose conduct often causes very significant harm both to individuals and to society as a 
whole.”). 
963 Anti-Bribery Law, supra note 796, art. 19. 
964 Law of Criminal Procedures, supra note 308, art. 69 (reading that “whoever suffers harm in 
consequence of a crime may file a claim in respect of his private right of action during the 
investigation of that action. The Investigator shall decide on the admissibility of such claim 
within three days from the date of filing. If the claim is rejected, an appeal may be lodged with 
the head of the relevant department within one week from the date of communication of the 
decision to the interested party. The decision issued by the head of the relevant department shall 
be final during the investigation stage.”). 
965 Id. art. 147 (“A person harmed by a crime and his heirs shall, at any time during the 
proceedings of the case in issue, be entitled to submit a request to the trial court regarding his 
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addition to establishing the liability, the Law expands its application to foreign firms. That is, the 
Law does not distinguish between national and foreign entities in imposing criminal liability on 
legal persons.966  
Though the Law includes and establishes the criminal liability of legal persons, a 
loophole still exists that may allow for the evasion of such liability. In the provision of Article 
19, the phrase “whose manager or any personnel thereof has been found guilty of committing 
any offences provided for herein” (emphasis added) 967 may raise a serious issue. Such a phrase 
may restrict the application of the Law.968 Depending on how the phrase is interpreted, this may 
mean that if an outside intermediary was utilized by the firm, this may negate the imposition of 
criminal liability on the firm.969  
Nevertheless, provisions in the Law of Government Tenders and Procurement address 
this issue. Though it is discretionary, Article 53 provides that  
a government authority may withdraw the work from a contractor and rescind the 
contract or execute it at his expense without prejudice to the right of the government 
authority to claim compensation for damage sustained as a result, in any of the following 
cases: 
                                                                                                                                                       
private right of action regardless of the amount thereof, even though his action has been rejected 
during the investigation.”). 
966 Anti-Bribery Law, supra note 796, art. 19. 
967 Id. 
968 Maíra Martini, Liability of legal persons for corruption, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, 5 
(2012). 
969 See generally Mark Livschitz, Liability of Legal Persons for Corruption: A Swiss Perspective, 
in CRIMINALISATION OF CORRUPTION: LIABILITY OF LEGAL PERSONS FOR CORRUPTION, 
CONFISCATION OF THE TOOLS AND PROCEEDS OF CORRUPTION, MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN 
CORRUPTION-RELATED CASES 7-19 (Expert Seminar for Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 
Almaty, Kazakhstan, 2007), available at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/29/38873929.pdf 
(The Swiss provision on liability of legal persons was criticized on the same ground.). 
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(a) If it is proven that a contractor attempts by himself or through others, directly or 
indirectly, to bribe an employee of an authority subject to the provisions of this Law or 
has procured the contract by way of bribery.970  
These provisions lead to the second point that deserves to be highlighted, which is the 
debarment. Generally, countries differ as to which debarment approach they have adopted—
either the automatic debarment approach or the discretionary debarment approach.971 Although 
the Law has taken a significant step in prohibiting the convicted entities from making future 
contracts with the government, future amendments may take into consideration that the ban from 
entering into any contract with the government’s agencies and entities should be a collateral 
penalty, rather than an original penalty. The recent provision leaves the ban as a judicial 
discretionary penalty in Article 19 by leaving it to the judge’s discretion to impose the monetary 
penalty and/or future ban from entering into contracts with the government’s agencies or 
entities.972 This also requires a further step to be taken in establishing a register of criminal 
convictions.973  
The argument for adopting an automatic debarment approach is based on two lines of 
reasoning. First, the automatic debarment approach increases the cost of a corruption offense 
when an offender is performing a cost-benefit analysis.974 Second, the default options are more 
                                                
970 Government Tenders and Procurement Law, supra note 834, art. 53(a). 
971 ELIZABETH ACORN, THE POWER OF PROCUREMENT IN THE FIGHT AGAINST FOREIGN BRIBERY 
(OECD INTEGRITY FORUM, PARIS, FRANCE 2016) (distinguishes between the automatic 
debarment approach and the “discretionary” debarment approach).  
972 Anti-Bribery Law, supra note 796, art. 19. 
973 Martini, supra note 968, at 5 (“While such a register is not yet common in other countries (of 
the countries [analyzed] here, only France keeps records of legal entities convicted), in the case 
of Switzerland, the absence of such a register makes it nearly impossible to apply the rules on 
repeat offending….”).   
974 Emmanuelle Auriol & Tina Søreide, An Economic Analysis of Debarment (Norges 
Handelshøyskole, Discussion Paper No. 23/2015, 2015) (This is especially true in “markets with 
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likely to be adopted in the decision-making process.975 That is, when the judge is faced with a 
provision imposing automatic debarment, she is more likely to impose the debarment. With the 
existing provision (i.e., a discretionary debarment approach), judges might find it more difficult 
to opt-out. It is worth noting that this argument and the tendency to adopt the automatic 
debarment approach is valid unless the government adopts a voluntary disclosure mechanism. In 
that case, the automatic debarment approach may backfire and decrease the effectiveness of the 
voluntary disclosure mechanism.976   
B.  The Wasta Provision 
Credit must be given to the drafters of the Law for the inclusion of Article 4 in its 
provisions, even though the Article is not comprehensive. In fact, the text of the Article seems to 
reflect the legislators’ attempt to avoid making the provisions overly broad. Nevertheless, the 
failure to combat wasta may be attributed to the legal system in general rather than to the Law 
itself. Wasta in its essence is an act of favoritism and discrimination, and to effectively combat it 
requires a comprehensive legal apparatus. Thus, a single provision in one law cannot achieve the 
intended result.  
In the Arab world, similar provisions have been enacted in number of countries.977 These 
provisions share similarities with Article 4 of the Saudi Anti-Bribery Law. However, the 
                                                                                                                                                       
low competition it may deter corruption as long as firms value public procurement contracts in 
the future and there is a certain risk of being detected in corruption.”).  
975 Eric J. Johnson & Daniel Goldstein, Do Defaults Save Lives?, 302 SCI. 1338, 1338-39 (2003); 
see also Shai Davidai et al., The Meaning of Default Options for Potential Organ Donors, 109 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
15201, 15201-5 (2012). 
976 See Mathias Nell, Contracts Obtained by Means of Bribery: Should They be Void or Valid?, 
27 EUR. J.L. ECON. 159, 159 (2009). 
977 See, e.g., Penal Code No 111 of 1969, art. 330 (Iraq) (“Any public official or agent who 
unlawfully refrains from executing the duties of his office or willfully fails to fulfill his duties in 
response to a request or instruction or to mediation by another or for any unlawful reason is 
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Jordanian provision in this matter is slightly different from the Saudi provisions, stating in 
Article 5 (i) that “[f]or the purposes of this Law, the following shall be deemed as corruption: (i) 
The acceptance of nepotism and favoritism, which revokes a right or validates what is void.”978 
The standard in the Jordanian provision is the individual’s right, rather than the public official’s 
duties. The standard shifts from public official’s duty to the individual’s right, which expands the 
scope of the application of the provision in fighting wasta.979  
 More importantly, such a shift in the Jordanian provision leads to a significant inference. 
The Saudi provision on wasta, similar to its Egyptian and Iraqi counterparts, weights the 
integrity of the public office more than other concerns. Thus, such provisions are instituted 
within the framework of the protection of public office, which explains why there is a 
requirement that the public official violate his duty in order for these provisions to apply.980  
Nonetheless, these advantages of the Jordanian provision have not immunized it from 
criticism. Some scholars argue that the Jordanian Anti-Corruption Commission Law refrains 
                                                                                                                                                       
punishable by detention.”); see also Law No. 58 of 1937, art. 105 bis (Criminal Code of 1937, 
reformed in 1952), Al-Jaridah Al-Rasmiyya (Egypt) (“Imprisonment, and paying a fine not less 
than two hundreds pounds, and not exceeding five hundreds pound, shall be the penalty inflicted 
on each public official/civil servant who performs or refrains from performing a work of his 
position duties, or default on the duties of his position as a result of an entreatment, 
recommendation, or mediation.” Note that the Saudi and Iraqi provisions are more explicit in 
requiring the violation of public official’s duty than the Egyptian provision.).    
978 Anti-Corruption Commission Law No. 62 of 2006, art. 5 (Jordan). 
979 Mish’al Al-Raggad & Fahed Al-Kasasbeh, Jarimat Qabul Alwasitat Fi Alttashrie Al'urdunni 
Wa Ishkaliat Alttatbiq (Dirasah Muqarna) [The crime of acceptance of nepotism in the 
Jordanian legislation and problematic application (comparative study)], 43 DIRASAT: SHARI’S & 
L. SCI. 99, 99-112 (2006). 
980 Mish’al Al-Raggad, The crime of acceptance of nepotism in the Jordanian legislation and 
problematic application (comparative study) [jarimat qabul alwasitat fi alttashrie al'urdunni wa 
ishkaliat alttatbiq (dirasah muqarna)] 19 (2011) (Unpublished Master’s Thesis, Amman Arab 
University) (on file with author).  
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from defining the rights it intends to protect.981 Further, the phrase “revokes a right” invites some 
criticism, since only legal rules define what revokes a right and nepotism and favoritism (wasta) 
does not revoke a right; rather, wasta is an infringement of rights.982   
 Moreover, the previously mentioned provisions, including the Jordanian provision, share 
the same disadvantage that these provisions do not apply unless the wasta is accepted. Thus, if 
the wasta was rejected, such provisions cannot be applied.983 This can be attributed to the focus 
of these provisions on the acts of public officials rather than on the acts of the individuals 
initiating the corrupt practice. Consequently, these laws refrain from criminalizing the act of 
offering or using wasta per se, if it is not accepted.984  
 In addition to the specific provision on wasta, the absence of certain provisions 
contributes to the difficulties of fighting wasta. One of the issues most closely related to wasta is 
conflict of interest. The Saudi legal system in a limited number of provisions prohibits certain 
practices that may involve a conflict of interest. Indirectly, the Civil Service Law prohibits public 
officials from engaging in commerce, which constitutes a preventive measure against the conflict 
of interest.985 Such prohibition is affirmed by the Royal Decree No. 43 in Article 1, which states 
                                                
981 Al-Raggad & Al-Kasasbeh, supra note 979, at 99 (This argues that study’s most important 
recommendations are for Jordanian legislators to correct the text of Article 5(i) by limiting the 
rights they seek to protect, by more accurately specifying the status of nepotism, by clarifying 
some unclear items, by using consistent terminology, and by abandoning the focus on 
determining a behavior’s criminality based the act of acceptance, focusing instead on “an 
immediate response to the concept of nepotism.”).  
982 Al-Raggad, supra note 980, at 28. 
983 MAREI, supra note 850, at 260-61. 
984 Id. 
985 See Civil Service Law, supra note 824, art. 13 (stating that “A public official must refrain 
from: 
(a) engaging directly or indirectly in commerce. 
(b) Participating in establishment of corporate of any kind or the acceptance of board 
member position within any corporate”); 
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that “a fine [of] not less than one thousand Riyal, and not exceeding ten thousands Riyal, shall be 
inflicted on: 
(a) public officials who are engaging in commerce.…”986 
The other provision that directly targets the conflict of interest is in the Law of Procedure 
before Sharia Courts. Article 94 of that law prohibits a judge from hearing a case in the 
following circumstances:  
(a)  If he is the spouse, relative, or in-law up to the fourth degree of a litigant. 
(b) If he, or his wife, has an existing dispute with a litigant in the case or with his wife. 
(c) If he is an attorney-in-fact, guardian, trustee, or presumptive heir of a litigant or if he 
is the spouse of the guardian or trustee of a litigant or if he is a relative or an in-law 
up to the fourth degree of such guardian or trustee. 
(d) If he, his wife, a relative, or an in-law in the ancestral line, or a person for whom he is 
trustee or guardian, has an interest in the existing case. 
(e) If he had issued a fatwa [religious legal opinion], litigated for one of the litigants in 
the case, or written about it, even if it were before he joined the judiciary, or if he had 
earlier considered the case as a judge, expert, or arbitrator, or had been a witness in 
the case or had engaged in any investigative action therein.987  
                                                                                                                                                       
see also Officers Service Law, supra note 824 (prohibiting the same acts in Article 17); see also 
the Law of Bureau of Investigation and Public Prosecution Royal Decree No. M/56 of 1409H 
(corresponding to 1989), art. 7 (SA) (“A member of the Bureau may not combine his job with 
commercial activities or any other profession or work inconsistent with the independence of the 
Bureau’s work and its dignity.”). See also Law of the Judiciary, supra note 309, art. 51.  
986 Royal Decree No. 43, supra note 806.  
987 Law on Procedures before Shari'a Courts, supra note 308, art. 94 (Article 96 includes the 
circumstances under which the parties are permitted, but not obligated, to file a motion to 
disqualify the judge, stating that  
“[a] judge may be disqualified for any of the following reasons: 
(a) If either he or his wife has a case similar to the case before him. 
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However, this provision does not inflict a penalty; rather, as stated in Article 95,  
An action or decision by a judge in any of the foregoing circumstances set forth in Article 
94 shall be null and void even if it were with the agreement of the litigants. If such 
nullification occurs with respect to a judgment upheld by the Appellate Court, a litigant 
may request said court to nullify the decision and assign another judge to reconsider the 
appeal.988  
 A clear-cut provision similar to 18 U.S. Code § 208 does not exist in the Saudi legal 
system.989 The lack of a direct conflict of interest provision may decrease the public awareness of 
the illegitimacy of such practices, leading ultimately to a reduction of culpability.990 
                                                                                                                                                       
(b) If he, or his wife, has a dispute with a litigant or his wife after the lawsuit was filed and 
pending with the judge, unless that [latter] lawsuit was filed with the intention of 
disqualifying him from considering the case before him. 
(c) If his divorcee with whom he has a child or one of his relatives or in-laws up to the fourth 
degree has a dispute before the judiciary with a litigant in the case, or with his wife, 
unless the case was brought with the intention of disqualifying him. 
(d) If a litigant is his servant or the judge had habitually dined or lived with him, or if he had 
received a gift from him shortly before the lawsuit was filed or thereafter. 
(e) If enmity or friendship exists between him and a litigant such that it is likely he would 
not be able to judge impartially.”); 
see also Law of Criminal Procedures, supra note 308, art 21 (This Article forbids the members 
of Bureau of Investigation and Public Prosecution from investigating or involving in the 
following cases:  
(a) If he is a victim of the investigated crime, or is the spouse, relative, or in-law up to the 
fourth degree of a litigant. 
(b) If enmity or friendship exists between him and a litigant such that it is likely he would 
not be able to judge impartially.  
(c) If he had already involved in a case: as an expert, arbitrator, an agent, a witness, and so 
on.). 
988 Law on Procedures before Shari'a Courts, supra note 308, art 95. 
989 Business Corruption in Saudi Arabia, supra note 399. 
990 See, e.g., MAMDOOH M. AL-RADADI, BANKS, SNAKES & LADDERS: ARAB BANKING & 
CORPORATE SUCCESS 196 (2011) (“I had a manager who had three relatives working under his 
supervision, I mean dude! Give me a break! Ever heard of conflict of interest?”).   
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Consequently, the absence of such a provision in the Saudi legal system not only contributes to 
the difficulties of prosecuting wasta, but also provides fertile ground for wasta to thrive in.991  
 Additionally, rules directly targeting nepotism and discrimination are absent from the 
Saudi legal apparatus. The Shoura Council just recently deliberated a bill for an Anti-
Discrimination Law.992 This law, if issued, would be more comprehensive than the U.A.E.’s 
Anti-Discrimination Law,993 which only prohibits discrimination for religious reasons.994 The 
Saudi bill criminalizes the discrimination on nearly on any basis, including race, region, religion, 
or ideology.995  
 What can be more difficult to implement is provisions aiming at the prohibition of 
nepotism. Rules similar to 5 U.S.C. 3110 and 5 U.S.C. 2302 have not been instituted in the Saudi 
framework. In addition to the difficulties in the application of these rules, they may raise 
skepticism about the effectiveness and practicality of anti-nepotism provisions, since nepotism is 
part of the socio-cultural, economic, and political structure.996 Despite such skepticism and 
difficulties, the issuance of these rules would raise public awareness about nepotism, which 
would eventually decrease the prevalence of nepotistic practices.  
                                                
991 See OECD JOINT LEARNING STUDY, IMPLEMENTING A CODE OF CONDUCT FOR THE PUBLIC 
SECTOR IN JORDAN, 20 (2010) (OECD report on Jordan recommends that “[t]he Government of 
Jordan may consider the following means to control wasta:  
1. Adopt and enforce clear conflict-of-interest provisions”). 
992 Law to criminalize all discrimination, ARAB NEWS, Aug. 22, 2016, 
http://www.arabnews.com/node/958811/saudi-arabia. 
993 Anti-Discrimination Law No. 2 of 2015 (U.A.E.). 
994 See generally U.A.E. Anti-Discrimination Law No. 2 of 2015, art. 4. 
995 Law to criminalize all discrimination, supra note 992 (“Article 12 of the law says that those 
who raise tribal slogans will be fined no less than SR 50,000 or will be jailed for at least six 
months, or both. Article 16 says that those who support the publication, recording, filming, 
taping, computer programs, applications or data in electronic format of any such material that 
ridicule religion, discriminates or foments hatred will face at least one year in jail and a fine of a 
minimum SR 50,000 and a maximum of SR 200,000.”). 
996 See generally Hayajenh et al., supra note 731, at 60-67. 
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C.  Immunity  
 In essence, countries grant immunity to a certain group of officials to serve a dual 
purpose: to safeguard their independence and to protect them from malicious prosecution.997 
Nevertheless, such immunity may constitute an obstacle to investigating or prosecuting corrupt 
practices committed by these officials. From the public perspective, immunity is one of those 
factors that increases corruption, leading the public to lose their confidence in the rule of law.998  
 Thus, immunity is a sensitive issue, especially when it is associated with corruption, 
requiring a balance between the need for immunity and the need for “effective investigation, 
prosecution and adjudication of corruption offences.”999 Accordingly, the UNCAC requires the 
parties of the convention to  
take such measures as may be necessary to establish or maintain, in accordance with its 
legal system and constitutional principles, an appropriate balance between any 
immunities or jurisdictional privileges accorded to its public officials for the performance 
of their functions and the possibility, when necessary, of effectively investigating, 
prosecuting and adjudicating offences established in accordance with this Convention.1000  
 To meet such a balance, countries should not adopt a notion of absolute immunity; 
instead the notion of immunity adopted should functional in nature, limiting the immunity to 
                                                
997 THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 871, at 
51. 
998 Id; see also Tilman Hoppe, Public corruption: limiting criminal immunity of legislative, 
executive and judicial officials in Europe, 5 VIENNA J. ON INT'L CONST. L. 538, 538 (2011) 
(“63% of respondents to a survey by Gallup International see 'public official's immunity' as one 
of the ‘main factors that have contributed to an increase in corruption’, ranking it the 2nd most 
important factor”). 
999 THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 871, at 
51. 
1000 UNCAC, supra note 29, art. 30.2. 
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only those acts performed within the framework of official duties.1001 The immunity should only 
cover the period when the official actually held office, rather than being open-ended.1002 In 
addition, suspending the statute of limitations, if there is such, during the time officials enjoy 
immunity must be taken into consideration to ensure that prosecution is not barred by the statute 
of limitations.1003    
 This subject deserves some attention. At the outset, the Saudi legal system grants 
immunity to ministers, judges, and members of the Bureau of Investigation and Public 
Prosecution (BIP). The source of this immunity is derived from variety of provisions. The 
immunity of officials previously in office can be revoked via various procedures, depending on 
the position they held.  
 Judges enjoy immunity from prosecution based on Article 68, which states, “Except in 
the foregoing cases [flagrante delicto], the judge may not be arrested, be subject to investigation 
proceedings, or be prosecuted without the permission of the Supreme Judicial Council. Detention 
of judges and execution of punishments restraining their freedom shall be implemented in 
separate facility.” A similar provision has been included in Article 19 of the Law of the Bureau 
of Investigation and Public Prosecution, but the permission to prosecute must be provided by the 
Bureau Administration Committee.1004  
                                                
1001 THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 871, at 
51. 
1002 Id. 
1003 Id.  
1004 Law of Bureau of Investigation and Public Prosecution, supra note 992, art. 19 (“Except in 
the foregoing cases [flagrante delicto], Members of BIP may not be arrested, be subject to 
investigation proceedings, or be prosecuted without the permission of the Bureau Administration 
Committee. Detention of Members and execution of punishments restraining their freedom shall 
be implemented in separate facility.”). 
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 The immunity of ministers deserves more elaboration since there are two different sets of 
rules governing it. Generally, the Law of Criminal Procedures requires a prior revocation of 
immunity issued by the King to prosecute ministers and those who hold the rank of minister or 
have previously been appointed minister or held the rank of minister.1005 With respect to certain 
corrupt practices, as noted above in Chapter 3, officials are subject to impeachment rather than 
public prosecution.1006  
 Drawing on this brief explanation, advantages and disadvantages of the Saudi anti-
corruption measures can be noted. The Saudi legal system did not adopt a statute of limitations 
for the corrupt offenses which would allow the prosecution of officials after they leave office. 
Further, immunity can be revoked with the permission of the authorized authorities. Yet the 
procedures need to be more transparent to ensure effective procedures for revoking immunity.1007 
Further, immunity for ministers or those who hold the rank of ministers raises a twofold issue. 
On the one hand, immunity extends even after an official leaves office, which contradicts the 
                                                
1005 Law of Criminal Procedures, supra note 308, Para. 4 of preamble.    
1006 Impeachment of Ministers Law, supra note 842, art. 5. (criminalizes the following acts: 
A. Behaviors and actions that would impact the increase or decrease in the price of goods, 
real estate, currency, or stock, to obtain personal benefit to him or to others. 
B. Acceptance of a benefit — of any kind — to himself or others, to perform official act or 
refrain from formal work. 
C. Influence peddling, whether the fraud is for the benefit or advantage of himself or of any 
other body or company, or organization. 
D.  Deliberate violations of laws, regulations and orders that result in financial loss of the 
state’s rights, or the rights of individuals. 
E. The disclosure of cabinet decisions and deliberations relating to national security, state’s 
foreign affairs, financial and economic affairs, and the trial of ministers. 
F. Personal intervention in the affairs of the judiciary and other government bodies and 
departments.).  
1007 THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, ANTI-CORRUPTION 
REFORMS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA: PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES, 2009-2013, 
FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN EASTERN EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA 75 (2013) (“A number of 
standards can be formulated with regard to immunity which should … provide for swift and 
effective procedures for lifting immunity, clear criteria for lifting of immunity which are the 
based on merits of the request to lift immunity.”). 
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principle of limiting the duration of immunity.1008 On the other hand, immunity extends to an 
unnecessarily large number of officials. Finally, it would be more effective to restrict the 
immunity so that it is clearly functional in nature, a concept which cannot be garnered from the 
broad language of the previous provision.1009   
D.  Penalties and Rewards 
Penalties play a significant role in preventing crimes, at least based on the classic 
analysis. Theoretically, the increase of penalties would reduce the number of corrupt practices, 
but also may increase the amount of bribes. In reality, however, the number of perpetrators who 
are punished for such practices is low, not to mention the gap between the penalties stated in the 
law and those actually imposed. It is also worth noting that the preventative roles of penalties 
decrease significantly if the penalty is not associated with a loss of social capital, which is the 
state of things where corruption is prevalent.1010   
At the core of this issue is the anti-corruption provisions and laws. To succeed, such laws 
must adopt the “right mix of penalties, rewards, and undercover law enforcement.”1011 Anti-
corruption laws achieve more by compromising between deterrent impact and rewarding 
“whistleblowers.” The probability of detection and the imposed penalties, including those 
imposed by societies, influence the deterrence to engaging in criminal behavior.1012 Thus, while 
                                                
1008 Law of Criminal Procedures, supra note 308, Para. 4 of preamble.   
1009 THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 871, at 
52 (“[E]ven officials who were involved in car accidents because of speeding have escaped 
prosecution, even though driving is not part of their official duties.”). 
1010 Tanzi, supra note 1, at 574 (citing Gary Becker, Crime and punishment: An economic 
approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 169-217 (1968)). 
1011 ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 21, at 68. 
1012 Id. at 55. 
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high fixed penalties lower the number of corrupt acts, they increase the sum of payoffs.1013 That 
is, officials will demand a high payment to engage in bribery when the penalty is high.1014  
Bases on a cost–benefit analysis, then, the probability of being apprehended and the 
penalties inflicted, which include those inflicted legally and socially, shape the deterrence of 
criminal behaviors.1015 Another point that must be taken into account is that the benefits for the 
bribe payers and bribe recipients are not symmetric. Such an asymmetry can be seen, for 
instance, when a briber pays a $1,000 to a bribee to get a benefit of $2,000 from a contract.  
In an assessment of the effectiveness of monetary penalties, OECD concluded that “23 
countries' maximum fines were not high enough to offset the financial return on investments in 
which bribery is involved.”1016 The low monetary penalty has provoked a number of 
commentators, among them OECD Secretary General Angel Gurria, who stated that 
“[s]ometimes sanctions are so light that even if people have a 100 percent chance of getting 
caught they would still choose to pay the fine and get the benefit of the act of bribery.”1017 
Despite these considerations, conventions against corruption tend to avoid providing 
detailed guidance for sentencing in corruption offenses. The UNCAC, refraining from providing 
a minimum or a maximum for penalties, states that “each State Party shall take measures … to 
provide effective, proportionate and dissuasive civil, administrative or criminal penalties”1018 
                                                
1013 Id. at 54. 
1014 Id.  
1015 Id. at 52. 
1016 Disparate Laws, Low Fines Mean Corporate Bribery Often Pays: OECD, REUTERS, Jun. 9, 
2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-oecd-corruption-idUSKCN0YV1BR. See also OECD, Is 
foreign bribery an attractive investment in some countries? in OECD BUSINESS AND FINANCE 
OUTLOOK 2016 207-22 (OECD ed., 2016). 
1017 Id. 
1018 UNCAC, supra note 29, art. 12 (1); see also OECD Convention, supra note 29, art. 3 Para. 1 
(states that bribery of foreign officials “shall be punishable by effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive criminal penalties comparable to the penalties for corruption of domestic officials.”). 
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Additional recommendations are provided by the UNCAS and the OECD, including the 
disqualification of convicted individuals from holding public offices,1019 the recognition of “legal 
persons’ criminal liability,”1020 and confiscation of the benefit.1021 
Accordingly, countries around the globe vary in the penalties they inflict on corruption 
offenses. In terms of penalties, countries generally impose a fixed imprisonment penalty, yet they 
vary in the assignment of monetary penalties. A number of countries impose a fixed monetary 
penalty for bribery,1022 while others take into consideration the value of bribe.1023 Notably, some 
countries, including Saudi Arabia, have adopted a mix of the two systems, where they apply the 
former to individuals and the latter on legal persons.1024 It is also worth noting that a number of 
countries, including United Kingdom, do not set a maximum limit for a monetary penalty.1025 
In the Saudi context, the Saudi legal system assigns asymmetric penalties depending on 
the offenses ranging from 2 to 10 years of imprisonment and a monetary penalty ranging from 
                                                
1019 UNCAC, supra note 29, art. 30 (7). 
1020 OECD Convention, supra note 29, art. 3 Para. 2; see also UNCAC, supra note 29, art. 26. 
1021 OECD Convention, supra note 29, art. 3 Para. 3; see also UNCAC, supra note 29, art. 31. 
1022 See, e.g., CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN.] art. 435-1, 435-2, 435-3 435-4 (Fr.) (Bribery is generally 
punished by “ten years' imprisonment and a fine of €150,000.” Article 131-38 for legal persons 
“The maximum amount of a fine applicable to legal persons is five times that which is applicable 
to natural persons by the law sanctioning the offence.”); see also OECD, supra note 1016, at 210 
(“Some countries impose simple maximum thresholds for monetary fines. These vary greatly in 
size from about USD 580 000 in the country with the lowest threshold to over USD 10 million in 
the highest threshold.”). 
1023 See, e.g., Act No. 16 of 1960, art. 114 (Kuwaiti Penal Code of 1960), Official Gazette 
(Kuwait); Criminal Code No. 15 of 1976, art. 191 (Bahr.); Criminal Code No. 11 of 2004, art. 
140 (Qatar); Criminal Code No. 3 of 1987, art. 238 (U.A.E.); 18 U.S. Code § 201 (West). 
1024 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) divs 141.1 (5)(6) (Austl.) (Australia adopts a mix of the two 
systems. See Division 141.1 (5) penalty for individuals is a fix amount of monetary penalty. 
Division 141.1 (6) also adopts a similar system for legal persons, allowing the judge to impose a 
fine of 100.000 penalty units, or a maximum that does not exceed threefold the value of the 
benefit.). 
1025 Gerry Ferguson, Criminal Sentences and civil sanctions for corruption, in GLOBAL 
CORRUPTION: LAW, THEORY AND PRACTICE 24 (2015); see also OECD, supra note 1016, at 210 
(indicating that “eight countries do not set ‘maximum’ thresholds for fines.”). 
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twenty thousand to a million Saudi Riyal. Additionally, the Anti-Bribery Law achieved certain 
advances in imposing collateral penalties, which includes dismissal from public office, 
confiscation, and promulgation of convictions.1026 The Law also made an advance by 
recognizing aggravated penalties for repeated offenders1027 and the criminal liability of legal 
persons, imposing a monetary penalty of tenfold the value of the bribe.1028  
Although the Saudi legal system has achieved a number of significant advances, certain 
points deserve to be highlighted. The absence of sentencing guidelines and the penal code have 
contributed to the issue of an inconsistency between penalties. With regard to bribery, while the 
monetary penalty is assigned in the Anti-Bribery Law, the Impeachment of Ministers Law 
refrains from imposing monetary fines.1029 Even if a fixed monetary penalty were imposed, 
which is the situation in the current Anti-Bribery Law, which imposes a penalty of a million 
Saudi Riyal (equivalent to 270,000 USD), the Saudi legal system might be falling into the trap of 
a low monetary penalty. Consequently, the shift from a fixed amount of monetary penalty to a 
monetary penalty based on the value of the bribe would provide more consistency and be more 
effective.  
Finally, since the success of any anti-corruption system partly depends on whistleblowers 
and uncovering these offenses, a process which is always characterized by secrecy, rewards play 
                                                
1026 See Anti-Bribery Law, supra note 796, arts. 13, 15, & 21. 
1027 Id. art. 18. 
1028 Id. art. 19; see, e.g., THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, 
supra note 960, at 58 (Note that there are number of countries that do not adopt the criminal 
liability of legal persons, including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Egypt and 
Kuwait.). 
1029 See Impeachment of Ministers Law, supra note 842, art. 5 (States that “a penalty of 
imprisonment between 3 – 10 years shall be inflicted on whoever commits one of the following 
offenses”). 
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significant role in such a system. Similar to the laws in a number of countries,1030 the Anti-
Bribery Law grants relatively generous rewards to encourage whistleblowers to report crimes. 
The rewards range from 5,000 Saudi Riyal (equivalent to 1,333 USD) to the half of the value of 
the confiscated benefits.1031   
E.  Protection of Whistleblowers and Witnesses  
 In addition to penalties and rewards, the success of anti-corruption laws requires a 
mechanism to uncover corrupt practices. Since it is mainly characterized by hidden acts, to 
uncover these acts may require motivating whistleblowers to report. This can be done either by 
the reward mechanism, as noted, or by protection, or both. In addition to its significant role in 
detecting corrupt practices by providing unaccusable information facilitating the investigation, 
reporting may play a similar role in preventing corrupt practices by increasing mistrust between 
bribers and bribees.1032 In social terms, reporting enhances trust in law enforcement and the rule 
of law on one hand, and a decreased perception of corrupt practices as normal practices on the 
other.1033    
 Confusion arises, mainly in countries where laws and rules regarding the protection of 
whistleblowers and witnesses are not common,1034 between the protection of whistleblowers and 
                                                
1030 OECD, WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION: ENCOURAGING REPORTING 10 (2012) (“The [Korean] 
Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission may provide whistleblowers with rewards of up to 
USD 2 million if their report has contributed directly to recovering or increasing revenues or 
reducing expenditures for public agencies.” “The Dodd-Frank Act also authorizes the SEC to pay 
rewards to individuals who provide the Commission with original information that leads to 
successful SEC enforcement actions (and certain related actions). Rewards may range from 10 
percent to 30 percent of the funds recovered.”).  
1031 See Anti-Bribery Law, supra note 796, art. 17. 
1032 THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 960, at 
71. 
1033 Id. 
1034 Id (“not a single country in the region [Eastern Europe and Central Asia] has effective legal 
provisions to protect whistleblowers in either the private or public sectors.”). 
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the protection of witnesses and individuals cooperating with the investigatory authorities. The 
difference between these two groups lies mainly in the procedures they are involved in: 
whistleblowers are not normally part of a criminal procedure, either because the private company 
or government agency deals with the issue internally, or because law enforcement has adequate 
evidence and does not need the whistleblower’s testimony. Witnesses, on the other hand, are 
directly involved in the criminal procedure.1035 The source and the purpose of the protection 
differs accordingly. Since whistleblowers will not take part in criminal procedures in most cases, 
provisions are derived from administrative regulations, labor laws, or specific laws on the 
protection of whistleblowers aiming at protecting them against retaliation, mobbing, dismissal, 
etc., in the workplace.1036 In contrast, the protection of witnesses and individuals cooperating 
with the authorities aims at protecting their physical integrity.1037  
 Based on this distinction, anti-bribery rules generally tend to focus on the protection of 
witnesses and individuals cooperating with the authorities due to the fact that these cases are 
criminal cases in nature. In this matter, the UNCAC provides that “[e]ach State Party shall 
consider providing for the possibility, in accordance with fundamental principles of its domestic 
law, of granting immunity from prosecution to a person who provides substantial cooperation in 
the investigation or prosecution of an offence established in accordance with this 
Convention.”1038  
                                                
1035 Id. at 71-72. 
1036 Id. at 72 (“whistleblower protection rules for the private sector are provided in labour code 
(Slovak Republic, Sweden [France and Norway]) or in specific laws on protection of 
whistleblowers (Japan, United Kingdom, [New Zealand and Canada]). Whistleblower protection 
in the public sector is usually provided in administrative laws or regulations (Mexico).”). 
1037 Id. 
1038 UNCAC, supra note 29, art. 37(3); see also Article 22 of Criminal Law Convention on 
Corruption, January, 27, 1999, Eur. T.S. No. 173 (Similarly states that “[e]ach Party shall adopt 
such measures as may be necessary to provide effective and appropriate protection for:  
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 A distinction between the defense of effective regret and the immunity or leniency 
granted to individuals cooperating with the authorities deserves to be highlighted. Despite the 
great similarities between them, “[i]n most countries, the effective regret [defense] applies only 
when an offender reports the crime shortly after its commission, which is not required in the case 
of immunity.”1039 However, this requirement, i.e., reporting the offense shortly after the 
commission, is not always adopted by countries, since some countries allow more time so long 
as the offense was not uncovered by the authorities, and thus an offender may benefit from such 
a defense.1040 Thus, countries take different positions on effective regret; while some countries 
provide such a defense, others do not.1041  
Nevertheless, a concern about the “effective regret” defense arises in the case of the 
bribery of foreign officials. Generally, the effective regret defense benefits the briber who reports 
the bribery to avoid the criminal liability, which eventually also assists the authorities by 
providing essential information to prosecute corrupt officials.1042 Such a purpose may not be 
                                                                                                                                                       
a) those who report the criminal offences established in accordance with Articles 2 
to 14 or otherwise co-operate with the investigating or prosecuting authorities;  
b) witnesses who give testimony concerning these offences….”).  
1039 THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 871, at 
53. 
1040 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK & ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT, THE CRIMINALISATION OF BRIBERY IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 35 (2011). 
1041 Id. at 251, 284, & 458 (Within the Japanese Penal Code, “domestic bribery offences do not 
contain some defenses to bribery that are commonly found in other jurisdictions. According to 
the Japanese authorities, there are no defenses of small facilitation payments, solicitation or 
‘effective regret’.” A similar position has been taken by Korea and Singapore.); see also 
RODERICK MACAULEY, FIGHTING CORRUPTION: INCRIMINATIONS 54 (2011) (“[The effective 
regret defense] is not known at all in the more western European nations.”).  
1042 OECD, FOREIGN BRIBERY OFFENCE AND ITS ENFORCEMENT IN EASTERN EUROPE AND 
CENTRAL ASIA 53 (2016). 
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achieved in bribery involving foreign officials since “there is no guarantee that the foreign 
official who was given a bribe will be prosecuted if the bribe giver comes forward.”1043   
Within the Saudi legal system, the Anti-Bribery Law, as noted in the previous chapter, 
adopts the effective regret defense for the briber and the middleman who cooperates with 
authorities, but this does not extend to the recipient of bribe.1044 Though the Law does not require 
that the information provided to be fundamental in building and proving the case,1045 scholars 
have argued that such a requirement must be met.1046 However, the Law allows for a delay in 
reporting the offense so long as the offense is not uncovered or investigated by the authority.1047 
In terms of witness protection, the Executive Regulation of Criminal Procedure Law allows the 
investigator to conceal the identity of witnesses.1048  
Nevertheless, the Saudi legal system lacks a comprehensive legal apparatus to protect 
witnesses or individuals reporting offenses, their relatives, and other close individuals. 
According to the U.N. Executive summary, “Saudi Arabia has not taken appropriate measures to 
provide effective protection against potential retaliation or intimidation for persons who 
cooperate with the justice authorities or for their relatives and other persons close to them.”1049 
Notably, anonymous reports are not always preferred nor protected, especially in regard to 
corrupt offenses.1050 In terms of protection of whistleblowers, such provisions do not exist in 
                                                
1043 Id.  
1044 Anti-Bribery Law, supra note 796, art. 16. 
1045 Id. 
1046 NOUR, supra note 839, at 153-54. MAREI, supra note 850, at 204. 
1047 Anti-Bribery Law, supra note 796, art. 16. 
1048 Executive Regulation of Law of Criminal Procedures, supra note 327, art. 69(3). 
1049 See U.N. Conference of the States Parties to the UNCAC, St. Petersburg, Russ., Nov. 3-4, 
2015, Review of implementation of the UNCAC, CAC/COSP/IRG/I/4/1/Add.20 (Sept. 24, 
2015).  
1050 Saudi whistle-blowers slam sackings, lack of protection, ARABNEWS, Sept. 16, 2013, 
http://www.arabianbusiness.com/saudi-whistle-blowers-slam-sackings-lack-of-protection-
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Saudi Arabia, thus allowing retaliation against whistleblowers.1051 In view of the absence of such 
provisions, the Ministry of Labor and Social Development and the Ministry of Commerce and 
Investment recently took steps to issue new regulations aiming at encouraging and protecting 
whistleblowers.1052  
F.  The Jurisdiction of the Anti-Bribery Law 
 Historically, anti-bribery provisions began by targeting the offenses within the 
framework of public offices due to the fact that public offices were controlling and responsible 
for significant resources, and those offenses would jeopardize the social and economic structure, 
leaving the bribery in the private sector to be governed by “civil (e.g. competition) or [labor] 
laws or general criminal law provisions.”1053  
With the emergence of mega corporations and enterprises, societies, and more 
importantly, economies, were restructured. These corporations and enterprises have gained the 
same significance and effects on societies and economies as governments once had. Soon, their 
business activities expanded from the local domain to become global, which then added more 
difficulties to combating bribery, since countries are restricted in their jurisdiction to certain 
geographical and personal scopes.  Thus, certain countries realized such an effect and acted to 
face corrupt offences occurring within that scope. Regrettably, however, a number of countries 
                                                                                                                                                       
518365.html#.V8TiumUi6f5 (Ministry of Labour spokesman Hattab Al Enezy indicates that 
“disclosure of informers’ identities was essential to take legal action against corrupt officials.”); 
see also SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL SERVICE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, THE STATE OF 
WHISTLEBLOWER & JOURNALIST PROTECTIONS GLOBALLY: A CUSTOMARY LEGAL ANALYSIS OF 
REPRESENTATIVE CASE, 81 (2015) (“whistleblowers are put in even more potential danger, since 
the state will not allow anonymous reporting. The law states that the identity of the 
whistleblower is necessary in order to investigate the claims.”). 
1051 Saudi whistle-blowers slam sackings, lack of protection, supra note 1050.  
1052 Saudi Arabia: Protection for ‘whistleblowers’, ARABNEWS, May. 16, 2016, 
http://www.arabnews.com/news/protection-‘whistleblowers’  
1053 THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 960, at 
57. 
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did not extend the application of anti-bribery provisions to reach the private sector’s corrupt 
practices.  
 In addition to the traditional form of bribery where a bribe is paid to a local official, 
countries have become subject to two additional forms of bribery. The first is bribery within the 
private sector, which may take the form of private to private bribery or individual to private 
bribery. The second form is bribery paid by a private sector company or private individuals to a 
foreign official. This is not, however, limited to bribery offenses, but may also extend to other 
offenses such as trade in influence or abuse of power.    
 Accordingly, a number of contemporary conventions against corrupt practices include the 
private sector (commercial bribery) and the bribery of foreign officials within their provisions. 
The UNCAC urges, rather than requires, its state parties to adopt “legislative and other measures 
as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally in the 
course of economic, financial or commercial activities.”1054 Further, conventions have advanced 
to cover bribes paid by private entities and individuals to foreign officials, expanding the 
jurisdiction of countries to prosecute those entities and individuals.1055   
 The U.S. took the initiative to fight the bribery of foreign officials as early as 1977 when 
it enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).1056 The FCPA prohibits individuals and 
entities within the FCPA’s jurisdiction from committing “any acts in furtherance of bribery 
aimed at influencing the business decisions of foreign government officials or foreign political 
                                                
1054 UNCAC, supra note 29, art 21 (Note that Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on 
Corruption in article 7 and 8 requires its state parties to “adopt such legislative and other 
measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when 
committed intentionally in the course of business activity.”).  
1055 See UNCAC, supra note 29, art 16. Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, supra note 
1038, arts 5 & 6. OECD Convention, supra note 29, art. 1.  
1056 The Act was amended in 1988 and 1998.  
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candidates or parties.”1057 The purpose of the FCPA clearly aims at protecting fair competition 
among American businesses and individuals carrying out international business activities.1058 
Since the domain of international business is shared and includes other international entities 
whose countries do not adopt similar acts restricting the bribery of foreign public officials, the 
American entities were disadvantaged when competing with other countries’ entities.1059   
 Thus, the Americans took another step, but this time globally. Their efforts aimed at the 
adoption of harmonized provisions criminalizing the bribery of foreign officials.1060 These efforts 
result in the implementation of such provisions in other conventions, as noted above.1061 At the 
beginning of this century, such efforts culminated in the adoption of similar provisions targeting 
the bribery of foreign officials in more countries and placing the same restrictions on more 
international corporations.1062  
 Within the scope of private sector, bribery offenses became more common, leading 
national legislatures to react by improving and amending their criminal law, yet different 
countries have adopted different techniques.1063 Countries such as Germany, Korea, the 
Netherlands, and Sweden, for instance, have adopted criminal provisions directly targeting 
                                                





1061 See generally id. at 61-62.  
1062 See, e.g., The U.K. Anti-Bribery Act 2010 § 6 (Eng.); CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN.] art. 435-3 & 
435-4 (Fr.); Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) div 70 (Austl.); Fusei kyōsō bōshi-hō [Unfair 
Competition Prevention Act], Act No.47 of 1993, art. 28 (Japan); Corruption of Foreign Public 
Officials Act (S.C. 1998, c. 34 (Can.).  
1063 GÜNTER HEINE ET AL., PRIVATE COMMERCIAL BRIBERY: A COMPARISON OF NATIONAL AND 
SUPRANATIONAL LEGAL STRUCTURES 8 (2003) (“Nevertheless, despite international and national 
tendencies towards combating commercial bribery by means of criminal law, some 
payments/benefits for facilitating the conduct of business are still tolerated.”).  
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commercial bribery in their criminal codes.1064 Others have opted to follow another technique by 
adopting criminal provisions in different special laws such as commercial laws or anti-trust 
provisions.1065 Notably, some countries remain reliant on classical crimes such as “fraud 
management, misappropriation, fraudulent administration, or forgery of documents.”1066    
The Saudi Anti-Bribery Law defines specifically the scope of its application in Article 8. 
The law, as explained in the previous chapter, covers bribery in the private sector, as well as 
bribery of public officials. While the law covers persons employed in joint stock corporations 
and corporations carrying out banking operations with no conditions, a condition of performance 
of public service or managing, running, or maintaining a public facility is a condition to applying 
the provisions of the Law to persons employed in entities other than these kinds of corporations. 
That is, an entity other than a joint stock corporation, whether it is a holding company, a sole 
corporation, a limited liability corporation, or a non-profit organization, has to meet the previous 
requirement to be included within the scope of Article 8. Finally, all others can be prosecuted 
and punished under the ta’azir crimes.  
To understand the jurisdiction of the Law, three scenarios must be provided. The first is 
one where the giver of a bribe is a Saudi corporation, of any kind, and the recipient is foreign 
official in a foreign embassy in Saudi Arabia or abroad. This is definitely outside the jurisdiction 
of the Anti-Bribery Law since the Law and “Saudi legislation does not criminalize bribery 
                                                
1064 Id. at 9. 
1065 Id (For instance, countries may include criminal provisions in “commercial codes (Korea - 
with overlapping provisions in the Penal Code, Japan, the Czech Republic, Switzerland), the 
Prevention of Corruption Act (England/Wales, 1906), the Labor Code (France).”). 
1066 Id (This technique was followed by for instance, Spain, Poland, and Switzerland.). 
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committed by foreign public officials or officials of international public institutions, nor does it 
criminalize the solicitation or acceptance of a bribe by any such official.”1067 
The second scenario can be more complex and challenging to the Law specifically and to 
the legal system generally. Consider the situation where the giver of bribe is within the 
jurisdiction of the Law, yet the recipient is not. In such a scenario, none of the parties falls within 
the jurisdiction of the Law since the Law only criminalizes the solicitation or acceptance of a 
bribe if that is committed by persons within the jurisdiction of the Law.1068 Aside from ta’azir, 
provisions criminalizing certain practices in different laws might be applied to such a situation. 
One such provision is found in the recently enacted Companies Law, which criminalizes the 
misuse of power or votes knowingly when such an act is against the interests of the company and 
seeks to directly or indirectly obtain personal advantages for oneself or other individuals or 
another company.1069 The other provision is in the Competition Law; it is rather indirect and 
targets legal persons, stating that  
[p]ractices, agreements or contracts among current or potential competing firms … shall 
be prohibited, if the objective of such practices, agreements or contracts, or consequent 
impact thereof is the restriction of commerce or violation of competition among firms. A 
firm or firms enjoying a dominant position shall also be banned from carrying out any 
practice which restricts competition among firms.…1070  
                                                
1067 U.N. Conference of the States Parties to the UNCAC, supra note 1049, at 3. VLIEGER, supra 
note 340, at 198 (For instance, the bribing of foreign embassy personnel occurs more frequently 
in the context of domestic workers. In an answer provided to a questionnaire about what to do to 
demand a legal right, a domestic worker said, “The only place to go really is the embassy, but 
they also sometimes help the Saudis; maybe they take some money under the table, you know.”). 
1068 Anti-Bribery Law, supra note 796, arts. 1, 2, & 3. 
1069 Law of Companies, supra note 857, art. 211(c).  
1070 Competition Law Royal Decree No. M/25 of 1425H (corresponding to 2004), arts. 4 & 12 
(SA) (Article 12 imposes a penalty of  five million Saudi Riyals (equivalent to $1.3 million)).  
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The final scenario can be more specific to the trade in influence offenses, but is intended 
to highlight the jurisdiction of the Law over former officials. Suppose a payment was provided to 
a former official to use his influence in an agency, organization, or other entity in which he has 
been holding a high rank. Such a situation would challenge the jurisdiction of the Law since the 
Law’s jurisdiction is limited to current public officials or those who are deemed as such by 
Article 8. That is, if an individual does not hold a position that falls within the scope of Article 8 
at the time he agrees to use his influence, he may not fall within the jurisdiction of the Law.1071   
To sum up, offenses committed by certain individuals may fall outside the jurisdiction of 
the Anti-Bribery Law. This includes foreign public officials, former officials, and employees in 
the private sector other than joint stock corporations, corporations carrying out banking 
operations, or corporations performing public services or managing, running, or maintaining a 
public facility. It is also important to emphasize that the Law focuses on the recipient’s soliciting 
or accepting a bribe; this means that if the recipient of the payment is not covered by the scope of 
Article 8, the jurisdiction of the law is limited, even if the giver of bribe falls within the scope of 
Article 8.  
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has examined six aspects of the Saudi Anti-Corruption Law. Those aspects 
were selected to focus on the most significant legal issues when discussing bribery or similar 
corrupt practices. These aspects include the liability of legal persons, the wasta provision, 
immunity, penalties and rewards, the protection of whistleblowers and witnesses, and the 
jurisdiction of the Anti-Bribery Law.  
                                                
1071 Anti-Bribery Law, supra note 796, art. 8. 
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As noted above, the Saudi legal system possesses a number of advantages that other 
countries lack. However, such advantages may not be fully functional since they are either 
incomplete or there are other provisions within the general legal framework that may hinder their 
effectiveness. Finally, this chapter sought to provide an examination and evaluation of the issues, 
rather than recommending solutions, which will be provided in the next chapter with respect to 
certain issues.    
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CHAPTER EIGHT: FIGHTING CORRUPTION A DIFFERENT WAY 
INTRODUCTION  
Having highlighted the main issues behind corruption in Saudi Arabia, this chapter aims 
at providing legal and procedural suggestions that can directly or indirectly reduce the practice of 
wasta and other corrupt practices. Since a number of corrupt practices are socially and legally 
influenced, these suggestions bear such factors in mind in order to provide applicable solutions 
to fight corruption in Saudi Arabia. It is also important to note that though a number of 
weaknesses have been highlighted in the previous chapter, this chapter does not provide 
additional recommendations on topics where they have been provided previously. The exception 
is the jurisdiction of Anti-Bribery Law, which will be discussed in this chapter.  
In addition to suggestions about reforming the jurisdiction of Anti-Bribery Law to cover 
private-to-private bribery on the one hand and the bribery of foreign public officials on the other, 
this chapter also urges the simplification of procedures by proposing a number of changes in the 
existing e-government program. The development of such programs serves a dual purpose: that 
of simplification and of adding anti-corruption mechanisms. In this chapter, a number of nudges 
are recommended to fight wasta in particular and generally other corrupt practices. Finally, this 
chapter explores the role of criminal law in fighting corruption.  
A.  Nudges  
Since wasta is deeply rooted in Saudi society, the solution may be to combat such 
practices indirectly. Laws and regulations are more likely to fail and prove to be ineffective when 
they are too far ahead of the culture in which they are enacted. In line with that, mechanism 
combating wasta in the recent time should adopts a gradual and indirect approach to facilitate 
  235 
and minimize the shock of introducing legal provisions that directly target such practices. 
Accordingly, gentle nudges may play a useful role.  
Generally, policies may take different forms among which are a form of ‘do and do not,’ 
a form of economic incentives, and a form of nudges. A nudge is defined as “any aspect of the 
choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any 
options or significantly changing their economic incentives. To count as a mere nudge, the 
intervention must be easy and cheap to avoid.”1072 Recently, this approach has been utilized in 
various areas such as, for instance, environmental and health issues. The nudge approach is 
based on the idea of libertarian paternalism, which on the one hand seeks to “steer people’s 
choice in directions that will benefit them” while maintaining or increasing their freedom of 
choice on the other.1073 Further, a nudge can take various forms, among which are the 
simplification of rules and procedures, the use of social norms, an increase in ease and 
convenience, graphic warnings, reminders, eliciting implementation intentions, and informing 
individuals about the consequences of their past decisions.1074  
Various nudge practices have been used or suggested as means of fighting corruption. 
One example is the use of architecture and design to fight corruption; one writer has suggested 
that offices should be designed to be transparent (i.e., glass offices) to promote more 
                                                
1072 RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, 
WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 6 (2009).  
1073 Id. at 5. Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1159 (2003).   
1074 Cass R. Sunstein, Nudging: A Very Short Guide, 37 J. CONSUMER POL’Y, 583, 583-88 (2014) 
(highlighting ten of the most important nudges some of which mentioned in the body and the 
remaining includes, default rules, disclosure, and precommitment strategies.). 
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transparency in the activities that go on within them.1075 To illustrate the importance of 
architecture and design; another study sheds light on the development of the architecture and 
design of courthouses throughout history and how that development shapes people’s notions of 
justice.1076  
Yet another study supports the idea that simple and inexpensive initiatives (nudges) may 
reduce corrupt practices by officials. The study, which examined five laboratory experiments and 
another organizational survey study, found “that exposure to moral symbols displayed by the 
subordinates dissuades superiors from both engaging in unethical behaviors themselves and 
asking their subordinates to engage in unethical behavior.”1077 What these moral symbols do is to 
nudge individuals by reminding them to maintain their integrity and refrain from acting 
unethically. Another interpretation is that such symbols create a social norm of rejecting 
unethical behavior. Once such a social norm is perceived by superiors, then they are dissuaded 
from violating the norm by acting or asking others to act unethically.       
 In practice and reality, a brilliant initiative was undertaken by an Indian NGO named 
Fifth Pillar to fight petty corruption (bribery of lower level officials). They printed and 
distributed zero rupee notes to the citizens so that they could hand these valueless notes to 
officials who were demanding bribery.1078 The goal was to show a rejection of the demand of 
                                                
1075 See generally Dieter Zinnbauer, Architecting Transparency Back to the Roots—and Forward 
to the Future? (Transperancy Int’l, working paper, 2015), available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2616655.  
1076 See generally Judith Resnik & Dennis E. Curtis, Re-presenting Justice: Visual Narratives of 
judgment and the invention of democratic courts, (Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper No. 3861, 
2012), available at http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/3861.  
1077 See generally Sreedhari Desai & Maryam Kouchaki, Moral Symbols: A Necklace of Garlic 
Against Unethical Requests, ACAD. MGMT. J. (forthcoming 2017). 
1078 Dean Nelson, India 'Issues' Zero Rupee Banknotes, THE TELEGRAPH, Feb. 2, 2010, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/india/7137567/India-issues-zero-rupee-
banknotes.html.  
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bribery and “to get people to show their disapproval of public service delivery dependent on 
bribes.”1079 The zero Rupee served as a nudge since it enhanced individuals’ commitment to 
reject petty corruption and paying a bribe.  
Scholar Dieter Zinnbauer has introduced a notion he calls “ambient accountability,” 
which “can be broadly described as all efforts that seek to shape, use and engage systematically 
with the built environment and public places and the ways people experience and interact in 
them, in order to further transparency, accountability and integrity of public authorities and 
services.”1080 Since it eventually aims at “steer[ing] people’s choice in directions that will benefit 
them,”1081 the notion of ambient accountability can be considered as a nudge approach in a broad 
sense. Zinnbauer’s examples of such initiatives include the idea of graphic warnings, informing 
individuals about their rights (reminders and disclosure), and enabling them to provide feedback 
(simplification and increases in ease and convenience).1082    
Consequently, the initiatives introduced by Zinnbauer focus on informing individuals of 
their rights and allowing them to provide an evaluation at the very place where the service is 
provided, which then enhances accountability. One of the interesting ideas Zinnbauer presents is 
that of Twitter walls  which provide immediate feedback from citizens about the service they 
have just received and the performance of officials and employees. These Twitter walls were 
placed in front of the place providing a service, allowing immediate feedback and accountability.  
                                                
1079 Fumiko Nagano, Paying Zero for Public Services, WORLD BANK BLOG, (Dec. 29, 2009), 
http://blogs.worldbank.org/publicsphere/paying-zero-public-services (“Corrupt officials seldom 
encounter resistance by ordinary people that they become scared when people have the courage 
to show their zero rupee notes, effectively making a strong statement condemning bribery.”).  
1080 Dieter Zinnbauer, Ambient Accountability: Fighting Corruption Where and When it Happens 
4 (Transparency Int’l, Working Paper No. 5.3, 2012). 
1081 THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1072, at 5.  
1082 See generally Zinnbauer, supra note 1075.  
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In terms of nudges that have already been employed in Saudi Arabia, a number of 
initiatives have been seen on the ground, some of which are initiated by individuals and others 
by the government. In terms of those initiated by individuals, some officers and law enforcement 
personnel have started taking off their name tags to avoid pressure from others that would affect 
the performance of their duty. As explained above in Chapter 5, the name of the family can 
provide demographic information about the individual, and law enforcement personnel who have 
a name tag presenting their family or tribal name can invite pressure from others belonging to the 
same region, tribe, or family. Such pressure then inhibits law enforcement officials from 
performing their legal duties ethically and impartially. As an example of initiatives implemented 
by governmental agencies and organizations, detailed information about projects highlighting the 
timeline of the project, the contractors, and the cost of the project has been presented on signs at 
the place of the proposed projects. Such initiatives are aimed at promoting the transparency of 
government projects and contracts.  
These initiatives and nudges can be also developed and enhanced to be more effective. 
Not wearing the name tag is a way to avoid the pressure and protect the impartiality of officers 
and personnel, yet it may not be the most appropriate practice from a legal point of view. What 
can be done instead is to provide personnel with the option of wearing a name tag that shows 
only their first name and an officer identification number. The practice can be also expanded to 
be applied to individuals in other governmental agencies and organizations whose duties involve 
dealing with the public. On the other hand, informational signs are great in terms of promoting 
transparency, yet they do not invite feedback. To improve the sufficiency and effectiveness of 
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these signs, the utilization of social media, mainly Twitter,1083 and the creation of an active 
channel to allow immediate feedback can yield more benefits from such an initiative and 
promote accountability in addition to transparency. 
With that being said, there are still other nudges that can be suggested to fight corruption 
generally and wasta particularly. In terms of corruption in general, it has been argued that one of 
the obstacles facing efforts to fight corruption is the “denial of victim” justification—that is, 
“most corrupt activities are clandestine and go unreported because they lack an immediate 
victim.”1084 To nudge the system, therefore, a solution that can be suggested is to visualize the 
victims, which would help in bridging the gap. Thus, it can be suggested that the Saudi 
government use a graphic warning showing the victims of corruption—for instance, a graphic 
warning about the consequences of corruption in which victims of the Jeddah floods appear. This 
step would serve a purpose in informing individuals about the consequences of their past 
decisions. Such a nudge can be more effective than graphics that merely warn against accepting 
or paying a bribe. 
With respect to wasta, in addition to graphic warnings showing the victims of wasta, 
other graphic warnings showing how other individuals negatively perceive individuals using 
wasta can help in reducing the practice. For instance, data have been provided in Chapter 5 
showing that individuals using wasta are perceived as less competent; or a visual image 
representing the perception of wasta as a form of corruption and an unfair practice can be shown 
to people to nudge them to refrain from engaging in the practice of wasta. Another nudge that 
                                                
1083 See Saudi Arabia profile – Media, BBC, Jan. 23, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
middle-east-14703480 (“With 2.4 million users, Saudi Arabia is home to more than 40% of all 
active Twitter users in the Arab region, says the Dubai School of Government (2014). Among 
the top Twitter users are clerics and members of the royal family.”). 
1084 Michael Johnston, Why Do So Many Anti-Corruption Efforts Fail? 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. 
AM. L. 467, 468 (2011). 
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can be suggested is to have a “whitelist” which rewards the agencies and organizations that 
reduce the practice of wasta, which can enhance the commitment to fighting wasta. To 
implement this nudge, another nudge may be suggested—push-button boxes linked to the 
National Authority for Combating Corruption (Nazaha) through which individuals can report the 
practice of wasta directly. An award then can be based on the number of reports, which can then 
enhance the commitment of both citizens and officials to refrain from engaging in the practice of 
wasta.   
Finally, since Saudi society is a largely Muslim society, nudges should be utilized to 
increase individuals’ self-awareness. These nudges should focus on and highlight the dissonance 
between Islamic principles (which, as has been shown in the second chapter, firmly reject 
corruption) and the existing corrupt practices. Consider, for instance, an experiment aimed at 
examining self-awareness of cheating as a dishonest behavior which proved that the number of 
people cheating decreased when participants merely signed an honor code.1085 Such a procedure 
apparently increased the participants’ self-awareness, which by itself controlled their dishonest 
behavior. Similar steps can be adopted simply by using a verse of the Qur’an or other phrases on 
official documents to increase the self-awareness of those who use them. Even more practically, 
official documents should contain a line that states, for instance, that this document has been 
processed in agreement with regulations signed by public officials.  
B.  Simplification of the Procedures and the Implementation of E-Government    
In this section, the discussion will focus on approaches to fighting wasta primarily, 
although some of the points discussed will be applicable to other corrupt practices as well. To 
                                                
1085 Nina Mazar & Dan Ariely, Dishonesty in Everyday Life and Its Policy Implications, 25 J. 
PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 117, 121 (2006); see also Nina Mazar et al., The Dishonesty of 
Honest People: A Theory of Self-Concept Maintenance, 45 J. MARKETING RES. 633, 636-37 
(2008).  
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understand why wasta is difficult to dictate or reduce, one must examine the role of the 
institutional structures. As noted above in Chapter 5, wasta seems to provide an alternative to 
weak institutional structures. The same also applies to other indigenous forms of informal 
influence such as guanxi. As has been suggested in the Chinese context, “the absence of official 
rules permits guanxi relations to drive official decision-making.”1086  
Thus, weak institutional structures and official rules lower the level of 
professionalism.1087 This can be seen in the weak role of codes of conduct in both the public and 
the private sector in Saudi Arabia. In 2013, however, Nazaha drafted a code of conduct in 
conjunction with the Ministry of Civil Service which aims at inter alia protecting public money 
and imposing mandatory financial disclosure for public officials.1088 The Nazaha also drafted and 
adopted a code of conduct and urged the private sector to follow their lead.1089  
The issues raised by the foregoing are twofold: first, a weak institutional structure leads 
to vague procedures. The second issue that stems from the weak institutional structure is 
undefined discretionary power. The unrestricted discretionary power by itself, as discussed in the 
first chapter, creates a fertile ground for corruption to thrive in.  Thus, those two factors when 
coupled together lead to the thriving of wasta and drive individuals to rely on wasta to advance 
                                                
1086 Pitman B. Potter, Guanxi and the PRC Legal System: From Contradiction to 
Complementarity, in SOCIAL CONNECTIONS IN CHINA: INSTITUTIONS, CULTURE, AND THE 
CHANGING NATURE OF GUANXI 179, 189 (Thomas Gold et al. eds., 2002). Jacob Harding, 
Corruption or Guanxi? Differentiating Between the Legitimate, Unethical, and Corrupt 
Activities of Chinese Government Officials, 31 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 127, 144-45 (2014) (Jacob 
Harding also identifies weak institutional structures as a cause of corruption in China: “China’s 
corruption problem is caused by flaws in the institutional structures for regulating corruption, 
China’s method of anti-corruption enforcement, and China’s burdensome bureaucracy. Thus, 
China will have the greatest success battling corruption by addressing these institutional 
problems.”). 
1087 See generally, Potter, supra note 1086, at 189. 
1088 Nazaha Urges the Private Sector to Adopt Code of Conduct, ALEQTISADIAH NEWSPAPER, 
Feb. 18, 2014. http://www.aleqt.com/2014/02/18/article_826454.html. 
1089 Id.  
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their businesses, to say nothing of the thriving of corrupt practices in general. This suggests that 
the clarification and simplification of procedures on the one hand, and the defining of 
discretionary powers on the other, would limit the pervasive practice of wasta.1090  
Related to these issues, a number of studies have suggested that the use of e-government 
reduces the level of corruption in general and of wasta specifically.1091 When implemented 
effectively, e-government can curb corruption, at least partly, since it reduces discretionary 
power, which then closes the door to opportunities to act arbitrarily; from the other side, the fact 
that e-government secures and maintains detailed information about each transaction facilitates 
the investigation and the tracking of corrupt practices, which then increases the odds of their 
being detected.1092 In general, “[b]y making rules simpler and more transparent, e-government 
emboldens citizens and businesses to question unreasonable procedures and their arbitrary 
application.”1093 
 In Saudi Arabia, e-government has been already implemented by a number of 
governmental agencies. Early in 2003, the Saudi government issued a Royal Decree ordering the 
                                                
1090 See, e.g., Irène Hors, Fighting Corruption in Customs Administration: What Can We Learn 
From Recent Experiences? 21 (OECD Research, Working Paper No. 175, 2001) (arguing that 
“[t]his radical simplification of tax structure greatly reduced abusive exercise of discretion by 
customs officers.”).  
1091 See, e.g., Thomas B. Andersen, E-Government as an Anti-Corruption Strategy, 21 INFO. 
ECON. & POL. 201, 209 (2009) (“[t]his paper documents that increases in the use of e-
government have led to reductions in corruption over the decade 1996–2006 in non-OECD 
countries.”); see, e.g., Cassandra E. Di Rienzo et al., Corruption and the Role of Information, 38 
J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 320, 320-32 (2007). 
1092 Subhash Bhatnagar, E-government and Access to Information, in GLOBAL CORRUPTION 
REPORT 2003: ACCESS TO INFORMATION 24, 30 (Transparency Int’l 2003). 
1093 Id; see also Subhajit Basu, E-Government and Developing Countries: An Overview, 18 INT’L 
REV. L. COMPUTERS & TECH. 109, 110 (2004) (arguing that “[t]he strategic objective of e-
governance is to support and simplify governance for all parties; government, citizens and 
businesses.”). 
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Ministry of Finance to establish an e-government program.1094 In the same year, another Royal 
Decree was issued to assign the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology to be 
responsible for managing, planning, and developing of the communications and information 
technology sector.1095 Later in that year, the Ministry of Communication and Information 
Technology was ordered to institute a plan to provide e-government services to individuals and 
was authorized to provide the necessary resources through government procurement.1096 In 2005, 
the E-Government Program (YESSER) was established in a partnership between the Ministry of 
Communication and Information Technology and the Ministry of Finance.1097  
To succeed, or at least increase the benefits of this strategy, certain points have to be 
taken into consideration to enhance and support fighting corruption. When discussing the e-
government initiatives, the experience of the Seoul e-government system for anti-corruption, 
known as OPEN (Online Procedures Enhancement for civil application), offers useful lessons. 
Inter alia, OPEN implemented prevention and enforcement strategies aimed at curbing 
corruption. The prevention strategy involved a reform of administrative procedures and practice 
“by clarifying the procedures and designing systems that ‘simplify, standardize, and de-
personalize the delivery of services.’”1098 The enforcement strategy aims at achieving a high 
level of accountability and transparency.1099 Further, the Seoul Metropolitan Government 
strengthened its enforcement strategy by inviting the Audit and Inspection Bureau to be part of 
the enforcement mechanism. The transparency aspect of the OPEN system can be seen in a 
                                                
1094 See Royal Decree No. 7/B/2427, 16/1/1424H (corresponding to Mar. 19, 2003) (SA).  
1095 See Royal Decree No. 133, 21/05/1424H (corresponding to July. 20, 2003) (SA). 
1096 See Royal Decree No. 7/B/33181, 10/07/1424H (corresponding to Sept. 7, 2003) (SA).  
1097 SAUDI E-GOVERNEMNT PROGRAM (YESSER), 
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1098 Seongcheol Kim et al., An Institutional Analysis of an E-Government System for Anti-
Corruption: The Case of OPEN, 26 GOV’T INFO. Q. 42, 47 (2009). 
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feature that provides an applicant with the ability to know the status of the transaction in real 
time, the official in charge, and the time frame in the transaction is to be handled.1100 This feature 
enhances the accountability aspect since applicants can submit a complaint to the audit 
department—“they may even contact the Mayor through an e-mail or online bulletin board”—
when any misconduct or delay is observed.1101  
In addition, social media applications play an important role in fostering the process and 
utility of e-government systems, which is especially significant in those cultures that value face-
to-face interactions.1102 In general, social media can serve the dual purpose of accountability on 
one hand and of clarifying and simplifying administrative procedures on the other. A study based 
on the concept of psychological distance found that “forms of e-government conducive to the 
transmission of less detailed information (social media) may be more effective at improving 
relationships between citizens and their government than forms of e-government that are more 
commonly used to transmit detailed information (e-government websites).”1103  
This suggests that Saudi Arabia can improve its e-government by considering these 
points. The involvement of an independent audit body, the Nazaha for instance, in addition to the 
audit departments of the agencies and organizations, will contribute significantly to 
accountability and eventually enhance the strategy of anti-corruption. Further, the adoption of a 
hybrid system through which the governmental websites provide concise information while 
social media channels provide more information through active interactions with individuals 
would maximize the utility of the e-government system.     
                                                
1100 Id. 
1101 Id. 
1102 Suha AlAwadhi & Anne Morris, Factors Influencing the Adoption of E-Government 
Services, 4 J. SOFTWARE, 584, 584-90 (2009). 
1103 Gregory A. Porumbescu, Linking Public Sector Social Media and E-Government Website 
Use to Trust in Government, 33 GOV’T INFO. Q. 291, 291-304 (2016).  
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Broadly speaking, the divisive effect of wasta specifically and of corruption generally 
can be eradicated by implementing fair procedures. Thus, “[p]rocedures and practices that all 
parties regard as ‘fair’ facilitate positive relations among group members and preserve the fabric 
of society even in the face of conflicts of interest that exist in any group whose members have 
different preferences and different beliefs concerning how the group should manage its 
affairs.”1104 
To summarize, the existence of e-government per se does not limit or reduce corrupt 
practices and behaviors. Instead, legal regulations are needed that define procedures and impose 
civil and criminal liability for violations. Such violations may take the form of the alteration of 
confidential or legal documents. The culpability is greater when the distance between the act and 
the result is close, which is not always the case with corrupt behaviors and acts. Thus, violations 
of the rules regulating e-government has the effect of decreasing the distance between the act and 
the result, and thus increase the perception of culpability. The existence of e-government should 
also aim at providing legitimate procedures that apply equally and fairly.  
In essence, this solution can be characterized as an indirect approach to targeting wasta 
by incorporating nudges into the system. That is, instead of outlawing wasta directly, this 
approach minimizes the cultural clash and confrontation by shifting the focus to restricting the 
practice through reforming procedures. The reform of procedures then decreases the reliance on 
wasta, which eventually decreases the prevalence of the practice and intensity of the cultural 
confrontation. 
                                                
1104 Tracey L. Meares et al., Why Do Criminals Obey the Law? The Influence of Legitimacy and 
Social Networks on Active Gun Offenders, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY. 397, 403 (2012). 
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C.  The Reform of Anti-Bribery Jurisdiction 
The most recent waves of anti-corruption regulation have aimed at fighting the bribery of 
foreign officials and private-to-private bribery. Rules targeting the bribery of foreign public 
officials have been adopted by a growing number of countries as a result of American efforts, as 
noted in the previous chapter, to protect fair competition between corporations conducting 
business activities abroad.1105 Above all, these provisions close the loopholes resulting from the 
limited jurisdictions of anti-bribery provisions, allowing corporations to escape from prosecution 
and criminal liability for their conduct abroad.  
1. General View of the Jurisdiction of Anti-Bribery Law  
Building on the all the illustrations offered in previous chapters and the social structure of 
Saudi Arabia, where the power and resources may not always be associated with public office, 
the only suggestion that can be made is to abandon the “protection of the integrity of public 
offices” notion and shift to a “protection of national integrity” notion. Such a task is definitely 
not an easy one since it requires a comprehensive reconsideration of the recent provisions 
enacted to combat corruption practices.  
From a broader perspective, the problem of the Anti-Bribery Law’s jurisdiction is not 
limited to the offenses of bribery. In fact, the other offenses namely, trade-in-influence, 
accepting of wasta, or the following up of a case being processed outside the public official’s 
authority, may invite more difficulties and more easily evade the short reach of the provisions of 
the Law. These offenses share one characteristic in that they all require that an individual must 
have power and influence to be able to commit any of these offenses. Thus, since power may not 
always derive from one source, i.e., public office or position, which is especially true in the 
                                                
1105 Hoffmann, supra note 1057, at 61-62. 
  247 
Saudi context, the individual committing the offense may not always be a public official or hold 
a public office at the time of committing such an offense.  
Thus, in addition to failing to extend the jurisdiction of the Law to the private sector 
completely, the Law fails to include former public officials, as mentioned in the previous 
chapter, within its jurisdiction. The question is raised as to whether the inclusion of them would 
be sufficient. The accurate answer is that it would allow the prosecution of more cases and 
consequently eliminate, to some extent, the commission of such offenses.  
The dilemma may be seen in whether to widen the jurisdiction of the Law and provide a 
broad jurisdiction to the application of the Law on the one hand, or to limit the jurisdiction of the 
Law and avoid creating catch-all provisions on the other. Thus, it seems that expanding the 
jurisdiction of the Law to apply to all the aforementioned offenses is not practical. From a 
practical prospective, the suggestion that can be offered to overcome such a dilemma is that 
instead of adopting a general jurisdiction of the Law applying to all of the offenses within the 
Law, the jurisdiction should be defined on the basis of the offense. For instance, the jurisdiction 
of the trade-in-influence offense should be defined distinguishably from the offense of following 
up on a case being processed outside a public official’s authority. That is, the jurisdiction of the 
Law can be defined on an offense-by-offense basis, rather than creating one jurisdiction for all 
offenses, which is the current situation of the Law.   
2. Bribery of Foreign Public Officials 
In the Saudi legal system, the lack of provisions targeting the bribery of foreign public 
officials may not only negatively impact fair competition, but also the human rights of 
individuals. For instance, a number of foreign workers have accused their countries’ embassies 
of receiving bribes from their Saudi employers in order to turn a blind eye to the violations of 
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contracts committed by the employers.1106 In a larger context, recruitment companies and 
agencies, for instance, may engage in similar activities.1107  
The bribery of foreign public officials also may be committed by other Saudi companies 
engaging in international business activities, especially considering the growing size and number 
of Saudi companies.1108 As an example of the impact of the Saudi private sector, five out of the 
ten largest joint stock corporations in Arab world are Saudi corporations.1109  
As with American corporations, such an initiative would definitely provoke many 
complaints from Saudi companies since these provisions may put them at a disadvantage when 
competing with other international corporations whose countries have not adopted similar 
provisions. Nevertheless, this does not eliminate the need for enacting provisions to combat the 
bribery of foreign public officials.  
In order to enact comprehensive provisions combating the bribery of public officials, 
specific elements have to be taken into consideration; namely, the definition of a public official 
and the affirmative defense. Thus, to enact optimal provisions, both international and national 
experience needs to be utilized. At the international level, the UNCAC and the OECD provide a 
basic framework for the bribery of public officials while the FCPA and the U.K. Bribery Act of 
2010 (hereafter the Bribery Act of 2010) offer examples of efforts at the national level.  
                                                
1106 VLIEGER, supra note 340, at 198. 
1107 See, e.g., id.  
1108 See, e.g., Forbes global 2000: Saudi Arabia's largest companies, ECONOMY WATCH, July. 7, 
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At the outset, the provisions of the aforementioned laws seem to agree on the definition 
of a foreign public official, though they may differ structurally. Generally, these rules cover two 
distinct kinds of officials: public officials of international organization and foreign public 
officials. For instance, the OECD defines a foreign public official as “any person holding a 
legislative, administrative or judicial office of a foreign country, whether appointed or elected; 
any person exercising a public function for a foreign country, including for a public agency or 
public enterprise; and any official or agent of a public international [organization].”1110 The 
U.K.’s recently enacted Bribery Act of 2010 goes a step further in defining a public international 
organization to include any organization “whose members are any of the following: 
(a) countries or territories, 
(b) governments of countries or territories, 
(c) other public international organisations,  
(d) a mixture of any of the above.”1111    
The difference between the provisions of the aforesaid laws and conventions lies in their 
position on the affirmative defense and how it is adopted. Neither the UNCAC nor the OECD 
included in their provisions an affirmative defense to the bribery of foreign public officials.1112 
On the national level, the FCPA highlighted mainly two affirmative defenses and one exception 
introduced by the 1988 amendment of the FCPA establishing the “local law defense” and the 
                                                
1110 OECD Convention, supra note 29, art. 1(4)(a). See also UNCAC, supra note 29, art. 2(b)(c). 
See also Section 30A(f )(1)(A) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f )(1) (A); 15 U.S.C. §§ 
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1111 The U.K. Anti-Bribery Act 2010 § 6 (6) (Eng.). 
1112 See, e.g., OECD Convention, supra note 29, Annex I(A) (“Article 1 of the OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention should be implemented in such a way that it does not provide a [defense] or 
exception where the foreign public official solicits a bribe.”). 
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“reasonable and bona fide promotional expense defense,” in addition to the exception for 
“‘facilitating or expediting payments made in furtherance of routine governmental action.”1113  
The Bribery Act of 2010 adopted another position by narrowing the defenses and the 
exceptions in its provisions and providing more discretionary power to the U.K. authorities. The 
Bribery Act of 2010 restricts the defense to those payments expressly permitted by local written 
law. Consequently, whether the payment is a facilitating payment or another type of payment, 
“section 6 explicitly provides that no violation occurs if the written law governing the official’s 
conduct requires or permits him or her to be influenced by the offer, promise, or gift.”1114 
Nevertheless, concerns have been raised about the criminalization of “the sorts of common 
payments [such as] payments for obtaining permits or licenses, processing government papers, or 
scheduling inspections.”1115 Practically, the Joint Committee on the Draft Bribery Bill has 
indicated that authorities would not use their discretionary powers to prosecute an offence 
involving “such small amounts of money.”1116 Further, the Bribery Act of 2010 does not indicate 
promotional expense as a defense, which creates an unclear situation raised mainly in cases of 
routine inexpensive hospitality.1117 Again, this is largely left to the discretion of the authorities, 
                                                
1113 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(b)-(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(b)-(c), 78dd-3(b)-(c); see generally CRIMINAL 
DIVISION OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE ENFORCEMENT DIVISION OF THE U.S. 
SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT 
PRACTICES ACT 3, 25 (2012).  
1114 Warin, F. Joseph et al., The British are Coming: Britain Changes its Law on Foreign Bribery 
and Joins the International Fight Against Corruption, 46 TEX. INT'L. L.J. 1, 21 (2010). 
1115 Id. at 20. 
1116 Id. at 20-21 (“In other words, U.K. authorities may at their discretion decline to prosecute 
certain facilitating payments that are technically illegal under the Bribery Act.”). 
1117 Id. at 21 (“Accordingly, most business courtesy expenditures provided to foreign public 
officials constitute a prima facie offense under the Act.”); see JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE DRAFT 
BRIBERY BILL, FIRST REPORT, 2008–09, H.L. 115-I/H.C. 430-I, available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200809/jtselect/jtbribe/115/11502.htm.  
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who will be unlikely to prosecute an offense in such a case.1118 Finally, the Bribery Act of 2010 
provides a defense “for corporations who have adequate procedures, programs, and practices in 
place to monitor and prevent bribery by associated persons.”1119 
In light of the brief illustrations above, Saudi legislators may adopt a similar provision to 
that provided by the OECD convention in defining a foreign public official. In the context of the 
affirmative defense, Saudi legislators could benefit from the examples provided by the FCPA 
and the Bribery Act of 2010. However, the FCPA might be an optimal model, if they intend to 
adopt affirmative defense provisions, since it is more clear and consistent as a matter of practice 
and in its legal provisions.  
In terms of how to implement these provisions in the Law, Saudi legislators may do so in 
two forms. The first is to amend the scope of Article 8 by including foreign public officials 
within its provisions. However, this may result in more confusion due to the issue of affirmative 
defense associated with the bribery of public officials. The second form is to implement a new 
section into the Anti-Bribery Law specifying the definition of a foreign public official, who is 
covered, specific offenses, and affirmative defenses, if adopted. As an initial step, the second 
form would also allow further steps and provides more flexibility for further amendments such as 
the accounting rules.  
3. Private-to-Private Bribery  
Private-to-private bribery cannot be underestimated, especially when the role and the size 
of the private sector is taken into consideration. Though some countries adopt provisions 
criminalizing such bribery, a great number of others lack such provisions. Instead, they rely on 
                                                
1118 Id. at 22 (“[T]he U.K. Ministry of Justice has indicated publicly … that it is not inclined to 
prosecute bona fide promotional expenditures provided to foreign public officials.”). 
1119 Michael Peterson, Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Should the Bribery Act 
2010 be a Guideline?, 12 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 417, 426 (2012).  
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other provisions to prosecute these offenses.1120 Thus, sometimes bribery per se is not against the 
law unless it involves another offense.1121   
In Saudi Arabia, the seriousness of the issue can be shown by the fact that, according to 
strategic management professor Abdulwahab Al-Gahtani, “bribes incurred in the Saudi private 
sector total $15 billion annually,” which eventually harms society.1122 This number is only likely 
to increase with the growing size of the private sector on the one hand and the national 
transformation program “Vision 2030” moving toward the privatization of services on the 
other.1123  
In the previous chapter, the problem of the jurisdiction of the Anti-Bribery Law has been 
highlighted. As has been mentioned, in certain scenarios the Law’s jurisdiction appears to have a 
short reach. Though the Law made an advance in including certain corporations within its 
jurisdiction, other potentially problematic issues have emerged, which can be summarized as 
follows: generally, a number of companies, as illustrated in the previous chapter, may not fall 
under the jurisdiction of the Law; specifically, the provisions of the Law only apply in cases 
where the recipient is within the scope of Article 8, rather than vice versa.  
                                                
1120 See, e.g., Cheryl A. Krause & William Gibson, Private Commercial Bribery: The Next Wave 
of Anti-Corruption Enforcement?, 2 FIN. FRAUD L. REP. 710, 711-12 (2010) (Most U.S. states 
criminalize directly commercial for example, Texas Penal Code § 32.43. Commercial Bribery 
and Delaware Code Title 11. Crimes and Criminal Procedure § 881. Bribery. “China, for 
example, has prohibited commercial bribery since 1996 but has strongly stepped up enforcement 
in recent years. The PRC Anti-Unfair Competition Law prohibits the offering business 
counterparts money or property to induce them to purchase or sell products.”). 
1121 SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN & BONNIE J. PALIFKA, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, 
CONSEQUENCES, AND REFORM 209 (2016). 
1122 “Bribes Incurred in the Saudi Private Sector Total $15 Billion Annually”, ALAYAM 
NEWSPAPER, Jan. 24, 2013, http://www.alayam.com/online/Economy_online/213969/-دبكت-ىشرلا
 ً ایونس-رلاود-رایلم-15-يدوعسلا-صاخلا-عاطقلا.html. 
1123 See SAUDI VISION 2030, (last visited Dec. 31, 2016), http://vision2030.gov.sa/en/node/6; see, 
e.g., Saudi Arabia to privatize 295 hospitals, ALARABIYA, May. 15, 2016, 
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/business/economy/2016/05/15/Saudi-Arabia-to-privatize-295-
hospitals.html  
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Though the Law represented an advance at the time of its enactment by partly including 
the private sector under its jurisdiction, this now appears insufficient due to the fact that a 
number of companies are neither joint-stock corporations nor performing a public service nor 
managing, running, or maintaining a public facility. Apparently, what was not taken into 
consideration is the social tendency toward forming family companies. “[A]ccording to the Saudi 
Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), … family companies constitute 95% of the total number of 
companies. While the majority of these companies are considered to be small and medium 
enterprises, 45 of the 100 largest companies are family business.”1124 This issue would be 
unimportant if these companies met the other conditions of Article 8, i.e., carrying out banking 
operations, performing a public service, or managing, running, or maintaining a public facility, 
yet in reality this is not always the case. 
Even if a company meets the requirement of carrying out banking operations, performing 
a public service, or managing, running, or maintaining a public facility, this only provides a 
limited jurisdiction for the application of the Law on only the offenses committed within that 
scope.1125 In other words, if a company had a contract to run a public facility, the jurisdiction of 
the Law would be limited to the offense of bribery committed within the scope of running a 
public facility. Thus, if an employee of such a company received a bribe in a matter not related to 
                                                
1124 Fahad A. Albloshi & Yehia S. Nawar, Assessing the Impact of Leadership Styles on 
Organisational Performance: The Case of Saudi Private SME's, 2 J. ORGANISATIONAL STUD. & 
INNOVATION, 66, 68 (2015); see also Chamber of Commerce, 95% of the registered companies in 
Saudi Arabia are family companies, ALARABIYA, Sept. 16, 2013, 
http://www.alarabiya.net/ar/aswaq/special-interviews/2013/09/16/-تاكرشلا-نم-95-ةراجتلا-ةفرغ
ةیلئاع-ةیدوعسلا-يف-ةلجسملا.html  
1125 See generally Osama M. Alsulaimani, Nitaq Tatbiq Nizam Mukafahat Alrrashwat Alssaeudi 
Ealaa Muazzafi Alqitae Alkhass [The Jurisdiction of Saudi Anti-Bribery over Personnel of the 
Private Sector], 12 ALEXANDRIA U. J. LEGAL AND ECON. RES. 67 (1997). 
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the scope of the contract to run a public facility, then such an offense may not necessarily fall 
within the jurisdiction of the Law.1126    
The issue is aggravated when the legal system is viewed as a whole. Unlike those 
countries opting to prosecute commercial bribery under provisions other than direct bribery 
provisions, the Saudi legal system may lack such an option because the number of codified 
offenses is significantly lower than the number of offenses existing in other countries. As shown 
in the previous chapter, two of the provisions under which commercial bribery can be prosecuted 
complicate the prosecution of such offenses.1127 Such difficulties can be shown clearly by a 
comparison between the Saudi legal system and the U.S. Federal armory of laws.  
Even if an offense can be successfully prosecuted under the previously highlighted 
provisions, namely Article 211(c) of the Law of Companies and Article 4 of the Competition 
Law, further issues appear to challenge the success of such a prosecution. Violation of the 
provision of the Competition Law may not result in the imprisonment of the offender; rather a 
monetary fine is imposed.1128 With respect to the violation of Article 211(c) of the Companies 
Law, the liability is not extended to the legal person; rather, there is only an individual criminal 
liability.1129 All of these provisions may fall into the trap of ineffective penalties, explained in the 
                                                
1126 Id. 
1127 Law of Companies, supra note 857, art. 211(c). Competition Law, supra note 1070, art. 4. 
1128 Competition Law, supra note 1070, art. 12 (providing that “[w]ithout prejudice to any 
harsher punishment under another law, each violation of the provisions of this Law shall be 
subject to a fine not exceeding five million Riyals [equivalent to $1.3 million], to be multiplied 
in case of repetition. Judgment shall be published at the expense of the violator.”). 
1129 See generally Law of Companies, supra note 857, art. 211(imposing the punishment of 
maximum of five years imprisonment, or a monetary penalty not exceeding five million Riyals 
(equivalent to $1.3 million), or both.).  
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previous chapter, since they only impose a fixed monetary penalty, which may be insignificant 
when compared to the undue advantage gained by the bribery.1130  
The potential solution, then, has to meet two requirements: (1) it needs to have direct 
provisions targeting private commercial bribery, and (2) it needs to establish the liability of legal 
persons, which can be achieved via a number of approaches. The semi-direct approach would be 
through amending the Companies Law to explicitly criminalize commercial bribery, both active 
bribery and passive bribery, and then establishing the criminal liability of legal persons within 
the provisions of the Companies Law, which would eventually kill two birds with one stone and 
serve the dual propose of criminalizing bribery offenses in the private sector and establishing 
criminal liability for legal persons, not only for bribery offenses, but also for other potential 
offenses. The second approach would be to amend the jurisdiction of Article 8 by omitting the 
conditions of carrying out banking operations, performing a public service, or managing, 
running, or maintaining a public facility for a company to be held liable.  
Another approach that deserves mention was adopted by the Bribery Act of 2010, which, 
if adopted by Saudi legislators, would involve more complication and additional amendments to 
the elements of the bribery offenses and the structure of the Anti-Bribery Law. After defining 
offenses of bribing another person in section 1 and offenses relating to being bribed in section 2, 
the Act of 2010 specifies the area “within which bribery can take place.”1131 The Act defines the 
“‘relevant function or activity’ that can be improperly performed for the purposes of sections 1 
and 2 [as]: 
(a) any function of a public nature, 
                                                
1130 The maximum monetary penalty imposed by both laws is five million Riyals (equivalent to 
$1.3 million).  
1131  Joseph et al., supra note 1114, at 25. 
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(b) any activity connected with a business, 
(c) any activity performed in the course of a person’s employment, [or] 
(d) any activity performed by or on behalf of a body of persons (whether corporate or 
unincorporate).”1132  
In addition to the requirement of relevant function or activity, the person performing such 
function or activity must be expected to (A) perform it in good faith,1133 (B) perform it 
impartially,1134 or (C) be “in position of trust by virtue of performing it.”1135    
D.  The Role of Criminal Law in Preventing Corruption  
The importance of criminal law in anti-corruption policy is manifest in three objections 
that are related to each other. At the first level, criminal anti-corruption policies and provisions 
project externally that the issue of corruption is taken seriously, which by itself helps to build the 
external reputation of the country and give evidence of a serious commitment to fight corruption. 
Internally, the message delivered to the public is that such corrupt practices are not accepted. At 
the third stage, then, these policies and criminal provisions are ready to step in to be enforced 
against extreme and obvious corrupt practices cases.  
This is reflected in the practices of a number of countries, among which are the United 
Kingdom and, more recently, China. The United Kingdom ratified the OECD’s Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions in 1998, 
and since then U.K. anti-bribery laws have received a series of criticism by numerous OECD 
Working Groups.1136 “Although the U.K. Government never conceded that its criminal laws fell 
                                                
1132 Id (citing The U.K. Anti-Bribery Act 2010 § 3(2)(a)–(d) (Eng.).  
1133 The U.K. Anti-Bribery Act 2010 § 3(3) (Eng.).  
1134 The U.K. Anti-Bribery Act 2010 § 3(4) (Eng.). 
1135 The U.K. Anti-Bribery Act 2010 § 3(5) (Eng.). 
1136 Joseph et al., supra note 1114, at 4-5. 
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short of its obligations under the Convention, it acknowledged that failure to implement legal 
reform could call into question the United Kingdom’s commitment to it.”1137  
Mainly, the criticism was premised on “the United Kingdom’s ‘continued failure’ to 
address its unsatisfactory anti-bribery and anticorruption laws,”1138 and more specifically on the 
premise of its inadequate criminal provisions to fight corruption. To put it differently, the 
assessment of the commitment of the U.K. Government and its anti-corruption framework and 
policy have revolved primarily around the role of criminal law and provisions in fighting 
corruption.   
China, on the other hand, ratified the UNCAC in 2006 and has followed a similar pattern 
to that of the U.K. Government. China has for a lengthy period of time been subject to many 
criticisms and much skepticism about its efforts to fight corruption. At the outset, the eighth 
amendment of the PRC Criminal Law in 2011 was enacted, which introduced the crime of 
bribery of foreign public officials.1139 In 2015, wider coverage was introduced by the ninth 
amendment of the Anti-Bribery and Anti-Corruption (ABAC) Act.1140  
                                                
1137 Id. at 5 (Note that “[t]he Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act of 2001 included 
provisions criminalizing the bribing or corruption of foreign officials by U.K. nationals or 
companies. [Yet] this reform ignored the actions of foreign nationals domiciled or habitually 
resident in the United Kingdom.”).  
1138 Id. 
1139 China criminalizes foreign bribery, WALL ST J., May. 2, 2011, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2011/03/02/china-criminalizes-foreign-bribery/.  (the 
eighth amendment expands the scope of Article 164 of PRC Criminal Law, which criminalizes 
the commercial bribery, to cover the bribery of foreign public officials.). See Squire P. Boggs, 
China adopts amendment to the Criminal Law to outlaw bribery of foreign officials, LEXOLOGY, 
Mar. 25, 2011, http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=2bd89e0b-c4ea-4a94-abb5-
25a04136cbc2.   
1140 Sammy Fang et al., A Signal of Further Reform: China Amends its Anti-Bribery Laws – Key 
Highlights, DLA PIPER, Dec. 10, 2015, 
https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2015/12/the-global-anticorruption-
perspective/a-signal-of-further-reform/.  
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The ninth amendment includes inter alia (1) criminalizing the bribery of “the immediate 
relatives” of current or former government workers or “individuals who have close 
relationship[s]” with government workers,1141 (2) imposition of monetary penalties on individual 
bribers regardless of the circumstances,1142 (3) raising the threshold of the exemption from the 
penalties,1143 and (4) replacing the criteria of the punishments for embezzlement and accepting 
bribery offenses to general standards instead of fixed and specified monetary figures.1144   
More precisely, China’s anti-corruption campaign was fundamentally based on the 
criminal law approach, which can be grasped clearly in the strategy of targeting and pursuing 
“tigers and flies.”1145 Since the launch of the campaign around five years ago, more than 100,000 
                                                
1141 Id. Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó Xíngfǎ (中华人民共和国刑法) [The Criminal Law of the 
People’s Republic of China] (amended by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 29, 
2015), arts. 390-1 & 393 (China). 
1142 Id (“Before the Amendment, monetary fines were usually imposed on entity 
offenders.  Individual offenders were only fined when they offered a large bribe or bribes, to a 
company employee, a foreign official performing official duties or an official of an international 
public organization.”). Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó Xíngfǎ (中华人民共和国刑法) [The 
Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China] (amended by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Aug. 29, 2015), art. 390-91 (China). 
1143 Id (“Under the Amendment, a bribe giver who self-reports before the commencement of a 
prosecution will only be eligible for an exemption of punishment under specific circumstances, 
such as if the offense is relatively minor, the accused has provided information to authorities 
leading to a ‘successful investigation of a major case,’ or the accused performs major meritorious 
services assisting the authorities.”). Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó Xíngfǎ (中华人民共和国刑
法) [The Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China] (amended by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 29, 2015), art. 390 (China) (note that this article applies to the bribe 
giver rather than to the recipient.).   
1144 Id (“The new standards are referred to as: (1) ‘relatively large’ amount or ‘relatively serious’ 
circumstances; (2) [a ‘huge’] amount or ‘serious’ circumstances; and (3) [an ‘especially huge’] 
amount or ‘extremely serious’ circumstances.”). Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó Xíngfǎ (中华人
民共和国刑法) [The Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China] (amended by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 29, 2015), arts. 267(1) & 286-1 (China).   
1145 Can Xi Jinping's Anti-Corruption Campaign Succeed?, Center for Strategic and International 
Studies (last visited Dec. 31, 2016), http://chinapower.csis.org/can-xi-jinpings-anti-corruption-
campaign-succeed/ (The tigers category includes “officials with the rank of vice minister or vice 
governor and above,” while the flies category includes “mid and lower ranking officials”.). 
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individuals have been prosecuted and indicted for various corruption offenses,1146 among which 
are more than 120 high-ranking officials.1147 Another indication of the heavy reliance of the 
government on criminal law comes from the amendment of the criminal law, which tightened its 
grip on these offenses. The ninth amendment, in addition to the raising the threshold of the 
exemption from the penalties mentioned above, not only imposes severe penalties that may 
include the imposition of death penalty, but also shows no leniency for individuals who commit 
serious corruption offenses.1148   
Even at the international level, the reading of various international conventions suggests a 
heavy reliance on criminal law. In fact, a number of the criticisms of countries’ anti-bribery 
policies and laws revolve around the lack of sufficient criminal provisions and failures to 
criminalize and prosecute corrupt practices and offenses, which can be seen in the case of the 
evaluation of the U.K.’s efforts to combat corruption for instance.1149 Eventually, the pressure of 
                                                
1146 Robber Barons, Beware: A Crackdown on Corruption Has Spread Anxiety Among China’s 
Business Elite, ECONOMIST, Oct. 24, 2015, http://www.economist.com/news/china/21676814-
crackdown-corruption-has-spread-anxiety-among-chinas-business-elite-robber-barons-beware  
(“Of more than 100,000 people indicted for graft since Mr Xi became leader in 2012, most are 
politicians and officials—not private businessmen.”). 
1147 See generally Visualizing China’s Anti-Corruption Campaign, CHINA FILE, Jan. 21, 2016, 
https://www.chinafile.com/infographics/visualizing-chinas-anti-corruption-campaign. See also 
Can Xi Jinping's anti-corruption campaign succeed, supra note 1145 (according to Minxin Pei, 
Professor of Government & Director of the Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies, 
Claremont McKenna College, “In terms of tigers … as of today, the number is about 150 [that 
have been arrested, which is] double the number of officials arrested in any given year before the 
anti-corruption campaign.”). 
1148 See Fang et al., supra note 1140 (“According to the Amendment, for an individual who is 
convicted of embezzlement or accepting bribes, is sentenced to the death penalty, and is then 
granted a reprieve, if the sentence is reduced to life imprisonment, the individual cannot then be 
paroled or afforded a further reduction of his/her term of imprisonment.”); see also Zhōnghuá 
Rénmín Gònghéguó Xíngfǎ (中华人民共和国刑法) [The Criminal Law of the People’s 
Republic of China] (amended by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 29, 2015), 
arts. 383 & 386 (China).   
1149 See, e.g., OECD, UNITED KINGDOM: PHASE 2BIS REPORT ON THE APPLICATION OF THE 
CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL 
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the international community seems to abate when amendments to criminal law provisions takes 
place.   
At the domestic level, the advantage of the criminal law stems from the direct and 
explicit intention of the prohibition. That is, the criminal law is ought to communicate an explicit 
message of intolerance of a corrupt behavior, which can be carried out because “[t]he criminal 
law defines, or should define, the outer boundaries of the tolerable, and enforces those 
boundaries by declaring those who transgress them as outlaws.”1150 Criminal process and law 
“serve unique functions in educating the public about basic standards of behavior, stigmatizing 
violators, and reinforcing the security, sense of justice, and automatic compliance of the law-
abiding nearly as powerfully as criminal punishment.”1151 For a better or worse, countries tend to 
enact and enforce provisions of criminal law to deliver the message that “nobody dares to be 
corrupt,” which is the notion that China, for example, seems to have adopted.1152  
This by no means should be understood as underestimating the role of other laws, 
including civil laws and administrative regulation, in fighting corruption. Instead, the 
significance of criminal law stems from the existence and readiness of adequate provisions to be 
applied in cases of serious and obvious corrupt practices. Thus, anti-corruption policy may fail in 
its mission if the goal is completely weed out corruption, since this would eventually “impose 
rigid and cumbersome constraints that increase, rather than decrease, corrupt incentives.”1153  
                                                                                                                                                       
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND THE 1997 RECOMMENDATION ON COMBATING BRIBERY IN 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS (2008). 
1150 Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing Corporate Misconduct, 60 L. & 
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 23, 63 (1997). 
1151 Id. at 52. 
1152 See, e.g., Xi Calls for a China in 2016 Where “Nobody Dares to Be Corrupt,” Bloomberg, 
Jan. 12, 2016, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-13/xi-calls-for-a-china-in-
2016-where-nobody-dares-to-be-corrupt-. 
1153 ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 21, at 68. 
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Due to the sensitivity of the role of criminal law interventions, certain points need to be 
highlighted. As mentioned in the previous chapter, to succeed, anti-corruption policy must adopt 
the “right mix of penalties, rewards, and undercover law enforcement.”1154 Further, the “right 
mix” should also mean the adoption of anti-corruption policies and mechanisms in which 
criminal law is not the sole device; instead, other provisions from various laws should be 
integrated into the criminal law.1155 This leads to a warning against the imposition of criminal 
punishment “for technical regulatory violations, or in the absence of moral blameworthiness; 
[criminal punishment] should not be a device for collecting revenue in the form of corporate 
fines, expediting compensation of victims, or adjusting the marginal costs of corporate activities 
that regulators would like to discourage.”1156  
In the context of the indigenous forms of informal influence which include inter alia 
guanxi and wasta, the intervention of criminal law remains at the minimum level. The difficulty 
in drawing a line between the legitimate and illegitimate forms of these practices raises a 
challenge for the intervention of criminal law. Around the fine line between legality and 
illegality, individuals are moving and dancing and frequently they exceed it, yet the speed of 
their movements coupled with the vagueness of the line confuse the perception of those practices 
by the individuals themselves and the law. China, for instance, approaches the practice of guanxi 
from two different perspectives: the first is that of traditional criminal law provisions covering 
corrupt practices.1157 The other approach is the “soft law,” which is derived from ethical rules for 
                                                
1154 Id.  
1155 See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and the Criminal Law, 2 F. CRIME & SOC’Y. 3, 
3-21 (2002). 
1156 Lynch, supra note 1150, at 64. 
1157 See Harding, supra note 1086, at 134-35 (“Chinese Criminal Law categorizes 
graft/embezzlement (tanwu), bribery (shouhui), and misappropriation (nuoyong) as economic 
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official behaviors published and enforced by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).1158 The 
former may not necessarily authorize criminal punishments; rather, it can be more disciplinary in 
nature.1159     
In the Saudi context, bribery and other corrupt practices may not challenge the role of 
criminal law as much as the practice of wasta, which sends a signal of caution when approaching 
such a practice. Approaching wasta can be problematic due to the fact that the practice is not 
fully blameworthy, at least from the perspective of social norms. Though the Anti-Bribery Law 
targets wasta, at least partly, the problem with the wasta provision is not only its short reach, but 
also its failure to prevent the practice in the first place. That is, the Law stipulates the 
punishment, and defines the violation of the Law, in regard to the response and the action of a 
public official. That however cannot be understand as a call for punishing the mere act of 
offering or using wasta. Instead, such an act should be targeted indirectly and differently.  
                                                                                                                                                       
crimes that are included within Legal Corruption. China also has a crime of illicit enrichment, 
which punishes government officials for possessing assets clearly in excess of their earnings.”).   
1158 See Hualing Fu, The upward and downward spirals in China’s anti-corruption enforcement, 
in COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CHINA 390, 395-96 (Michael 
McConville & Eva Pils eds. 2013) (“A random survey of the CCP disciplinary rules reveals that 
there are, at the ground level, rules prohibiting lavish living, womanizing, visiting prostitutes, 
practicing superstition, being religious, privilege-seeking, or violating the one-child policy; at the 
next level, there are rules against housing irregularities, unauthorized business operation, 
profiteering, or nepotism aiming at self-enrichment; and at the next higher level, there are rules 
against smuggling, irregular banking loans, misappropriation of public funds, and other types of 
financial fraud; and finally there are rules which replicate the existing criminal laws.”). 
1159 Id. at 396 (“The greatest utility of the CCP rules is to cover the field so as to exclude the 
intrusion of external rules, including the criminal law. While criminal offence and disciplinary 
offence are conceptually distinct, there is a large overlapping jurisdiction in which the CCP 
norms prevail and can marginalize legal norms. Once the CCP defines an act or omission as 
misconduct without expressly authorizing criminal punishment, then criminal law is regarded as 
being ousted. For example, CCP rules govern and punish CCP members who use official funding 
for overseas travel for leisure, and as a result the abuse in that particular matter can only be a 
disciplinary matter and is not capable of becoming a criminal offence; no matter how abusive a 
case may be the maximum penalty for this misconduct is dismissal from the CCP membership.”).  
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Thus, to succeed, a criminal provision should establish the use of wasta with different 
elements. As an indirect and fair approach, the practice and the use of wasta can be illegalized in 
the context of the direct or indirect intervention of an unauthorized individual in the legal process 
and decision making process, knowing that such an intervention may affect the neutrality of the 
legal process and the decision-making process. However, the existence of such a provision is 
contingent on a well-established legal and institutional structure.  
Another potential approach is to fight wasta through administrative disciplinary rules and 
actions, which may include, in addition to the civil penalties, removal from the office, reduction 
in grade, debarment from office for a certain period of time, suspension, or dismissal from 
office.1160 Since individuals are more inclined to protect their power, administrative penalties that 
threaten their power may constitute an effective approach to fighting wasta.1161  
CONCLUSION  
In this chapter, a number of suggestions have been offered, taking into consideration the 
specific social and legal factors relevant to Saudi Arabia. Among the proposed solutions is the 
improvement and development of the existing e-government program in order to not only 
simplify the procedures, but also to detect corrupt practices. In addition, this chapter has 
suggested the use of nudges as a tool to fight wasta in particular and other corrupt practices in 
general.  
Furthermore, out of the various weaknesses of the Saudi legal framework when it comes 
to fighting corruption, this chapter opted to discuss the problem of the limited jurisdiction of the 
Anti-Bribery Law. The selection of this particular issue was based on the realization that the 
                                                
1160 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 1215(a)(3).  
1161 See Guinote & Cai, supra note 581, at 12 (“Power gives advantages to individuals by 
increasing the availability of resources, and is a buffer against social competition and aggression. 
Therefore, individuals in power positions often have a desire to maintain power.”).   
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reform of other weaknesses will be partly or completely built on the reform of the jurisdiction 
issues. Moreover, this problem—that of limited jurisdiction—is one of those that receive an 
emphasis when anti-corruption regulations are evaluated, especially when taking into 
consideration the movement of a number of countries toward criminalizing private-to-private 
bribery and the bribery of foreign public officials. Finally, due to the significant role of criminal 
law, this chapter has concluded by shedding light on the role of criminal law in fighting 
corruption.   
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CONCLUSION 
Corruption is a concern around the globe, as it impacts the growth and the well-being of 
individuals and of nations. The study of corruption is complex, since every single aspect of it, 
whether cultural, economic, political, or legal, plays a role in its development and flourishing. It 
is not surprising, therefore, that diagnosing the root causes of corruption is a necessary 
antecedent to successfully combating it. An accurate diagnosis of its root causes will sketch the 
roadmap for fighting corruption and establish the priority of each step to be taken.  
Influenced by recent studies and surveys highlighting the issues related to wasta and the 
demand for legal reforms, this dissertation has shed light on corruption in Saudi Arabia by 
exploring the social and legal factors behind corruption in the Saudi context. As Saudi Arabia is 
a country that has established its legal system on the foundation of Shari'a, it was necessary to 
examine the Islamic position on corruption. That examination showed that Islamic rules and 
principles clearly mandate against traditional corrupt practices, among which are wasta and 
bribery. There is no doubt about Shari'a’s prohibition of bribery, nor about its prohibition of the 
contemporaneously practiced form of wasta, even if individuals in certain cases confused it with 
the concept of permissible shafa’ah, or intercession, to justify the practice.  
Wasta is a social factor in corruption, since it is rooted in and influenced by the society 
itself, which creates difficulties in fighting it. The negative role of wasta has been 
underestimated when compared to that of bribery, yet such assessments do not take into 
consideration how widespread and divisive the practice of wasta is, and thus fail to grasp the 
total number of people affected and the holistic consequences of it.  
Since it is rooted in and influenced by Saudi society, wasta also constitutes a challenge to 
the Saudi legal system. In essence, the limitations of each of the Saudi legal provisions that can 
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be applied to those practicing wasta create a grey area where it can be practiced legally. The lack 
of other provisions discouraging acts of favoritism and discrimination, which are the core of 
wasta, aggravates the challenge involved in fighting the practice. Saudi legal and institutional 
structures bear responsibility for the prevalence of wasta. The complexity of procedures and the 
weaknesses of the legal structures influence individuals’ decisions to rely on wasta to overcome 
these challenges and find solutions to their problems.  
This dissertation has sought to highlight a number of legal factors considered to be 
crucial in fighting corruption by examining the provisions of the Anti-Bribery Law specifically 
and related aspects within the Saudi legal system generally. Since the Saudi legal system lacks a 
comprehensive penal code, it was necessary to widen the scope of the study to cover the impact 
of other legal provisions beyond the Anti-Bribery Law.  
Therefore, the dissertation evaluated six aspects which needed to be taken into account. 
This evaluation shed light on the advantages and disadvantages of each aspect. In addition to 
legal provisions directly related to wasta, the evaluation included the liability of legal persons; 
immunity; penalties and rewards; the protection of whistleblowers and witnesses; and the 
jurisdiction of the Anti-Bribery Law. No reforms were proposed, except with respect to the 
jurisdiction of the Anti-Bribery Law; instead, the disadvantages associated with each aspect were 
pointed out.  
Basied on this analysis, it was argued that certain solutions can be suggested to decrease 
corrupt practices in general and wasta in particular. Since it is a socially influenced practice, 
wasta can be reduced by the implementation of nudges aimed at increasing the condemnation of 
wasta practices, which will eventually increase the cognitive dissonance of those involved in 
them, and that will, in turn, weaken the self-justification process related to them. This will 
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facilitate the passing of legal measures to outlaw wasta, on the one hand, and increase the social 
rejection of wasta and of other corrupt practices on the other.  
This research further suggests that the improvement and simplification of government 
processes would discourage corrupt practices. Among the potential solutions, the improvement 
of e-government can be recommended in order to enhance the efficiency of procedures. 
Although a number of Saudi governmental agencies and organizations have taken steps in 
implementing e-government, certain aspects need to be further developed to serve the purpose of 
fighting corrupt practices.  
As regards the Anti-Bribery Law, the reform of its jurisdiction is necessary in order to 
expand to the application of its provisions. Its limited jurisdiction, aimed at protecting the 
integrity of public office, is insufficient, especially when the role of the private sector is taken 
into consideration, to say nothing of its inconsistent position on corrupt practices in the public 
sector vs. corrupt practices in the private sector.  
Finally, this study has argued that the role of criminal law is fundamental in building a 
strong mindset against corruption by sending a message internally and externally that corrupt 
practices will not be tolerated. The existence of such criminal provisions will also reflect the 
readiness to apply them to corrupt practices that pose serious harm to the health and wellbeing of 
the society in which they occur.   
Chapter five places the practice of wasta under the microscope. The first section 
describes the practice of wasta and compares it with similar practices from other cultures that 
involve informal influence. The chapter then tracks the evolution and development of wasta in 
Saudi Arabia in light of the overview of historical and cultural background provided in chapter 
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four. The last section investigates how the public perceives wasta and the legal position of the 
practice.  
The Anti-Bribery Law is the focus of chapter six. Before analyzing the Anti-Bribery 
Law, the first section reviews the Saudi anti-corruption legal system. The second section 
explores the definition of bribery as an offense under the Law, the elements of the offense, the 
scope of the Law’s application, and the punishments, defenses, and rewards for reporting the 
offense under the Law. The third section further examines the corrupt practices included in the 
Law and their elements.  
Based on chapter six, chapter seven examines the strength and weaknesses of the Anti-
Bribery Law in regard to four aspects: the liability of legal persons; the wasta provision, 
immunity; penalties and rewards; the protection of whistleblower and witnesses; and the 
jurisdiction of the Anti-Bribery Law.  
 The last chapter suggests potential legal, structural, and behavioral solutions to fight 
corrupt practices generally and the practice of wasta specifically. The first section proposes 
improving institutional structures by the implementation and development of e-government. The 
second section suggests using the approach of nudges in order to discourage corrupt practices 
generally and wasta specifically. The third section then considers the possibility of expanding the 
jurisdiction of the Anti-Bribery Law. Finally, the dissertation concludes by addressing the role of 
criminal law in fighting corruption.   
 
